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Disturbances in unawareness can offer an important avenue to investigate the 
neurocognitive processes involved in the construction of the bodily self. The general aim 
of the present thesis was to advance the current state of knowledge on a prototypical 
disorder of self-awareness, anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP): unawareness of motor 
deficits contralateral to a brain lesion.  Based on insights gained from both clinical and 
experimental research on anosognosia, it is argued that purely sensorimotor accounts do 
not explain several features of the syndrome, such as the delusional and emotional 
aspects. Therefore a revision of prevailing, modular theories of anosognosia is proposed 
that take into account the involvement of affective and social processes. Accordingly, the 
thesis aimed to: (1) investigate the emotional and social factors that underlie motor 
unawareness; (2) identify the neurocognitive factors and neuroanatomical correlate that 
underlie such factors; and (3) develop potential, bedside rehabilitation interventions for 
AHP that are informed by the above investigations.  
 
These aims were achieved using an integrative methodological approach, which 
combined neuropsychological testing, psychophysiological experiments and 
neuroimaging methods. A series of experimental group investigations and clinical case 
studies were conducted in 53 adult patients with right-hemisphere strokes. The main 
results of these studies showed that: (i) motor awareness is modulated by negative, but 
not positive emotion in a social context; (ii) anosognosia is associated with specific 
deficits in 3rd person perspective taking in visual-spatial and mentalising tasks; (iii) 
anosognosia is modulated by ‘other’ referent and 3rd person verbal and visual perspective 
taking. These experimental findings on the role of emotion and social processes in AHP 
were in turn used to develop a rehabilitation intervention applied in two case studies that 
showed promising results. Additionally, converging neuroimaging evidence provided 
support for the unique involvement of the inferior frontal gyrus, insula ribbon, 
supramarginal and superior temporal gyrus, and dorsal frontal white matter in 
anosognosia, which have well-established links to motor monitoring, subjecting feelings 
and self awareness, and the proposed ‘mentalising network’. These finding are in support 
of a proposed new account of AHP, which moves away from traditional modular theories 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
1.1 Introduction  
Conceptualising conscious awareness as a subjective, first-person, phenomenon has often 
resulted in the marginalisation of its scientific enquiry (Damasio, 1998; Prigatano, 
2010).  Nevertheless, disturbances of self-awareness have fascinated relevant clinical 
fields such as neurology and psychiatry since the time of Charcot, Freud and Babinski. 
Nowadays, it is recognised that neuropsychiatric disturbances of awareness offer an 
important avenue to investigate the neurocognitive processes involved in the construction 
of the self (Fotopoulou, 2012). Particularly in regards to the bodily self, the classical work 
of William James (1890) describes the immediacy of experiences of one’s own body, 
while differentiating between different senses of the self. Within this framework, self-
awareness involves both a sense of ownership- the feeling that my body belongs to me; 
and sense of agency- the feeling that I am the initiator of an action (Gallagher, 2000). 
Consequently disorders of self-awareness can involve disturbances of body ownership or 
agency, or both. Disorders of Body ownership include: asomatognosia, the inability to 
recognise one’s own body (Cutting, 1978) and somatoparaphrenia, a set of body 
ownership delusions where patients attribute ownership of their arm to another person, 
often a close relative (Gerstmann, 1942).  
 
This thesis will focus on a specific disturbance of body agency called anosognosia for 
hemiplegia (AHP), the apparent unawareness of or, inability to understand paralysis and 
other sensorimotor deficits following stroke (Cocchini, Beschin, Cameron, Fotopoulou, & 
Della Sala, 2009). More specifically, this thesis aims to investigate how neurological 
patients represent and emotionally perceive themselves and their bodies following brain 
injury (i.e. stroke). AHP is a prototypical form of unawareness, and can provide useful 
clinical and empirical insights, as well as the neural basis, of bodily self-awareness. 
Previous research has focused mostly on cognitive and motor models (Frith, 2000; 
Garbarini et al., 2012; Vallar & Ronchi, 2006). Although still theoretically important, 
pure motor accounts of AHP have neglected the delusional and emotional aspects of the 
phenomenon (Turnbull & Solms, 2005). Previously, limited experimental research (e.g. 
Fotopoulou, Pernigo, Maeda, Rudd, & Kopelman, 2010; Turnbull, Evans, & Owen, 2005) 
and clinical case studies (e.g. Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000) have focused on the 




thesis is to examine the cognitive, emotional and social processes underlying anosognosia 
for motor deficits.  
 
Accordingly, the present thesis aimed to contribute to experimental and neuroimaging 
research into the emotional and social factors that modulate AHP. To address these main 
aims, the thesis used a combination of methods from clinical neuropsychology and 
behavioural neurology, experimental psychology and social cognitive neuroscience, to 
combine methodological and theoretical approaches in a novel interdisciplinary way.  
This introductory chapter briefly describes the conceptualisation of anosognosia, provides 
an overview of the clinical presentation and incidences, as well as the diagnosis and 
assessment of AHP. It will cover neuroanatomical and neuropsychological findings and 
possible causes, as well as outline the main theoretical frameworks and models describing 
the phenomena. It will then move to discuss the potential for rehabilitation interventions 
for AHP. The chapter will conclude with a summary of the specific objectives and 
research questions of this thesis, and provide an outline of the following chapters.  
 
1.2 Conceptualising anosognosia  
The first documented descriptions of anosognosia were made by Von Monakow (1885), 
Anton (1898) and Pick (1898; also see Bisiach & Gemainiani, 1991 and Prigatano, 2010). 
Babinski (1914) initially coined the term anosognosia (a: without; noso: disease; gnosia: 
knowledge) a century ago to describe unawareness of paralysis following stroke. The 
term however, is now used more broadly to include unawareness in many 
neuropathology’s, including traumatic brain injury (Prigatano, 1988), Alzheimer’s disease 
(Reed, Jagust, & Coulter, 1993) and schizophrenia (Mohamed, Fleming, Penn & 
Spaulding, 1999). There is currently a lack of consensus in the literature on the actual 
definition of anosogonisa (see Table 1.1). However for the purpose of this thesis 
anosognosia for hemiplegia will be operationally defined as:  the apparent unawareness or 
inability to understand paralysis and other sensorimotor deficits following stroke 


















The apparent lack of awareness of hemiplegia following 
an acute brain lesion 
 
Cutting (1978) Denial of limb weakness, including other “anosognosia 
phenomena” (i.e. abnormal attitudes towards limb 
weakness) 
 
Prigatano & Schacter (1991) 
Prigantano (2010) 
Unawareness for motor, visual or cognitive impairments 
in patients with neurological diseases 
 
Orfei et al., (2007) A disorder in which a patient, affected by a brain 
dysfunction, does not recognise the presence or appreciate 
the severity of deficits in sensory, perceptual, motor, 
affective or cognitive functioning 
 
Cocchini et al. (2009) Apparent unawareness/inability to understand paralysis 
and other sensorimotor deficits following stroke 
 
 
1.3 Clinical presentation  
The following clinical vignettes provide narrative examples of the variations in the 
clinical presentation of the phenomenon. The case examples are of right-handed, female 
patients who both suffered a stroke in the region of the right middle cerebral artery. The 
interviews were conducted by the investigator (SB) three days post onset.  
 
1.3.1 Case example 1 
SB: Why are you in the hospital? 
Patient: They say I had a stroke, but I don’t remember anything about it. 
SB: The doctors tell me you had a stroke, do you agree with them? 
Patient: I don’t know anything about strokes. 




Patient: I haven’t noticed anything really. 
SB: Do you have any weakness anywhere? 
Patient: Not really, I’m sure I can make a fist if I wanted to.  
SB: Is your left arm causing you any trouble? 
Patient: Not at all, no. 
SB: [The examiner lifts the patient’s left arm and moves it to the right hemispace] There 
seems to be some weakness in you left arm, do you agree? 
Patient: No it’s fine. 
SB: Can you try and move your left arm for me? 
Patient: Yes, I move it. 
SB: But I didn’t see your left arm move. 
Patient: That’s because you weren’t paying attention, I just moved it now! 
 
1.3.2 Case example 2 
SB: What symptoms have you noticed since the stroke? How does your body feel? 
Patient: It feels alright. 
SB: Do you have any weakness anywhere in your body? 
Patient: No, no weakness. 
SB: Is your left arm causing you any trouble? 
Patient: No, of course not. 
SB: Can you raise your left leg? 
Patient: Yeah, sure I can. 
SB: Can you please try and raise your left arm for me? 
Patient: [Silence. The patient does not move.] 
SB: Can you try and do it for me now? 
Patient: [Patient uses right arm to move left arm] 
SB: Did you do it? 
Patient: Yes, you saw it move. 
SB: Yes, but did it move on it’s own? 
Patient: Well, with the help of this [right] one [arm]. 
SB: Can you do it without the help of your right hand? 
Patient: Yeah. 
SB: Do you think you can clap your hands? 
Patient: Yes, sure. 




Patient: [Uses right hand to lift left hand, then slaps the top of the left had to ‘clap’] 
SB: Did you manage to clap your hands? 
Patient: Yes, I did it. [The patient then winks at SB] 
 
As the clinical examples demonstrate, AHP presents in different forms and it is important 
to try to differentiate between the potential varieties of AHP in both classifying patients 
and when investigating the underlying mechanisms involved (for discussion see Vocat, 
Staub, Stroppini, & Vuilleumier, 2010). In the literature, characteristics like the degree 
(i.e. severity of unawareness symptoms), extension (i.e. the extent of unawareness of 
motor weakness, such as admitting to hemiplegia but underestimating the functional 
significance), partiality (i.e. if patients have partial knowledge or awareness of their 
motor weakness) and specificity (i.e. how specific is their unawareness; are patients only 
unaware of their paralysis or does unawareness generalise to other disabilities or 
illnesses) of unawareness, as well as the affectivity towards the paralysed body part and 
its sense of ownership have been noted to vary  (see Table 1.2 for summary; Jenkinson, 
Haggard, Ferreira, & Fotopoulou, 2013; Marcel, Tegnér, & Nimmo-Smith, 2004; 
Prigatano & Schacter, 1991). Specifically in terms of the degree of AHP, unawareness 
can vary in severity ranging from a mere indifference to one’s disabilities or illness, 
usually referred to as anosodiaphoria (Babinski, 1914), to blatant denial of limb paralysis 
and delusional beliefs of ability.  Patients may also report illusionary movements- 
claiming their limb has moved despite demonstration of the opposite. Illusory limb 
movements are also commonly associated with reported false memories (e.g. “I just 
walked to the bathroom myself, I’m just too tired to show you now”).  
 
In terms of extension, some patients deny their motor deficits in every aspect tested, while 
others may verbally accept their deficit, but fail to acknowledge their functional 
consequences (e.g. they try to stand and walk), or vice versa. Differences in partiality are 
suggested by studies (Cocchini, Beschin, Fotopoulou, & Della Sala, 2010; Fotopoulou et 
al., 2010; Moro, Pernigo, Zapparoli, Cordioli, & Aglioti, 2011) that show that some but 
not all patients present with either explicit, or, implicit awareness of their deficits 
(‘implicit’ awareness is defined as ‘knowledge that is expressed in task performances 
unintentionally and with little or no phenomenal awareness’; Schacter, 1990, p. 157). 
There has been recent evidence suggesting that some patients with AHP show greater 




tasks, both when visually presented in videos (Fotopoulou, Rudd, Holmes, & Kopelman, 
2009) and verbally (Marcel et al., 2004).  
 
Moreover, the specificity of unawareness can vary, in that some patients only deny their 
hemiplegia, while accepting other stroke-induced deficits, while other patients deny all 
stroke-related deficits. Some patients may also show a morbid dislike or hatred for their 
paralysed limb (i.e. misoplegia; Critchley, 1955, 1974) as opposed to the opposite 
emotional response, anosodiaphoria (Babinski, 1914). Finally, only a subset of AHP 
patients may also present with disruptions in their own sense of body ownership, 
asomatognosia (the inability to recognise one’s own body), or somatoparaphrenia (bodily 
ownership delusions; Gerstmann, 1942). This clinical variability suggests that AHP is a 
multifaceted and heterogeneous phenomenon, but this position remains debated in the 
literature.  
 






Degree & Affectivity 
 
Range of severity: emotional indifference 
(anosodiaphoria) to denial & delusional beliefs; hate of 
parlyised limb (misoplegia)  
 
Extension Verbally acknowledge deficits but not functional 
consequences (e.g. try to walk) & visa versa 
 
Partiality  Partial knowledge or awareness of motor deficits, e.g. 
explicit versus implicit awareness 
 
Specificity Generalised unawareness of illness (or stroke related 
symptoms), or deny only hemiplegia 
 
Ownership Body ownership delusions (somatoparaphrenia); 






1.4 Assessment  
A number of assessment measures have been designed to assess AHP. The disparity 
between the tests however has resulted in vague diagnostic criteria and prevented a single 
‘gold standard’ assessment from being developed (Jenkinson, Preston, & Ellis, 2011; 
Orfei et al., 2007, for review). Cutting (1978) was one of the first to introduce a formal 
assessment measure of anosognosia and related phenomena. His detailed questionnaire 
proved to be a useful supplement to clinical observations. Clinical assessments further 
improved by introducing the use of a frequently used 4-point scale, used by the clinician 
to quantify the severity of the patient’s unawareness and ultimately classified as mild, 
moderate or severe (Bisiach, Vallar, Perani, Papagno, & Berti, 1986). The scale serves to 
differentiate between patients who are unaware of their paralysis, but recognise their 
deficit when asked and are unable to perform a specific movement, from patients who 
hold an active delusional component of anosognosia, producing false beliefs of having 
moved their hemiplegic limb.  
 
A more sensitive measure was later developed to assess the relationship between verbal 
anosognosia and related confabulations (Feinberg, Roane & Ali, 2000). This ‘Feinberg et 
al. interview’, consisting of 10 questions, not only determines the severity of 
unawareness, but identifies the presence of illusionary movements. A shortcoming of 
both the Bisiach scale and the Feinberg et al. interview is their reliance on explicit and 
verbal means of assessment.  The Berti, Ladavas and Corte (1996) interview provides a 
measure of both implicit and explicit awareness, and differentiates between unawareness 
for lower and upper limb paralysis, using both verbal and behavioural responses. The 
interview also estimates awareness of current motor ability in activities of daily living 
(e.g. clapping hands and walking). Many other assessment methods have more recently 
been developed  (see Cocchini et al., 2010; Della Sala et al., 2009; Marcel et al., 2004; 
Starkstein at al., 2006) to assess and classify anosognosia more reliably. These methods 
assess the clinical variability of AHP in greater detail and hold the potential for better 
diagnostic accuracy and homogeneity in the field. Yet despite this progress, it is clear that 
further psychometric testing and validation is needed to help define the diagnostic and 
assessment criteria for AHP (Jenkinson et al., 2011; Orfei et al., 2007). An important aim 
of clinical research in AHP is not just to identify the presence or absence of unawareness 
of motor paralysis (see next section), but also to understand the multidimensional nature 
of the phenomenon (Vocat et al., 2010). In order to help refine already existing 




clinical variability of AHP is needed, as well as a disciplinary move away from binary 
distinctions and towards multifactorial criteria.  
 
1.5 Incidence and duration  
AHP occurs more frequently following right perisylvian lesions, and less often in left 
perisylvian lesions (Cocchini et al., 2009; Heilman, Barrett, & Adair, 1998; Nathanson, 
Bergman & Gorden, 1952). A wide range of frequencies have been reported on the 
prevalence of anosognosia for hemiplegia. These variations can mostly be attributed to 
difference in diagnostic criteria, time and type of assessment (also see above) and 
variations in patient recruitment and selection (Orfei, Caltagirone, & Spalletta, 2009). 
Initial studies reported a frequency of 33 to 58% of AHP in stroke patients (Cutting, 
1978; Bisiach at al., 1986), more recently however a meta-analysis of studies reported a 
frequency ranging from 20 to 44% depending on the time of assessment (Pia, Neppi-
Modona, Ricci, & Berti, 2004). Orfei’s et al. (2007) review further identified a prevalence 
of 7 to 77%. However, Baier and Karnath (2005) used a more sensitive measure of AHP, 
only classifying patients as anosognosic after scoring a minimum of 2 on the Bisiach 
scale (i.e., the disorder is acknowledged only after demonstration of paralysis, Bisiach et 
al., 1986). Consequently, a much lower rate of AHP was reported: 10-18% in acute and 
subacute patients. In the first longitudinal study on AHP, the evolution of unawareness 
overtime was documented in 58 right-hemisphere patients assessed at three different time 
intervals: 3 days (hyperacute), 1 week (subacute) and 6 months (chronic). They reported a 
frequency of 38% in the hyperacute stage, dropping to 18% after 1 week and only 5% 
remaining aware in the chronic stage.  
 
Cocchini and Della Sala (2010) however, suggest that both low incidence of anosognosia 
in the chronic phase and following left-hemisphere damage may be a result of poor 
diagnostic tools used. Patients for example, may have actually “learned” the “correct” 
response after repeated awareness questions, rather than having a genuine remission of 
their unawareness. The “true” incidence of anosognosia in left-hemisphere brain damaged 
patients may also be obstructed by dependency on language abilities in awareness 
assessments. This has resulted in a recently developed tool, the Visual-Analogue Test for 
Anosognosia for motor impairment (VATA-m), which is designed to assess anosognosia 
with aphasic patients (Della Sala et al., 2009). Using this tool, this group has indeed noted 





1.6 Etiology of anosognosia 
The precise neurological and psychological causes of AHP have been difficult to 
establish. It has however been mostly accepted (Marcel et al., 2004; Orfei et al., 2007; 
Vocat et al., 2010) that a combination of a number of factors, rather than a single deficit, 
is likely to account for the range of clinical presentations and variability in anosognosia 
(Vuilleumier, 2004; Vocat et al., 2010). Yet the precise neurological and psychological 
causes and their critical combination remain unclear. Below a review of the major 
neuroanatomical and neuropsychological explanations of AHP to date is presented.  
 
1.6.1 Neuroanatomical accounts 
Recent improvements in structural neuroimaging methods, software and analysis, have 
resulted in several new studies that attempt to identify the precise brain regions that are 
associated with AHP. However this has resulted in the identification of multiple lesions 
sites, and sometimes opposing findings. This can be accounted for by the often 
fluctuating and wide variability found in unaware patients, but also by the scan quality 
(e.g. use of computed tomography, CT, versus magnetic resonance imaging, MRI), lesion 
mapping methods and analysis, and the diagnostic criteria and tests used (Jenkinson et al., 
2011). 
 
Taking into account reported findings from both CT and MRI scans, Pia et al. (2004) 
conducted a meta-analysis using 85 AHP cases. The lesion sites identified included the 
frontal, parietal, temporal, and occipital cortical regions, and at a subcortical level the 
thalamus, basal ganglia, internal capsule, corona radiate, insula, lateral ventriculus, and 
amygdalae. Their results further suggested that at a cortical level frontoparietal damage 
was the most frequent lesion site, and basal ganglia and thalamus lesions being most 
likely to account for unawareness following damage to a single subcortical area. A 
combination of both cortical and subcortical structures was therefore found to play a 
significant role in causing unawareness. 
 
Damage to areas related to motor planning and the role of the insula in AHP has recently 
become a center of much interest and debate in the literature. In a lesion analysis study 
Karnath, Baier, & Nägele (2005) analysed both CT and MRI scans of 27 patients: 14 with 
both hemiplegia and AHP patients, and 13 with only hemiplegia (HP control group). Both 
control and experimental groups were matched for age, lesion size and acuity, degree of 




mapped using MRIcon software on slices of a T1-weighted template MRI scan. The right 
posterior insula was identified as the only structure with greater damage in AHP patients. 
This runs in parallel to Craig (2009; 2002) model of self-awareness, in which he identifies 
the anterior insular cortex as the centre for all subjective feelings and self-awareness. In 
contrast, a lesion mapping study using both CT and MRI scans conducted by Berti et al. 
(2005) compared three patient groups: 17 patients with AHP, unilateral neglect and left 
hemiplegia (experimental group); 12 patients with unilateral neglect and left hemiplegia, 
and no AHP (control group); and 1 patient with left hemiplegia and AHP, and no 
unilateral neglect (case-study of ‘pure anosognosia’). They studied the anatomical 
distribution of lesions by superimposing the lesion plots of the two groups and conducting 
an anatomical chi-square distribution of the comparison. Their analysis concluded that 
anosognosia is characterised by damage to the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and middle 
frontal gyrus (MFG; dorsal premotor areas, Brodmann’s areas 6 and 44 specifically), the 
postcentral gyrus (somatosensory cortex), the precentral gyrus (primary motor cortex; 
Brodmann’s area 4), the insula ribbon, Brodmann’s area 46 (frontal agranular cortex) and 
sometimes in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. When compared to the case-study of 
‘pure anosognosia’, the same areas were identified with the exception of the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, and the addition of the insula. Areas related to motor monitoring were 
therefore identified as the most important indicators of anosognosia. The results of Vocat  
& Vuilleumier’s (2010) longitudinal study describe in detail above, also used CT and 
MRI scans to conduct an anatomical lesion analysis using a voxel based statistical 
mapping method  (voxel-based lesion symptom mapping, VLSM). In the hyperactute 
phase (3 days post stroke) insula damage and adjacent subcortical features were 
identified, similar to those reported by Karnath et al. (2005). While the persistence of 
AHP into the sub-acute and chronic stage was associated with lesions to the IFG and 
MFG (premotor areas), cingulate gyrus, parietotemporal junction and medial temporal 
structures, which are inline with Berti et al. (2005) findings supporting the crucial role of 
the premotor cortex.  
 
Fotopoulou et al. (2010) also conducted a lesion analysis using patient’s CT and MRI 
scans, but uniquely correlated experimental data with lesion data. They used experimental 
results to identify and group patients into those with “implicit” awareness and “explicit” 
awareness, and compared them to a group of hemiplegic controls patients with 
hemispatial neglect, but no AHP. They aimed to identify the brain areas involved with 




correlates related to implicit and explicit awareness. Cortical areas, mostly the frontal, 
parietal and occipital lobes, were more frequently damaged in patients that had both 
implicit and explicit awareness. Interestingly, the insular cortex was more frequently 
damaged in patients with intact implicit awareness, but without explicit awareness. These 
results demonstrate the apparent neural dissociation between implicit and explicit 
awareness, therefore suggesting that clinical variability found in AHP may be associated 
with different lesion sites.  
 
In support of these findings, Moro et al. (2011) similarly conducted a lesion mapping 
study in order to identify different neural structures involved in different types of 
anosognosia (i.e. implicit and explicit awareness). Twelve patients with severe 
hemiplegia and AHP were compared to a control group of 12 hemiplegic patients with no 
AHP. Lesions from CT and MRI scans were analysed using VLSM comparing damaged 
areas in anosognosic and non-anosognosic patients. They further identified the lesional 
correlates of patients with deficits in implicit and explicit awareness. Similar to 
Fotopoulou et al. (2010) impaired implicit awareness was associated with damage to 
subcortical areas including the basal ganglia, and impaired explicit awareness is more 
frequently related to cortical regions, including the frontal, temporal and parietal 
structures.  
 
The most recent study to investigate the neural correlates of AHP was conducted with 35 
acute (first 48 hours) right hemisphere damaged patients (Kortte, McWhorter, Pawlar, 
Slentz, Sur & Hills, 2014). Eight of these patients were classified as having severe AHP 
based on a cut-off score specified by Baier and Karnath (2005). The study aimed to 
identify cortical and subcortical structures associated with AHP in acute stroke patients 
using clinically acquired MRI scans and behavioural scores. The lesion analysis was 
conducted using a Region of Interest (ROI) analysis, with the results being confirmed by 
a secondary whole brain voxel-wise analysis. The study’s findings provided support for 
the unique role of right IFG. The right IFG, also know as the frontal operculum, is made 
up of pars orbitalis (BA 47), pars opercularis (BA44) and pars triangularis (BA 45). The 
results indicated that BA area 47 (pars orbitalis) of the IFG was damaged in six out of the 
eight AHP patients, with no control (aware) patients having tissue abnormalities in that 
area. Right BA 44 (pars opercularis) and 45 (pars striangularis) of the IFG were also 





Taken together, there have been recent advances in our understanding of the neural 
correlates of anosognosia. However, multiple brain structures have been implicated with 
few firm conclusions provided. This is due to several factors, including the use of poor 
quality clinical scans, small sample sizes and differences in diagnostic criteria for AHP, 
as well as discrepancies in time of AHP assessment and brain scanning. Nevertheless, 
most studies have confirmed the pivotal role of the right-hemisphere in AHP. Several 
studies have provided converging evidence for the importance of premotor areas (IFG) 
and the insula ribbon, more generally frontoparietal damage, and to some extent 
subcortical structures, specifically the basal ganglia. Overall, evidence suggests that a 
combination of both cortical and subcortical structures are involved in causing motor 
unawareness.  
 
Furthermore, the lesion mapping procedures used in most of the above studies do not 
draw on advanced statistical methods, but rather on meta-analysis approach (Pia et al., 
2004), descriptive (lesion-overlay and subtraction plots) approach (Karnath et al., 2005) 
or binomial tests (e.g. Chi-square; Berti et al., 2005). Few studies have utilised advanced 
statistical methods, such as VLSM (Vocat at al., 2010) and ROI analysis (Kortte et al., 
2014), to identify the statistical relationship between tissue damage and behaviour. 
Importantly, most previous studies have also relied on a priori classification of patients 
into groups based on lesion or behavioural scores that indicate a cut-off for pathology. In 
contrast the VLSM approach avoids this bias by not grouping patients based on lesion or 
behavioural cut-off scores, but rather by using continuous lesion and behavioural scores 
on a voxel-by-voxel basis (Bates et al., 2003). Nevertheless, mostly all of the above 
studies have only analysed the relationship between brain damage and behavioural scores 
indicating a diagnosis of AHP. Only two studies (Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Moro et al., 
2011) uniquely correlated other behavioural findings from experimental data (e.g. implicit 
awareness experiments) with lesion data. The current study aimed to utilise recent 
methodological advances in lesion mapping methods, such as software and analysis 
procedures, to help specify the exact brain areas associated with anosognosia.  
Furthermore, it will use lesion data to investigate not only the anatomical areas associated 
with a diagnosis of AHP, but also with performance on experimental tasks designed to 






1.6.2 Neuropsychological accounts 
 
1.6.2.1 Sensory and motor explanations  
Early accounts of AHP regarded the phenomenon to be a secondary consequence of 
sensory deficits, specifically neglect (visual and tactile), which often co-occurs with AHP 
in right-hemisphere damage (Cutting, 1978; Levine, Calvanio, & Rinn, 1991). It was also 
suggested that a combination of sensory deficits and other higher-order functions (e.g. 
memory and confabulation) result in AHP (Berti et al., 1996; Levine, 1991). However, a 
series of studies have since shown double dissociations between AHP and primary or 
high-order sensory deficits and a number of other higher-order cognitive deficits (Bisiach 
et al., 1986; see Heilman & Harciarek, 2010 for review), showing that these deficits may 
not be necessary for its occurrence. It is nevertheless probable that the aforementioned 
factors can lead to greater severity of unawareness or predispose patients to AHP when 
other contributing factors are also present (Marcel et al., 2004; Fotopoulou, 2014). 
Therefore evidence suggests that other deficits, such as neglect, impairments in 
somatosensory functioning (e.g. proprioception), cognitive deficits (e.g. memory) can co-
occur with AHP, but are not necessary for and do not explain the phenomena (Bisiach et 
al., 1986; Vocat et al., 2010; Kortte et al., 2014). 
 
More recent accounts have emphasised issues of motor planning and monitoring, rather 
than sensory deficits. Established computational models of the motor system proposed 
that motor awareness is dependent on the comparison between predicted and actual 
sensory information (Miall & Wolpert, 1996). Various studies have attempted to explain 
anosognosia using such models of motor control and awareness. It has been thus 
influentially proposed that AHP results from a specific deficit of forward motor 
monitoring (Heilman, Barrett & Adair, 1998; also see Berti et al., 2005; Frith, Blakemore 
& Wolpert, 2000). Interestingly from a neuroanatomical perspective, the right IFG is 
involved in action monitoring, but has also been associated with AHP (Berti et al., 2005; 
Kortte et al., 2014).  Here it is argued that there is an inconsistency in the predicted 
movement- based on intentions; and actual movement- based on sensory feedback.  This 
mechanism has also been labeled as the efference copy hypothesis (Frith, 2000; Frith, 
Blakemore & Wolpert; Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2010). According to this hypothesis 
AHP patients fail to correct cognitive predictions arising from their intentions to move 
their left arm or leg (Berti et al., 2005; Fotopoulou et al., 2008). Therefore, they fail to 




information. Furthermore, it has been suggested that lesions to the premotor and 
somatosensory cortex, as well as the primary cortex and insula, lead to this 
misrepresentation between the intention to move and the actual movement (Berti et al., 
2005; Karnath et al., 2005).  
 
Fotopoulou et al. (2008) investigated these proposals experimentally using realistic 
prosthetic hands to generate visual feedback of movements in AHP patients, while 
manipulating whether they had the intention to move themselves (self-intention) or 
someone else would move their arms (other intention). Their results showed that in AHP 
the illusory perception of movement in a non-moving hand occurred significantly more 
often in self- versus other- intention trials. This therefore reflects an abnormal dominance 
of motor intentions about the predicted effects of the movement over visual sensory 
information about the actual effects of the movement. In addition, a recent study by 
Garbarini et al. (2012) provides a behavioural demonstration of intact motor intentions in 
AHP. Garbarini and colleagues compared the performance on a classical bimanual 
interference or coupling task with three right-hemisphere brain damaged stroke patients, 
with 10 healthy, age matched controls. During this task the participants are asked to draw 
lines with their right hand (intact hand for AHP patients) and to draw circles with their 
left hand (paralysed hand for AHP patients) while blindfolded. The lines drawn by the 
intact hand in AHP patients became more oval, clearly demonstrating that there was an 
intention to move the paralysed hand. Anatomically, all three AHP patients had lesions to 
the insula ribbon, which is inline with recent findings on the critical role of the insula in 
AHP (Berti et al., 2005; Karanath et al., 2005; Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Vocat et al., 
2010). Garbarini and colleagues argue that both the insula and premotor areas provide the 
neural basis for the comparator component of the motor system.  As we explain in the 
following sections, despite the prominence of this view, the multiple facets of AHP 
suggest that the syndrome cannot be sufficiently accounted for by a disruption of 
sensorimotor mechanisms.  
 
1.6.2.2 Motivational account and affective processes  
The role of emotion in anosognosia has long been described in the literature dating back 
to Banbinski when it was first described a century ago. Yet despite a long tradition of 
clinical descriptions and theoretical debates (Bisiach & Geminani, 1991; Weinstein & 
Kahn, 1955), issues surrounding emotion and motivation are only occasionally mentioned 




contributing factors (see Vuilleumier, 2004 for review). For example, milder forms of 
unawareness, such as anosodiaphoria, which is described as emotional indifference to 
hemiplegia, is a direct example of the relationship between awareness and emotional 
processes. Other emotional disturbances (often having varying clinical presentations) are 
also frequently reported in AHP patients, including inappropriate cheerfulness (Gainotti, 
1972), but also apathy (Cutting, 1978).  Additionally, differences found between implicit 
and explicit awareness (Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Cocchini et al., 2010; Moro et al., 2011) 
as well as fluctuations in awareness described in clinical case studies (Kaplan-Solms & 
Solms, 2000) are also not accounted for in modular theories of anosognosia. Therefore, it 
is important to consider that pure motor accounts for AHP do not explain the full range of 
clinical variability, including the less understood dynamic, emotional and delusional 
features (Fotopoulou, 2012).  
 
Certain authors have therefore proposed that AHP should not only be explained by a 
disruption of sensorimotor mechanisms, but neuromotivational factors must also be 
considered (Fotopoulou, 2010; Turnbull, Fotopoulou, & Solms, 2014; Vuilleumier, 
2004). There has been a long tradition of regarding anosognosia as a psychological 
defense, most importantly dating back to the work of Weinstein and Kahn (1955). This 
motivational account of anosognosia has been mostly set aside for its lack of emphasis on 
the associated brain regions involved and the lack of experimental data. However, there 
has been a recent shift to reinvestigate the role of emotional and motivational factors 
associated with AHP (Feinberg, 2007; Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Nardone, Ward, 
Fotopoulou, & Turnbull, 2007; Orfei et al., 2007; Turnbull et al., 2014; Vocat et al., 
2010). With the emergence of an ‘affective neuroscience’ (see Panksepp, 1998)- 
emphasising the brain systems involved in basic human emotions in mammals- it is more 
widely recognised that ‘non-emotional’ processes, such as memory and attention, and 
emotional processes often overlap and can commonly involve the same neural 
mechanisms.  Some authors (Fotopoulou, 2010; Turnbull et al., 2014; Turnbull & Solms, 
2005) have therefore suggested that traditional motivational accounts of AHP could be 
modified to include a combination of factors, both neurocognitive and neuroemotional.  
 
As the role of the right-hemisphere, particularly in the anterior insular cortex, for 
processing affective information (Craig, 2009; Damasio et al., 2000) and social cognition 
(Frith & Frith, 1999) is now increasingly recognised, there is scope for empirical 




hemisphere lesions. Although it has been suggested by some authors that the right 
hemisphere is specialised for negative emotions (e.g. Davidson, 2001), and the 
subsequent loss of negative affect in AHP, it has been demonstrated by numerous studies 
that a range of emotions, both positive and negative, are experienced by these patients 
(Ramachandran, 1996; Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000; Turnbull et al., 2005). Descriptive 
case studies and experimental investigations have persistently shown that AHP patients 
experience a variety of emotions, but the incidences and diversity of emotional changes 
(i.e. emotion regulation) remains to be more fully explored (Turnbull et al., 2005). Even 
in the earliest reports of anosognosia, Babinski (1914) identified the relationship between 
unawareness and lack of emotional concern (anosodiaphoria). In Kaplan-Solms and 
Solms’ (2000) case series, some patients presented with explicit dislike or hatred for their 
paraplegic arm (misoplegia), while others presented with a fluctuation of emotion 
including so-called ‘catastrophic reactions’ (sudden, intense episodes of tearfulness and 
emotional breakdown) that was followed by transient awareness of their deficit (also see 
Turnbull et al., 2002).  
 
In response to these modular models of AHP, Vuilleumier (2004; also see Vocat et al., 
2010; Vocat, Saj & Vuilleumier, 2013) has proposed a general “ABC model” of 
anosognosia. This model aims to account for the range in clinical variability in AHP. The 
ABC model proposes that there is a combination of deficits affecting at least three main 
processes: assessment, belief and control operations. When there is a faulty or broken 
interaction between these three processes it results in patients presenting with motor 
unawareness.  In comparison, Fotopoulou (2012; 2014) has recently provided an 
alternative model to explain the multifaceted nature of anosognosia using a Bayesian 
‘predictive coding’ framework (Friston, 2010). This framework allows for a single and 
neurobiologically plausible formulation that incorporates both bottom-up and top-down 
mechanisms of perception and belief formation. In this context, AHP can be linked to a 
general antagonism between ‘prior beliefs’ (predictive internal models of the world based 
on previous learning) and ‘prediction error’ (discrepancies between expected and actual 
inputs based on interoceptive and exteroceptive signals). Both of these models have tried 
to synthesize cognitive explanations together with emotional and delusional components 
of anosognosia. However, these more integrative accounts still fail to specify what the 
exact role of emotion in anosognosia is, and only provide an overarching theoretical 





Anosognosia has also been understood in the context of a loss of emotion regulation 
functions, which attempts to account for the many disregarded aspects of AHP, such as 
fluctuations of awareness overtime, variations in clinical presentation and implicit 
awareness (Turnbull et al., 2014). Turnbull and colleagues propose that the relationship 
between the rightward lateralisation of disorders of awareness and emotional experiences 
is not as a result of abnormalities in emotional processing in general, but rather attributed 
specifically to a deficit in the ability to regulate emotions. Emotion regulation has been 
increasing shown to be a right-laterlaised psychological function (Nardone et al., 2007), 
with neuroimaging (Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009) and lesion studies (Salas, 
Gross, Rafal, Viñas-Guasch, & Turnbull, 2013; Salas, Gross, & Turnbull, 2014) 
confirming this hypothesis. Although no empirical studies have yet validated this model, 
it is proposed that damage to the right-lateralised emotion regulation system causes motor 
unawareness in AHP by making the patient revert to early developmental responses, such 
as denial (Turnbull et al., 2014).  
 
In summary, although many cognitive theories have been proposed to explain AHP, no 
single model has been able to account for its multifaceted and heterogeneous nature.  
Furthermore, as argued above, cognitive, modular models, and even more integrative 
accounts have failed to adequately address the role of emotion in anosognosia. Affective 
factors have in most cases been too quickly disregarded and there have been no 
experimental studies directly investigated the role of emotion in motor unawareness. 
There is a need for future studies to further explore the relationship between emotion, 
both positive and negative, and unawareness of deficit. Given that in other domains 
patients’ emotions and motivation can have a significant role in any rehabilitation effort, 
the relationship between awareness recovery and mood can also be studied, potentially 
providing valuable insight into effective rehabilitation strategies of these patients. This 
will be one of the aims of this thesis, as explained below. 
 
1.6.2.3 A proposed social account for AHP 
It has been tentatively proposed that there is a unique relationship between ‘spatial’ 
aspects of anosognosia and affective factors (Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000; Turnbull et 
al., 2014). Importantly, right-hemisphere damage is more frequently associated with 
disorders in spatial cognition (Maguire et al., 1998; Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000). Some 
experimental evidence has demonstrated that manipulating patient’s spatial perspectives, 




ability to perceive their motor deficits (Fotopoulou et al., 2011). As explained in more 
detail below, video replay that also draws on spatial 3rd person perspective taking 
permanently reinstated motor awareness in a single-case study investigation (Fotopoulou 
et al., 2009). Turnbull et al. (2014) suggest that AHP patients, as a consequence of their 
right-hemisphere damage, are more inclined to perceive the world subjectively (from a 1st 
person perspective) rather than objectively (from a 3rd person perspective). Selective 
studies have further shown that there are differences in awareness depending on if the 
questions were self referent or other referent (e.g. referring to the paralysis of another 
person; Marcel et al., 2004; Moro et al., 2011). Similarly, recent experimental evidence 
has suggested that affective processes in AHP are more pertinent in relation to the self 
than to others (Turnbull et al., 2005). Clinical reports and experimental findings have 
therefore posed the question of the role of perspective taking (both visual and verbal) in 
anosognosia.  
 
This concept of perspective-taking has frequently been explored under the generic 
concept of  ‘mentalisation’ or ‘Theory of mind’ (ToM). This unique ability is most 
frequently conceptualised as the ability to infer the thoughts and feelings of others 
(Premack & Wooclryff, 1978), and most broadly, as the ability to take another person’s 
perspective (Frith & Frith, 2007; Hynes, Baird & Grafton, 2006). Furthermore, 
perspective taking involves both the ability to mentally adopt someone else’s perspective 
and visual-spatial perspective taking that necessitates the ‘mental rotation of the self in 
space’ (Kessler & Thomson, 2010, pp.73). Kessler and Thomas propose that this rotation 
of the self in visual-spatial perspective taking is grounded in internal representations of 
the body that require adopting other viewpoints (i.e. other bodies). Within this 
framework, self- or 1st person perspective taking is centered around one’s own body, 
while other- or 3rd person perspective taking allows us to take the vantage point of 
someone else (Vogeley et al., 2004; Vogeley & Fink, 2003).  
 
Several lesion studies have also provided consistent anatomical evidence that ToM 
processes, at least in part, rely on right-hemisphere functioning (Brownell, Griffin, 
Winner, Friedman & Happé, 2000; Griffin et al., 2006; Happé, Brownell, & Winner, 
1999). Similarly, as described above, AHP is also most frequently associated with right-
hemisphere damage.  Although the neural mechanisms underlying social cognition and 
their related functions are not yet fully understood, neuroimaging and lesion studies have 




the “mentalising network” (Aichhorn et al., 2009; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Koster-Hale 
& Saxe, 2013; Siegal & Varley, 2002). Some of these areas have similarly been 
associated with AHP, such as the right temporal-parietal junction (TPJ; Vocat et al., 
2010) and the right inferior and middle frontal gyri (Berti et al., 2005). 
 
Unawareness of illness or lack of insight in patients with schizophrenia has also been 
thought to co-occur with impartments in ToM (Langdon & Ward, 2009). Here it is argued 
that awareness of illness in schizophrenia may depend on the ability to adopt the mental 
state of others. Using classic ToM tasks, Langdon and Ward (2009) suggest that 
impairments in the ability to take on another person’s perspective might compromise the 
patient’s ability to evaluate the reality of their own situation.  
 
Overall, clinical case studies, results and interpretations of experimental findings and 
lesion evidence all suggest a possible role of social processes in contributing to the 
presentation of anosognosia. However, no study has directly investigated the relationship 
between perspective taking (as an underlining modality of social cognition) and self-
awareness through the study AHP. Specific studies are therefore needed to examine the 
relationship between spatial cognition, social cognition and AHP. This will be one of the 
aims of the present study as outlined below. 
 
1.7 Awareness recovery and interventions 
Anosognosia is often a transient phenomenon, not frequently lasting beyond the acute 
stage. AHP typically spontaneously recovers within days, weeks or months from onset. 
However, unawareness of illness, especially in early critical stages, may significantly 
obstruct rehabilitation efforts (Gialanella, Monguzzi, Santoro & Rochi, 2005; Jehkonen, 
Laihosalo, & Kettunen, 2006). For example, anosognosia is said to be associated with 
longer hospital admissions (Maeshima, Dohi, & Funahashi, 1997) and poor functional 
recovery (Gialanella et al., 2005).  Additionally, systematic reviews of the literature 
suggest that approximately 30% of AHP patients remain unaware beyond the acute stage 
(Orfei et al., 2007; Pia et al., 2004). Recently some progress has been made in the 
management and rehabilitation of AHP (Prigatano & Morrene-Stupinsky, 2010; 
Jenkinson et al., 2011), but there is still no evidence-based treatment for AHP  (Kortte & 





There has been a long tradition in using vestibular stimulation to initiate a remission of 
AHP, but unfortunately the results are only temporary (Cappa, Sterzi, Vallar, & Bisiach, 
1987). Beschin, Cocchini, Della Sala, & Allen (2012) tested the effect of three types of 
treatment (optokinetic stimulation, prism adaptation and transcutaneous electrical nerve 
stimulation) on both neglect and anosognosia in five patients with severe AHP and 
neglect. A transient improvement of awareness was found in one patient using the 
combination of methods, and a temporary improvement of neglect found in two other 
patients using the same methods. However, these recent efforts only resulted in a 
temporary remission of AHP, similarly to vestibular stimulation. 
 
A recent single case study investigation reported the first clinical intervention to 
successfully lead to an immediate and permanent remission of AHP for the first time in 
the literature (Fotopoulou et al., 2009). Fotopoulou and colleagues used video replay as 
an experimental rehabilitation intervention method. Self observation in video replay 
offers a unique visual perspective by showing the patient both a 3rd person (from the 
outside) and ‘offline’ (watching oneself at a later time than the actual attempt to execute a 
movement) perspective.  Video replay was used to provide visual feedback to a patient 
with severe AHP. Below a brief vignette of the published case study is presented in order 
to illustrate the main elements of this approach. 
 
Case example 
LM was a 76-year-old right handed women with 15 years of education.  She had no 
significant previous medical or psychiatric history, and was hospitalised following a right 
middle cerebral artery (MCA) stroke. She presented with severe left-sided hemiplegia 
(0/5 power on Medical Research Council scale), mild dysarthia, facial weakness, 
proprioception deficits and hemispatial and personal neglect. Neuropsychological testing 
further reported mild executive impairment and anxiety, but no indications of depression. 
LM had severe AHP, as supported by her scores on both the Berti interview (Berti et al., 
1996) and Feinberg Questionnaire (Feinberg et al., 2010).  She further claimed that she 
could perform a number of bimanual and bipedal tasks (e.g. walking and clapping hands), 
and spontaneously reported false memories of such actions, including walking around the 






Patients with AHP typically remain anosognosic when their paralysed arm is brought to 
their ipsilateral (i.e. on the same side of their body) visual field. In contrast, a 90s video 
clip of LM answering awareness questions was played back to her, therefore providing 
video-based feedback to the patient. As a result the authors noted an immediate and 
spontaneous increase in motor awareness post-video intervention. LM’s awareness 
recovery was additionally maintained at a one-month (four week) follow-up. One 
important interpretation from the authors is that AHP patients may have more intact 
awareness when observing themselves from a 3rd rather than a 1st person perspective. A 
second interpretation is that there are functional and neural differences between 1st and 3rd 
person perspectives on the body, and this allows us to differentiate our body from other 
peoples. Interestingly, since video-viewing also provides the patient with an “offline” 
perspective (i.e. they are not trying to move their arm while watching the video), the 
impact of motor intentions is not relevant to motor monitoring during video observation. 
Video-viewing may have therefore facilitated the updating of LM’s motor awareness (i.e. 
3rd person and off-line self observation, using video replay, facilitated 1st person body 
awareness). These results however need to be replicated and the precise mechanisms of 
this effect, as well as other therapeutic factors that should potentially accompany the 
intervention (e.g. emotional support), need to be specified.  
 
Video replay has also been shown to help improve insight of psychotic patients 
(Davidoff, Forester, Ghaemi & Bodkin, 1998). In a more recent study, David, Ster, & 
Zavarei (2012) measured the effect of “self” and “other” video replay on insight of 
psychosis with a group of 40 schizophrenic patients. Twenty-one patients watched the 
“self” referent video and 19 patients watched the “other” referent video (an actor 
presenting with the same psychotic symptoms). Both videos resulted in an improvement 
of insight. Although there was a lack of a clear difference in the effect of the self and 
other video replay, patient’s insight did appeared to improve more after viewing 
themselves and/or the other patient in the video. 
 
Future studies are needed to further test the feasibility of self-observation using video 
replay. Firstly, there is a need to test this video intervention with both acute and chronic 
patients, in order to test whether spontaneous recovery can account for remission of AHP 
in the initial case study (Fotopoulou et al., 2009) with an acute stroke patient. Additional 
components for the optimisation of the rehabilitation intervention also deserve further 




the extension (see Section 1.3 of this Chapter) of remission of unawareness symptoms 
after using video replay, such as admitting to failures to move left arm and leg as well as 
realistic estimates of the functional significance of their paralysis; the use of a 
standardised protocol; and to explore how individual differences effect the administration 
of such direct rehabilitation interventions. Therefore, future studies are needed to first test 
the feasibility and effectiveness of the video replay intervention, followed by larger group 
studies and clinical trials. These were the aims of a clinical, rehabilitation case series 
study, presented in Chapter 6.      
 
1.8 Study rational and chapter overview  
In light of the above, considerable empirical evidence supports the idea that AHP 
involves a breakdown in motor planning and monitoring (Fotopoulou et al., 2008; 
Jenkinson, Edelstyn, Drakeford & Ellis, 2009; Garbarini et al., 2012). However, as argued 
above, purely motor accounts do not explain several features of the phenomena, such as 
emotional and delusional elements (Fotopoulou, 2012; Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000). 
Accordingly, this thesis argues that a revision of the prevailing, modular theories of AHP 
is necessary, taking into consideration the involvement of (i) emotion and motivation, and 
(ii) social mentalising and perspective taking. These findings on the role of emotion and 
social processes in AHP can then be translated and used in future rehabilitation strategies 
for AHP. Therefore this thesis will argue in favour of a new account of unawareness 
following right-hemisphere stroke, predicting that AHP patients live in an emotionally-
laden, egocentric reality, where the ability to adopt a 3rd person perspective or the link 
between 1st and 3rd person thinking is defective.  
 
The current thesis aims to advance our understanding of the neurocognitive, emotional 
and social factors involved in anosognosia. Recent advances in AHP research can be 
attributed to a number of interrelated factors discussed in detail above (Fotopoulou et al., 
2012), such as: improvements in neuroimaging methods that have allowed for the 
exploration of the anatomical correlates of AHP; and the use of well-controlled, 
psychophysiological experiments that supplement standardised neuropsychological 
assessments. Therefore the current study will draw on an integrative methodological 






Accordingly, the series of experimental investigations in this thesis aims to set the 
foundation for further, clinically oriented research on AHP, as a prototypical form of 
unawareness. In particular this thesis aims to: (1) investigate the emotional and social 
factors, that underlie motor unawareness in stroke patients; (2) identify the neurocognitive 
factors and neural  (neuroanatomical) correlates that underlie motor unawareness; and (3) 
develop potential bedside, rehabilitation interventions for AHP. The proposed PhD will 
focus on these related research topics of interdisciplinary scope with the intention of 
improving our psychological, neuropsychological and neuroscientific understanding of 
AHP.  Accordingly, the main research question guiding this thesis is: 
  
What are the emotional and social factors, and their neural counterparts, that underlie 
motor unawareness in stroke patients, and what is their relationship with the associated 
neurocognitive factors? 
  
A secondary research question being: 
  
How can we translate emotional and social experimental and neuroimaging findings to 
design and implement therapeutic bedside studies and appropriate interventions for motor 
unawareness post stroke? 
  
More specifically the aims of the present series of experiments was too:  
  
1. Experimentally investigate the influence of positive and negative emotion on 
unawareness. (Chapter 3) 
2. Experimentally investigate the relationship beween social cognition and 
AHP, under the broad theoretical framework of ToM, specifically looking at 
1st and 3rd person perspective taking. (Chapter 4) 
3. Experimentally investigate under what conditions motor awareness changes 
(i.e. partiality of motor awareness, Chapter 5), specifically examining: 
a. Differences in 1st versus 3rd person perspective taking.  
b. If motor awareness extends to the motor deficits of other paralysed 
patients.  





4. Investigate the neurocognitive factors and neuroanatomical correlates that 
underlie motor unawareness by using neuropsychological testing and lesion 
analysis methods, to develop a clearer understanding of the neural basis of 
anosognosia. (Chapters 3-5) 
5. Design and experimentally investigate bedside, therapeutic studies for the 
rehabilitation interventions for AHP. (Chapter 6) 
 
1.8.1 Summary of experimental chapters  
The following chapters describe a series of experimental and case study investigations 
carried out in order to address each of the above aims. Chapter 2 provides a general 
overview of the methods used in this thesis, combining neuropsychological testing, 
psychophysiological experiments and neuroimaging methods. The chapter will explain 
details of patient inclusion and recruitment, and ethical approval. Neuropsychological and 
neurological tests used during patient assessments will be described, as well as detailing 
the neuroimaging methods used to analyse clinically acquired CT and/or MRI scans for 
lesion overlay, subtraction, and VLSM analysis. Detailed experimental methods and 
statistical analysis used for each experiment will be specified in each individual chapter, 
and are therefore not included in the general methodological overview provided in 
Chapter 2.  
 
In Chapter 3 the possible role of emotion in AHP is experimentally investigated. The 
study aimed to investigate how positive and negative emotions influence motor awareness 
in anosognosia. Positive and negative emotions were induced under carefully-controlled 
experimental conditions in right-hemisphere stroke patients with AHP (n = 11) and 
controls with clinically normal awareness (n = 10). Using lesion overlay and VLSM 
approaches, the brain lesions associated with the diagnosis of AHP, as well as 
performance on the experimental task is explored.  
 
The relationship between social cognition and self-awareness is experimentally 
investigated in a series of studies in Chapter 4. Two experimental studies were used to 
examine the role of visual-spatial perspective taking and ToM, comparing 1st person 
perspective taking and 3rd person perspective taking abilities in patients with AHP (n = 
15) and HP controls patients (n =15), as well as age-matched healthy (non-neurological) 
control participants. Furthermore, using lesion-mapping methods, the areas commonly 




analysis was used to investigate the relationship of the damaged brain areas to the 
behavioural scores in the experimental tasks. 
 
In Chapter 5 self-other processes in motor awareness was explored in relation to partiality 
of awareness. Three experimental studies were conducted with 38 right-hemisphere 
damaged patients (AHP: n = 19; HP: n = 19) to examine under what conditions motor 
unawareness changes. These studies explored whether 1st and 3rd person verbal 
perspective taking changes motor unawareness for the self and of another paralysed 
patient. A second aim being to test if motor awareness extends or generalises to include 
the motor deficits of other paralysed patients and if there is a difference in the severity of 
unawareness for the self and the other patient. Lastly, the potential difference between 
self referent and other referent awareness is examined using disability related ToM 
stories. Lesion mapping methods (i.e. lesion overlay and VLSM) were used to identify the 
difference in lesioned areas in AHP compared to HP patients, and investigate the 
relationship between self-and-other referent differences and related brain areas.  
 
A case-study approach is used to explore possible rehabilitation interventions for AHP in 
Chapter 6. The study is based on the recent, bedside intervention, namely self-observation 
by video replay. This procedure has been adjusted and applied, as the basis of two 
intervention protocols administered to two patients with severe AHP. The first study used 
multiple, successive sessions of video-based self-observation in an acute patient, targeting 
first the awareness of upper limb and subsequently lower limb paralysis. The second 
study used a single session of video-based, self-and-other referent observation in a patient 
at the chronic stage following onset. Both protocols also involved elements of rapport 
building and emotional support.  
 
Lastly, a general discussion of the findings in relation to the main research questions 
guiding this thesis is presented. Results are discussed in the context of current theoretical 
perspectives, methodological issues and limitations are examined, applications to future 
rehabilitation strategies are proposed, and an outline for future research concludes this 







Chapter 2 General Methods 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a general overview of the methods used in this 
study, as well as information regarding participant inclusion and recruitment, and ethical 
approval. The methods described here are the ones shared between the subsequent 
chapters that focus on individual experiments and related methodological issues.  
 
2.1 Participants  
Patients fitting the following inclusion criteria were eligible to take part in this study. The 
main sample for this study consisted of acute neurological (i.e. stroke) patients, with 
clinically defined right-hemisphere damage and left-sided weakness (see below for 
detailed inclusion criteria). Stroke patients were classified as having anosognosia for 
hemiplegia (AHP) using the awareness assessments specified below and subsequently 
assigned into the experimental group (AHP group) and hemiplegic control group (HP 
group). In specific experiments, an additional control group of age-matched healthy (i.e. 
non-neurological) volunteers were recruited. 
  
2.1.1 Target group 
The target or experimental group of this study consisted of adult neurological (stroke) 
patients with right-hemisphere lesions and contralateral hemiplegia. All patients presented 
with clinical indications of AHP, which were formally tested using awareness 
assessments specified in Section 2.3.1 of this Chapter. The inclusion and exclusion 
criteria are specified below.  
 
Inclusion criteria 
1. Clinical indications of anosognosia for hemiplegia: quantified by formal testing 
during this study. 
2. Right-hemisphere damage, as detected by CT and/or MRI investigations and 
confirmed by neurological and neuropsychological assessments (e.g. left-sided 
motor weakness; presence of neglect). 
3. Recent pathology: patients were recruited less than four months post symptom 
onset (acute to sub-acute stage post-stroke).  
4. Contralateral hemiplegia, or other left-sided motor impairment: standard 






1. Generalised brain damage.  
2. Previous neurological or psychiatric history. 
3. Less than seven years of education. 
4. Acute confessional state: forward digit span less than 4, abnormal sleep-wake 
cycles. 
5. Dementia: as reported in medical records. 
6. Severe impairments in language: unsatisfactory comprehension, expression or 
communication.  
 
2.1.2 Control groups 
 
2.1.2.1 Neurological controls  
The main neurological control group consisted of adult neurological (stroke) patients with 
right-hemisphere lesions and contralateral hemiplegia. No patients presented with clinical 
indications of AHP, which were formally tested using awareness assessments specified in 
Section 2.3.1 of this chapter. The inclusion and exclusion criteria are specified below. 
The only difference between the experimental group and neurological control group was a 
clinical diagnosis of AHP.  
 
Inclusion criteria 
1. Right-hemisphere damage, as detected by CT and or MRI investigations and 
confirmed by neurological and neuropsychological assessments (e.g. left-sided 
motor weakness; presence of neglect). 
2. Recent pathology: patients were recruited less than four months post symptom 
onset.  
3. Contralateral hemiplegia, or other left-sided motor impairment: standard 
neurological testing confirmed presence and severity of motor deficit.  
 
Exclusion Criteria 
1. Clinical indications of anosognosia for hemiplegia: quantified by formal testing 
during this study. 
2. Generalised brain damage.  
3. Previous neurological or psychiatric history. 




5. Acute confessional state: forward digit span less than 4, abnormal sleep-wake 
cycles. 
6. Dementia: as reported in medical records. 
7. Severe impairments in language: unsatisfactory comprehension, expression or 
communication. 
 
2.1.2.2 Healthy controls  
An additional control group of healthy volunteers (non-neurological controls) were also 
used for specific studies. Relevant exclusion criteria are specified below.  
 
Exclusion criteria 
1. Previous neurological or psychiatric history.  
2. Motor paralysis, motor weakness or any other related impairment.  
3. On medication with severe cognitive or mood effects. 
4. Less than seven years of education. 
5. Severe impairments in language: unsatisfactory comprehension, expression or 
communication.  
 
2.2 Patient identification, recruitment and ethics 
 
2.2.1 Patient identification and recruitment sites 
This thesis fell part of a split-site collaboration project between the United Kingdom and 
South Africa, specifically between the University of Cape Town, and King’s College 
London and University College London. Accordingly patient recruitment took place at 
South London Hospital sites. Patients were identified and recruited from consecutive 
admissions to acute stroke wards from three hospital sites in the United Kingdom (UK), 
specifically: Mark Ward at St Thomas’ Hospital; The Friends Stroke Unit at Kings 
College Hospital; and William Drummond Ward and Brodie Ward at St George’s 
Hospital. For selective studies, patients were additionally recruited from a collaborating 
hospital site in Italy, namely: the Rehabilitation Unit of the Sacro Curora Hospital in 
Negrar, Verona. Healthy, non-neurological, volunteers were recruited from St Thomas’ 
Hospital among the visitors to the hospital wards. Recruitment took place over 
approximately a two-year period from September 2012 to April 2014. Patients recruited 
from the partnered Italian hospital site were a consecutive series of patients meeting full 




detailed discussion of potential limitations involved in recruiting from multiple hospital 
sites and testing in different languages.  
 
2.2.2 Ethics approval 
This study was granted a favourable opinion by the National Research Ethics Service 
(NRES) in the UK. Research and Development (R&D) approval was individually sought 
and granted for each participating site. The investigator held honorary contracts with all 
recruitment sites involved in the UK. Furthermore, the investigator carried out numerous 
presentations to the staff at the various hospital sites and liaised regularly with the 
responsible clinical staff regarding the progress of the study. This study was additionally 
approved by the local ethics committee in Italy, our collaborating research site, and 
carried out in accordance with the guidelines of the Declaration of Helsinki.  
 
2.2.3 Process of consent and recruitment procedures  
Patients were all approached under the guidance of the clinical team at the hospital sites 
and informed written consent was obtained for each participant. After the purpose of the 
study was explained to the participants, there were asked if they wished to participate in 
the study. They were informed that their participation is entirely voluntary and that they 
can withdraw from the study at any time, without consequences and without giving a 
reason. If the participant was in favour of participating in the study, the researcher then 
carefully read through the information sheet and consent forms, at the pace appropriate 
for the participant, especially for the patient populations. The participants were 
encouraged to ask questions and discuss the study. If the participant agreed to take part in 
the study, he or she was asked to sign the consent form. It was emphasised, that the 
participants did not have to make a decision immediately and that they could do so within 
a three-day period. A copy of the Information Sheet(s) and Consent Form for patients and 
healthy participants is in Appendix A and B.  
 
Stroke patients were all tested at the bedside in their allocated rooms on the hospital ward. 
The number and time of testing sessions varied between patients, depending on: time 
availability between clinical appointments; general fatigue and mood; or if patients were 
medically well to participate. Therefore, in general, testing took between five to ten 
sessions to complete, with each session lasting a maximum of one hour. When possible, 
testing sessions were performed on sequential days until all assessments had been 




A summary of patients screened and recruited is presented in Figure 2.1. The data 
pertains to: (i) the total number of patients screened; (ii) the number of patients excluded; 
(iii) patients consented and recruited, but unable to participate in study due to medical 
complications, severe fatigue, hospital transfer or death;  (iv) the total number of patients 
consented and participating in the study; and (v) the total number of AHP and HP control 
patients. The number of patients contributing to each individual experiment, as well as 
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2.3 Integrative methodological approach  
This study uses a combination of methods in order to investigate the emotional and social 
processes and neural biases of anosognosia. This integrative methodological approach is 
used in the group studies in the subsequent chapters. The methods used include: (i) 
clinical and neuropsychological assessments; (2) well-controlled, psychophysiological 
experiments (see Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2010 and Fotopoulou, 2012 for discussion); 
and (3) structural neuroimaging methods, software and statistics for lesion mapping that 
identified brain lesions selectively associated with AHP and other experimental measures. 
The clinical and neuropsychological assessments, as well as the neuroimaging methods 
used, are detailed below. However, the experimental design, methods and statistical 
analysis used in the psychophysiological experiments are specified in each chapter 
separately.   
 
2.3.1 Anosognosia assessments and classification of AHP patients 
As discussed previously in Chapter 1, there is no gold standard assessment for AHP. 
Patients were therefore classified as having AHP using two assessment measures: the 
Berti interview (Berti et al., 1996) and the Feinberg Scale (Feinberg et al., 2010). The 
Berti interview was the basis of the classification of patients with AHP, and the Feinberg 
scale used to specify the severity of the anosognosia.  
 
The Berti interview  
Classification was firstly based on the Berti verbal awareness interview (Berti et al., 
1996). The interview began with general questions  (e.g. ‘Why are you in the hospital?’), 
then followed by specific questions regarding motor ability (e.g. ‘Can you move your left 
arm?’), and ‘confrontation’ questions (e.g. ‘Please touch my hand with your left hand. 
Have you done it?’). The structured interview is scored on a three-point scale: 2 = denial 
of motor impairment and failure to reach the examiners hand (severe anosognosia); 1 = 
denial of motor impairment, but admits to failure to reach examiner hand (mild 
anosogosia); and 0 = full acknowledgment of motor deficits (normal). Patients scoring 
one or two were categorised as anosognosic.  
 
The Feinberg awareness scale  
The Feinberg et al. (2000) scale was used as a secondary measure of unawareness to rate 
the severity of the anosognosia. The scale consists of 10-items (see Appendix C). 




anywhere?’), followed by emotion related items (e.g., ‘Are you fearful about losing your 
ability to use your arm?’) and items asked from a 3rd person perspective (e.g., ‘The 
doctors tell me that there is some paralysis in your arm. Do you agree?’). The questions 
conclude with task-related and ‘confrontation’ items (e.g. ‘Please try and move your left 
arm for me. Did you move it?’). Responses were scored by the examiner for each item: 0 
= no awareness; 0.5 = partial unawareness; and 1 = complete unawareness. The responses 
are summed to produce a composite ‘Feinberg awareness score’: 0 = complete awareness, 
10 = complete unawareness. 
 
2.3.2 Neurological and neuropsychological assessment 
In addition to the above awareness assessments, all patients underwent neurological and 
neuropsychological assessments. As patients were in the acute stage following stroke and 
were routinely tested at the bedside, all tests were chosen and tailored to be suitable for 
bedside assessments. Detailed descriptions of the neurological and neuropsychological 
tests used are specified below. During testing sessions patients were also asked relevant 
demographic (e.g. years of education, employment) and medical information using 
routine history taking procedures. Other relevant demographic or medical information 
(e.g. date of birth; date of onset; radiology report) was acquired in the patients’ medical 
folders, under supervision of the clinical team (please see Appendix D). Qualitative or 
clinical observations regarding the behaviour of participants during assessments were also 
made. These behavioural observations were not documented in a systematic manner 
during time of testing, but were still useful in reflecting on the individual differences and 
quantitative results. These results are reported where appropriate in the subsequent 
chapters.   
 
Motor strength 
Motor strength of the upper and lower limbs was assessed using the Medical Research 
Council scale (MRC; Guarantors of Brain, 1986). The extent of motor impairment can 
vary from complete flaccidity (MRC score 0) to slight movements (MRC score 1–2). The 
MRC scale grades motor power on an ordinal scale: 0 = no contraction; 1 = flicker or 
trace of contraction; 2 = action movement, with gravity eliminated; 3 = active movement 







General cognitive functioning  
The Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (Wechsler, 2001) was used to provide an estimate of 
premorbid intellectual function. The test operates on a basis that vocabulary correlates 
highly with education and IQ and that verbal skills, such as reading ability, remain intact 
even in cognitively deteriorating patients. The tests comprises of a list of 50, phonetically 
irregular words. As the correct pronunciation of each word cannot be determined from it’s 
spelling, it is argued that the test relies on prior knowledge rather than current cognitive 
capacity. Participants are asked to read aloud a list of words, which are scored for 
pronunciation errors by the examiner. The test was used in the present study to compare 
the IQ of AHP and HP patients, as well as age matched healthy volunteers.  
 
Orientation in time, space and person, as well as general cognitive functioning, was 
assessed using the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MOCA; Nasreddine, 2005). The 
MOCA was chosen in order to exclude patients from the study who were in a confusional 
state or had severe generalised cognitive impairment. It is a brief screening test used to 
measure the severity of confusion or cognitive decline. It provides a general overview of 
several cognitive domains, including: orientation (to time and place), attention, memory, 
dysphasia, apraxia and executive function.  
 
Memory tests 
Working memory was assessed using the digit span task, forwards and backwards, from 
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III (WAIS III; Wechsler, 1997). Long-term verbal 
recall was also specifically assessed using the five-item test from the MOCA. Patients are 
asked to remember five items and are tested on immediate recall, with category clues and 
multiple-choice options are given when needed. The five items are then repeated, with 
immediate recall tested again. Finally, delayed recall is tested on the five items. Category 
clues and multiple-choice options were provided if necessary, however points are only 
given for uncued recall items.  
 
Neglect tests 
The Behavioural Inattention Test (BIT; Wilson, Cockborn & Halligan, 1987) is a 
standardised test used to assess unilateral visual-spatial neglect commonly occurring after 
right-hemisphere damage. Five of the conventional subtests from the BIT were 





Personal neglect was assessed using the ‘one item test’ (Bisiach, Vallar, Perani, Papani & 
Berti, 1986), and a more sensitive measure, the ‘comb/razor’ test (Mcintosh, Brodie, 
Beschin, & Robertson, 2000). The one item test is a routine clinical test in which the 
patient is asked to use their right hand (ipsilateral side) with their left hand (contralateral 
side). The patients movement or attempt to move is rated on a three-point scale: 0 = good; 
1 = done but with small error, uncertainty or latency; 2 = the search is interrupted before 
the search is completed; and 3 = no movement towards the other hand is performed. The 
Comb and Razor Test is a measure of unilateral spatial neglect in the patient’s personal 
space (called personal neglect) by assessing their performance in functional activities, 
such as using a comb or a razor. The percentage bias of the total score is calculated using 
the following formula: %bias = (left - right strokes) / (left + right + ambiguous strokes). 
The ‘%bias’ formula yields a score between -1 (total left neglect) and +1 (total right 
neglect). The cut off for left personal neglect is % bias < -0.11.  
 
Tests of executive functioning 
Executive and reasoning abilities were assessed using the Frontal Assessment Battery 
(FAB; Dubois et al., 2000), and the Cognitive Estimates test (Shallice & Evans, 1978).  
The cognitive estimates test was used to measure the ability to make complex mental 
calculations and estimations. The FAB consists of six subtests: similarities and abstract 
reasoning; mental flexibility; motor programing and executive control (Luria motor 
sequence); conflicting instructions; inhibitory control (go-no-go test); and precision 
behaviour. Each subtest has a maximum score or three (the higher the better), and a total 
score of 18 is generated.  
 
Emotion-related tests  
The Hospital Depression and Anxiety Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), was used 
to assess depression and anxiety. This is a self-rating scale used for measuring levels of 
anxiety and depression. The test is specifically designed to be used with patients with 
physical difficulties, so that symptoms such as fatigue do not raise the depressed mood 
score. A raw total score of eight or higher on the depression or anxiety subgroups 
indicated the presence of clinical depression and/or anxiety.  
 
Clinical tests 
Proprioception was assessed with a clinical protocol based on Vocat et al.’s (2010) 




and controlled movements applied to three joints (middle finger, wrist and elbow), at 
three time intervals. Correct responses were rated as zero and incorrect ones as one 
(Vocat et al., 2010; see Appendix E). The customary ‘confrontation’ technique was 
administered to test visual fields and tactile extinction (Bisiach et al., 1986). A clinical 
protocol was used to test disorientation for right and left. The patient is asked to identify 
their own right or left arm and leg, and use either their right or left arm to identify various 
body parts (e.g. right ear or left shoulder). The patient is also asked to identify the 
assessor’s right or left arm and body parts (e.g. right or left ear; see Appendix F). 
 
2.3.3 Experimental methods 
Experimental design, methods and procedures are described in full detail in each of the 
subsequent Methods Sections in the succeeding chapters.  
 
2.3.4 Neuroimaging methods 
 
Data acquisition  
Neuroimaging was performed on all patients as part of their standard clinical treatment 
within the first week of admission to the Accident and Emergency (A&E) departments  
(admission to neuroimaging interval: mean = 4.26 days, SD = 4.88 days). These routinely 
acquired clinical CT images were obtained for all patients of this study. Some patients 
underwent additional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) as part of their clinical 
diagnostics. Where available these MR images were used to cross-reference lesion 
location. All clinical images used for this study had been anonymised.  
 
Neuroimaging pre-processing and processing 
Available structural data were converted into software-readable formats for further 
processing. Accordingly, all images were pre-processed for visualisation using the 
dcm2nii programme (http://www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricro/mricron/dcm2nii.html). 
Visual inspection of the obtained files was performed in fslview 
(http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslview/) to identify possible equipment-induced or patient-
induced (e.g. movement) artefacts.  
 
Lesion delineation 
To facilitate comparison between the clinical data and a standard space template, the 




template using SPM (Statistical Parametric Mapping, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). 
The order of the patients was randomised. For each patient the structural scan was 
examined and anatomical landmarks were identified to acknowledge lesion location. 
Lesions were then reconstructed from available scans onto axial slices of the standard 
template provided within MRIcron 
(http://www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricro/mricron/). Other available imaging 
modalities were used for guidance where available. The corresponding binary mask was 
created for each lesion. An anatomist, who was blinded to the clinical information, 
groupings and study hypotheses, reviewed the reconstructions for accuracy and suggested 
corrections where necessary.  
 
Lesion overlay and voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping 
Lesion volume was extracted using FSL (FMRIB Software Library, 
http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki/) and an independent sample t-test was used to identify 
mean differences between the two clinically defined groups (AHP vs. HP).  To identify 
the areas that were commonly damaged within the sample of patients with and without 
AHP a lesion analysis was performed. Percentage lesion overlay maps for both groups 
and a subtraction map between them were computed in MRIcron.  
 
To identify voxels within the brain that have a significant effect on behaviours, a voxel-
base lesion-symptom mapping (VLSM) approach was implemented (Bates et al., 2003; 
Rorden, Karnath, & Bonilha, 2007). This advanced method characterises the statistical 
relationship between tissue damage and behaviour on a voxel-by-voxel basis, regardless 
of the classification of patients into categorical groups, or implementing a cut-off for 
pathology (Bates et al., 2003). This advanced lesion analysis was performed as linear 
regression analysis with the non-parametric mapping programme (NPM; 
http://www.cabiatl.com/mricro/npm/; Rorden & Karnath, 2004) and a VLSM mapping 
tool implemented in mricron, a method less sensitive to outlier profiles compared to other 
software packages (Rorden et al., 2007).  
 
Experimental scores used for each VLSM analysis are specified in the subsequent 
chapters. Results were calculated with the permutated (number of permutations set to 
1000) Brunner-Menzel test to correct for multiple comparison and small sample size 




(Holmes et al., 1998) in standard space. Anatomical locations were cross-referenced using 
the Juelich histological atlas (Eickhoff et al., 2007) implemented within FSL. 
 
2.3.5 Summary and conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was to provide an overview of the general methods used that span 
more than one experiment, in order to prevent repetition in subsequent chapters. The 
chapters to follow will provide detailed methods of the exact number of participants 
included, specifications of experimental design, methodology and statistical analysis 
used. Taken together, this thesis draws on an integration of methodological approaches 
used to advance the scientific study of anosognosia  (see Fotopoulou, 2012). Accordingly, 
a combination of methods will be draw on in the chapters to follow, specifically: 








Chapter 3 The affective modulation of motor awareness in anosognosia 
 
3.1 Introduction 
One facet of anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) that has received less empirical attention, 
despite a long history of clinical observations and theoretical debates (Weinstein & Kahn, 
1955; Bisiach & Geminani, 1991), is the role of emotional factors. On clinical 
examination, patients typically manifest some degree of blunted affect or ‘indifference’ 
for their paralysis and its consequences. This indifference (anosodiaphoria; Babinski, 
1914) can exist with or without concomitant explicit denial of deficits.  On the contrary, 
depressive symptoms and ‘catastrophic reactions’ (sudden influx of strong, negative 
feelings and related behaviours; Goldstein, 1939) are encountered rarely. Moreover, there 
are some clinical indications that as unawareness decreases over time, depressive 
symptoms begin to emerge in patients who were previously emotionally unresponsive 
towards their paralysis (Fotopoulou et al., 2009; Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000). 
Exceptionally, some patients with or without explicit denial of deficits have been noted to 
show a strong hatred towards their paralysed limbs (misoplegia; Critchley, 1974), or a 
disproportionate exasperation with irrelevant, minor disappointments, despite their 
apparent indifference for their paralysis (Weinstein & Kahn, 1950; Kaplan-Solms & 
Solms, 2000; Fotopoulou & Conway, 2004).  
 
Some authors have argued that this lack of affect, or misattribution of negative emotions, 
is caused by purely psychogenic ‘defence’ mechanisms. According to the now classic 
theory of Weinstein and colleagues (e.g. Weinstein & Kahn, 1955; Weinstein, 1991), 
denial and related premorbid coping mechanisms prevent patients from explicitly 
acknowledging their paralysis, and self-attributing the associated negative emotions. 
Alternatively, this lack of emotional reactivity has been considered to be the direct 
consequence of damage to the right (frontal) hemisphere, regarded by some authors as 
specialised for the processing of negative, withdrawal-related emotions (Davidson, 2001; 
see Gainotti, 2012 for review). However, neither of these two approaches has been fully 
supported by empirical evidence. Specifically, the psychodynamic account of AHP fails 
to explain the relative neuroanatomical and behavioural specificity of anosognosic 
behaviours (Bisiach & Geminani, 1991; Heilman & Harciarek, 2010). The ‘valence’ 
hypothesis has similarly not been supported in the literature; although patients with AHP 
do typically score lower than control patients in self-report measures of depression and 




do not differ from controls groups in their ability to experience such emotions (Turnbull 
et al., 2005; Vocat et al., 2010). They also show appropriate, negative emotional reactions 
to their deficits when the latter are evoked implicitly (Nardone et al., 2007; Fotopoulou et 
al., 2010). Thus, it appears that the relation between AHP and emotion is more complex 
than suggested by either the psychodynamic or the valence hypothesis.  
 
More generally, such rigid distinctions between purely psychodynamic and 
neurocognitive explanations have been challenged recently (Fotopoulou, 2012) and 
integrative accounts of AHP have been put forward (Fotopoulou, 2014; Turnbull et al., 
2005; Turnbull et al., 2014; Vuilleumier, 2004). According to such theories, complex 
imbalances between cognition and motivation may be caused directly by damage to 
insular, striatal, or limbic regions that have recently been found to be selectively 
associated with AHP (Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Vocat et al., 2010; Moro et al., 2011). For 
example, Vuilleumier and colleagues have suggested that damage to the basal ganglia 
may obstruct the “discovery” of deficits, as patients have reduced affective drive to 
respond to errors and revise beliefs based on new perceptual evidence (Vuilleumier, 2000, 
2004; Vocat et al., 2013). Similarly, within a computational framework, Fotopoulou and 
colleagues have suggested that insular and basal ganglia damage may lead to weak and 
imprecise signals about the physiological condition of one’s body. This leads to aberrant 
‘top-down’ inferences about bodily states, and difficulties in affectively personalising 
new sensorimotor information (Fotopoulou, 2014). 
 
Taken together, these accounts suggest that the lack or misattribution of negative 
emotions in AHP relates to impairments in higher-order cognition, rather than to primary 
deficits in emotional processing. This ‘top-down’ perspective is consistent with a 
relatively neglected facet of AHP, namely, the fluctuations of awareness based on the 
emotional or social context in which awareness is probed. For instance, Kaplan-Solms 
and Solms (2000, see also Turnbull, Jones & Reed-Screen, 2002; Ross & Rush, 1981; 
Starkstein & Robinson, 1988) have shown that when themes of loss are explored during 
psychotherapeutic sessions – particularly when such loss is apparently unrelated to their 
disabilities – transient awareness and depressive episodes can be experienced by patients 
that are otherwise stably anosognosic. Marcel and colleagues (2004) have further shown 
that awareness may increase in some patients when they are asked about their disabilities 
in an emotional, conspiratory manner, or from the perspective of the examiner (also see 




of these observations, to the investigators knowledge there is no systematic, experimental 
investigation of the moderating role of emotional and social context in AHP.  
 
Accordingly, this study aimed to investigate the relation between emotion and motor 
awareness in AHP. To this end, right-hemisphere stroke patients with AHP and control 
patients without AHP were recruited. Motor awareness was assessed before and after, 
providing positive and negative feedback about performance on a standardised cognitive 
test (the Hayling Test; Burgess & Shallice, 1997). The task includes components of 
varied difficulty that made it possible to match with the valence of the provided feedback 
to generate realistic conditions of positive and negative feedback. Moreover, it is 
unrelated to motor abilities so the role of emotion on motor awareness could be tested, 
without being uncomplicated by ‘bottom-up’ sensorimotor signals and the patients’ 
explicit or implicit feelings about their motor abilities. Based on the idea that patients 
with AHP have lost the ability to use signals from their own body to make related 
inferences about their current bodily state (Fotopoulou, 2014; see also above), the main 
aim was to test whether the ‘top-down’ experimental induction (by verbal, social 
feedback) of negative feelings about oneself could improve awareness of one’s motor 
disabilities. It was expected that patients with AHP would show increased awareness of 
their deficits following negative feedback compared with positive feedback, while such 
effects were not expected in the control group. Furthermore, in order to ensure that the 
experimental feedback had induced the desired emotions in patients, patients’ self-
reported emotional state was measured following each condition of the main task. If 
patients with AHP were capable of experiencing negative emotions, it was expected that 
negative feedback would to lead to more negative feelings than positive feedback in both 
patient groups.   
 
Lastly, this study examined whether lesions to critical cortical (premotor and the insular 
cortex) and subcortical (basal ganglia and limbic structures) areas would be associated 
with increased unawareness scores, as in previous studies (Berti et al., 2005; Karnath et 
al., 2005; Fotopoulou, et al., 2010; Moro et al., 2011). Contrary to such lesion subtraction 
investigations, however, a voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping (VLSM) approach was 
used (Bates et al., 2003; Rorden et al., 2007). This method was used to identify the brain 
regions associated with a change in motor awareness induced by the experimental task, 
which according to the presented hypothesis should include the insula ribbon and basal 




clinico-anatomical correlation has been investigated before in the literature, to the 
investigators knowledge, only two previous studies have investigated the association 
between behaviour on carefully-controlled experimental conditions and neuroanatomical 
data (Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Moro et al., 2011), and no study has examined this 




3.2.1 Patients and assessment of anosognosia 
A total of 16 patients took part in the study (nine women; mean age = 68.19, SD = 14.27 
years, age range: 41-88). Patients were recruited from consecutive admissions to two 
acute stroke wards according to the inclusion criteria specified in Chapter 2. Two 
additional sets of patients were recruited subsequently in order to test (see Section 3.2.3): 
(i) a control condition in which the order of experimental conditions was reversed (n = 2; 
two women with AHP, 82 and 90 years of age); and (ii) the specificity of the effect to 
motor awareness (n = 3; two patients without AHP, 57-year-old male and 70-year-old 
female, and one female AHP patient, 84 years of age).  
 
Eight of the 16 patients were classified as having AHP (four women; mean age = 71.63, 
SD =16.18 years, age range: 41-88) and eight were classified as right-hemisphere controls 
(HP group; five women; mean age = 64.75, SD = 12.14 years, age range: 47-78). This 
classification was based on the Berti et al. (1996) interview, as described in Chapter 2. 
The Feinberg et al. (2000) scale, also explained in Chapter 2, was used as a secondary 
measure of unawareness to confirm the diagnosis and rate the severity of unawareness. 
 
3.2.2 Neurological and neuropsychological assessment  
In addition to the anosognosia assessment above, all patients were tested using standard 
neurological and neuropsychological assessments, which have been described in detail in 
Chapter 2. Tests included: assessments of motor strength for both upper and lower limb; 
proprioception; visual and tactile extinction; premorbid intelligence, general cognitive 
function, orientation and mood tests; working memory, long-term verbal recall, and 





3.2.3 Experimental study design  
The main experimental aim was to induce positive and negative emotions in patients with 
AHP and HP controls, and assess their effects on motor awareness. To this end, a 
standardised cognitive task was administered, the Hayling Sentence Completion Test of 
executive functioning (Burgess & Shallice, 1997), which entails two similar tasks varying 
in difficulty. Namely, a simple, sentence completion task (measuring processing speed), 
and a more difficult sentence completion task, in which patients have to provide 
responses that are unrelated to the meaning of the sentences (measuring inhibition of 
automatic responses). Healthy controls and particularly neurological populations are 
known to perform faster on the first task, and with fewer errors, compared with the 
second task (Burgess & Shallice, 1997; see Results section below for confirmation of this 
result in the sample). In order to ensure the induction of positive and negative feelings 
respectively, explicit, verbal feedback provided by the experimenter was further 
manipulated after each trial: positive feedback was provided following trials of the easy 
task, and negative feedback was provided following trials of the difficult task. Hence, 
feedback could be administered ‘realistically’ and ensure construct validity. This 
feedback manipulation can be understood as a mood induction procedure (Nummenmaa 
& Niemi, 2004), widely used in psychological research, including with neurological 
patients (e.g. Mograbi, Brown, Salas, & Morris, 2012). As in Mograbi et al. (2012), the 
induced emotions are considered short lived and fall within the normal range of emotional 
experience (Frost & Green, 1982; Isen & Gorgoglione, 1983; Martin, 1990). This was 
confirmed in this sample at debriefing (see Procedures Section 3.2.5 below). 
 
The experiment had a 2 (Group: AHP vs. HP) x 2 (Emotion: positive vs. negative 
feedback) mixed factorial design, with Emotion as the within-subjects factor. Due to the 
nature and the standardised administration order of the Hayling Test (Part 1: the easier 
sentence completion task is followed by Part 2: the harder sentence completion task) 
positive feedback preceded negative feedback in the experiment. Thus, to examine 
possible order effects, a control experiment in two additionally recruited AHP patients 
was conducted, in whom the order of positive and negative feedback was reversed (i.e. 
first administering Section 2 with negative feedback, and then Section 1 with positive 
feedback).  
 
Finally, in order to determine the specificity of the emotion induction on motor awareness  




patients. The experimental procedure was identical to the above, with the exception of 
additional pre-and-post measures to assess any changes in visuospatial neglect, personal 
neglect, and anosognosia for drawing neglect, in addition to motor awareness. 
Specifically, changes in neglect were assessed by administering the copy, line bisection 
and star cancellation subtests of the BIT (Wilson et al., 1987) and the ‘one-item test’ 
(Bisiach et al., 1986) pre-and-post the positive and negative emotion induction. Four 
additional questions were added to the motor awareness questionnaire (please see below) 
to assess awareness of drawing neglect (Berti et al., 1996). Referring to their performance 
on the ‘copy’ subtest of the BIT (administered before the experiment; Wilson et al., 1987) 
patients were asked: (i) two general questions (e.g. “Are you happy with your drawing of 
the Daisy?” and “Are the daisies alike?”); and (ii) to provide subjective ratings of their 
drawing performance using a 11-point Likert-type scale (e.g. “Using this scale from 0-10, 
how good is the drawing, 0 being not good at all and 10 being very good?” and “Using 
this scale from 0-10, how alike are the drawings, 0 being not at all alike and 10 being 
exactly the same?”). 
 
3.2.4 Measures  
The primary dependent variable was ‘awareness change’, which was based on a motor 
awareness questionnaire, developed based on pre-existing, validated measures (e.g. Berti 
et al., 1996; Marcel et al., 2004), and administered immediately before and after each 
Emotion condition. Previous studies have suggested that AHP patients may ‘learn’ the 
‘correct’ responses to answers on awareness measures when repeatedly administered 
(Marcel et al., 2004). To avoid such repetition confounds, four equivalent versions of the 
questionnaire were developed. Each version comprised of seven items, covering four 
domains: (i) two general awareness questions (e.g. “Do you have any weakness 
anywhere?”); (ii) one question related to left unimanual ability, followed by a 
‘confrontation’ and ‘check’ question (e.g.  “Can you wave to me with your left hand? 
Please do it for me now. Have you done it?”); (iii) one question concerning bimanual 
action ability, each followed by confrontation and check questions (e.g. “Can you tie a 
knot? Please do it for me now. Have you done it?”), and (iv) one bipedal awareness 
question (e.g. “Can you climb a ladder?”). Each question was scored according to the 
method of Feinberg et al. (2000): 0 = no unawareness; 0.5 = partial unawareness; and 1.0 
= complete unawareness; therefore, higher scores indicated greater unawareness (range = 




awareness score was subtracted from the pre-induction awareness score of each patient, to 
obtain a main measure of awareness change. 
 
Additionally, in order to evaluate the effects of emotional feedback on patients’ emotional 
state per se, patients were asked to provide a subjective rating of their current emotional 
state on a 6-point Likert-type scale (i.e. “Using this scale from zero to five, zero being 
very unhappy and five being very happy, how do you feel right now?”). The scale was 
read aloud to patients and also presented visually as a vertical scale on an A4 sheet of 
paper (0 at the bottom and 5 at the top), positioned in the patient’s right visual field in 
order to minimise possible unilateral visual neglect effects. Patients were familiarised 
with the rating scale before the experiment. 
 
3.2.5 Procedures  
The experiment was organised into two phases: [i] administration of Hayling Test Part 1 
(simple sentence completion) with positive feedback, and [ii] administration of Hayling 
Test Part 2 (inhibition of automatic response) with negative feedback. These were 
conducted in a single session, separated by a 30-minute interval, during which standard 
neuropsychological tests (see above) were administered without feedback. Part 1 of the 
Hayling Test requires the patient to complete a series of sentences with the last word 
missing from it as fast as possible (e.g. “The rich child attended a private…”, response: 
school). The response and reaction time are recorded and the total time score is converted 
into a scaled score. In part 2, the patient is again asked to complete a series of sentences 
as above, but their response is to be completely unconnected to the sentence (e.g. 
“London is a very busy…”, possible response: banana). The response and the reaction 
time are recorded, and the total time and response errors are converted into a scaled score. 
 
Positive feedback was provided in a standardised manner, using one of the following 
seven statements, in a pseudorandomised order: (i) “Well done”, (ii) “That is correct”, 
(iii) “Your answer was very quick”, (iv) “Excellent work”, (v) “You are doing so well on 
this task”, (vi) “Very impressive”, and (vii) “Your performance has been excellent so 
far”. Positive feedback was matched to performance as much as possible, i.e. most 
answers were correct and given within one minute and hence one of the above statements 
was provided. In the unlikely event that an answer was wrong, statement (iii) was 
provided; or, if an answer was very slow (more than one minute), this statement was not 




although this feedback was realistic in all cases, it was pre-selected and false in the sense 
that it did not correspond to the norms of the Hayling Test.  
 
Similarly, negative feedback was provided using one of the following seven standard 
statements: . (i) “That is incorrect”, (ii) “You are not doing very well on this task”, (iii) 
“Your performance has been very poor so far”, (iv) “That is the wrong answer”, (v) “You 
are doing poorly so far”, (vi) “Your answer was too slow”, and (vi) “You are not 
performing very well”. Feedback was consistent with patients’ actual performance as 
much as possible (in the same manner as above, but matched to the poor performance of 
patients). 
 
Measures of awareness were taken immediately before (i.e. pre-induction awareness) and 
after (i.e. post-induction awareness) the two parts of the task. The emotion rating scale 
was completed after each post-induction awareness questionnaire, in order not to 
influence the latter. During the control experiment, the procedures were identical to the 
above, except for reversing the order of phases one and two. 
 
Patients were carefully and fully debriefed following completion of the experiment; the 
purpose of the positive and negative feedback were fully explained, and any questions 
were addressed. It was stressed that the feedback provided did not reflect their actual 
performance on the Hayling Task, as determined by the available, standardised norms, or 
by the face value impressions the task itself might generate. Any ongoing emotional 
distress (if experienced) was fully discussed and reflected upon to ensure that the 
patients’ emotional state was stable. There were no particularly strong reactions during 
the experiment, or following debriefing, and none of the patients reported having guessed 
or suspected the manipulation. 
 
3.2.6 Statistical analysis 
All behavioural analyses were conducted in Stata 11 (StataCorp, 2011). Independent 
samples t-tests were used to analyse mean differences between groups on 
neuropsychological tests. Items that were not normally distributed were also analysed 
using the non-parametric equivalent (Mann-Whitney U test) to confirm the findings (see 






Analysis of main experiment 
The differential ‘awareness change’ scores (see Measures, Section 3.2.4) were used as the 
outcome measure in all analyses, which were conducted using multiple linear regression. 
The awareness change data were not normally distributed, hence bootstrapping with 1000 
repetitions was applied (bootstrapping makes no assumption as to the distribution of the 
data; Guan, 2003); bootstrapped standard errors (SE) are therefore reported. The same 
analysis was also run while co-varying for overall negative mood (HADS depression 
scores, as these were found to differ between the groups, see below). Preliminary 
examination of the awareness change data identified one HP control patient scoring more 
than two SD above the group mean, and hence this patient was removed from subsequent 
experimental analyses as an outlier.  
 
Analysis of control variables 
A multiple linear regression (as above) on emotion ratings was used to investigate 
whether patients experienced a change in their emotional state in the two feedback 
conditions. The same analysis was also run while co-varying for overall negative mood 
(HADS depression scores). Furthermore, to ensure there was no difference in the baseline 
awareness scores preceding the positive and negative feedback conditions (particularly 
given the fixed order of the task), non-parametric tests were conducted that compared the 
baseline awareness scores preceding the positive and the negative feedback conditions in 
each group. In addition, a comparison between groups of the total scaled scores of the 
Hayling Sentence Completion test was conducted, as well as the scaled scores for Part 1 
and 2, to ensure the actual performance of both groups was consistent with the task’s 
expected difficulty levels, and that the provided feedback was realistic and of similar 
relevance to both groups. Additionally, modified t-tests (SINGLIMS_ES; Crawford, 
2010; Crawford et al., 2002; Crawford et al., 1998) were used to determine whether the 
awareness change scores of the two AHP patients in the reverse-order experiment (see 
Section 3.2.3) differed significantly from those of the HP group. Finally, in order to 
investigate whether any changes in awareness resulting from the experiment had a lasting 
effect, non-parametric tests were used to compare Feinberg awareness scores acquired on 
initial assessment (prior to the experimental session) with those obtained one-to-three 





3.2.7 Lesion analysis methods  
Routinely acquired clinical CT (n = 10) and MRI (n = 5) data sets were obtained within 
the first week of admission. The clinical data set of one HP control patient was 
unavailable and the patient was therefore excluded from further imaging analyses. Lesion 
mapping methods detailed in Chapter 2 were used for the analysis below. The VLSM 
analysis (Bates et al., 2003; Rorden et al., 2007) was used to identify anatomical regions 
associated with: i) the presence of anosognosia (Feinberg awareness scores, inverted to 
adhere with the NPM prerequisite of the directionality of the input data) and ii) the 
awareness change induced by the experimental design (‘change in awareness’ scores for 
the negative emotion induction). For these behavioural measures a lower score indicates 
lower awareness and less awareness change following negative emotion induction, 
respectively.  
 
3.3 Results  
 
3.3.1 Demographic and neuropsychological results  
Patients’ demographic characteristics and their performance on standardised 
neuropsychological tests are summarised in Table 3.1. The groups did not differ 
significantly in terms of age, education or symptom onset to assessment interval. As 
expected, there was a significant difference in awareness scores between the AHP and HP 
groups on both the Berti et al. (1996) interview (t (14) = 5.60, p < 0.001) and the Feinberg 
et al. (2000) scale (t (14) = 7.06, p < 0.001). The groups showed similar sensory deficits, 
as well as similar impairments in general cognitive functioning, abstract thinking, 
reasoning abilities and neglect. Although both groups showed deficits in proprioception, 
the AHP group was significantly more impaired (t (12) = 2.33, p = 0.04). The AHP group 
showed significantly lower scores for depression on the HADS when compared to 
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3.3.2 Main experimental results: awareness change 
A linear regression analysis revealed a significant main effect for the factor Group (b = 
2.04, SE = –0.45, p < 0.001, 95% CI = 1.16; 2.92), with the AHP group showing a greater 
change in awareness (marginal mean = 0.99) compared with the HP group (marginal 
mean = –0.02). Also, a significant main effect of Emotion induction type (b = –1.07, SE = 
0.46, p = 0.019, CI = –1.96; –0.18) was observed, with awareness change being 
significantly greater following the negative (marginal mean = 1.6) compared with the 
positive emotional induction (marginal mean =  –0.57). The interaction between Emotion 
induction type and Group was also significant (b= –2.05, SE = 0.61, p = 0.001, CI: –3.26; 
–0.84), with the AHP group (marginal mean = 2.55) showing a greater change in 
awareness compared with the HP group (marginal mean = 0.75) following the negative 
emotional induction only (see Figure 3.1). Taking the HADS depression scores into 
account in this analysis did not change the pattern of these results.  
 
A qualitative example of the change in motor awareness observed as a result of the 
emotion induction is described here.  During the pre-awareness assessment one patient 
stated “No, I have no weakness anywhere, no”, claiming that “I can move my arm, no 
problem” and was adamant that she raised her left arm and clapped her hands. Following 
the negative emotion induction, the same patient admitted that her left arm “is not as 
strong as before the stroke”, saying “I don’t think I can move this arm now, it feels weak”. 
When asked if she can tie a knot, she replied “I’m not so sure now” and after attempting 
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p = 0.8, r = 0.1) and response errors (Z = –1.1, p = 0.31, r = 0.28), with the AHP group 
performing ‘average’ for time (median = 6) and ‘abnormal’ for response errors (median = 
1.5). Similarly, the HP group performed ‘average’ for time (median = 6) and ‘abnormal’ 
for responses errors (median = 2). Therefore, the feedback given was realistic based on 
patients’ actual performance, with both groups performing better on part 1 than on part 2, 
and showing no differences between groups on either part. 
 
3.3.6 Reverse order control condition 
The two AHP patients who performed the experiment in the reverse order showed the 
same pattern of results as found in the main group analysis. After the negative emotion 
induction, both patients showed a greater improvement in awareness (AHP09: mean = 5, 
AHP10:  mean = 3.5) compared to the control group (mean = 0.5; SD = 0.82; AHP09: 
t(7) = 5.13, p = 0.001, r = 5.49; AHP10: t(7) = 3,42, p = 0.007, r = 3.66). There was no 
difference between either AHP patient and the HP control group in awareness change 
following positive emotion induction (AHP09: t(7) = 0.45, p = 0.33, r = 0.48; and 
AHP10: t(7) = 1.7, p = 0.07, r = 1.81).  
 
3.3.7 Specificity of effect control condition 
The three patients with right-hemisphere damage who performed this additional control 
experiment showed no change in personal neglect assessments, and a minor change in 
visuospatial neglect, with extrapersonal neglect becoming slightly worse following 
negative versus positive induction in two patients. Additionally, there was a non-mood 
specific improvement in awareness of neglect in one patient. The results are summarised 
in 3 case reports below (see Appendix H for a summary of results). Patient HP09 
presented with no AHP, no personal neglect, no visuospatial neglect except on the ‘copy’ 
subtest, and mild unawareness of drawing neglect. There was no change in visuospatial 
and personal neglect, or awareness of drawing neglect following the positive and negative 
emotion induction condition.  Patient HP10 presented with no AHP, mild personal 
neglect, visuospatial neglect and unawareness of drawing neglect. She showed no change 
in the line bisection subtest, personal neglect scores, and general questions for awareness 
of drawing neglect, but a small increase in visuospatial neglect following the positive and 
negative emotion induction conditions. There was also a small increase in awareness of 
drawing neglect following the negative emotion induction, but a much larger increase in 
awareness following positive induction. Lastly, patient AHP11 presented with AHP, 




was no change in her personal neglect and awareness of drawing neglect scores, and no 
change in her performance on the line bisection subtest following the negative and 
positive emotion inductions. There was a small increase in visuospatial neglect (star 
cancellation subtest) following the negative but not positive emotion induction. 
 
3.3.8 Follow-up awareness testing 
Wilcoxon signed rank test showed that there was no significant difference in Feinberg 
awareness scores before and after the experiment, in either the AHP (Z = –0.45, p = 0.66, 
r = 0.12) or HP group (Z = –1.63, p = 0.1, r = 0.42), suggesting that the observed 
awareness changes were temporary and experimental effects, rather than permanent, 
clinical changes.  
 
3.3.9 Lesion analysis  
All lesions resulted from a first-ever unilateral stroke, mainly within the right middle 
cerebral artery territory. Group-level percentage lesion overlay for the AHP group (n = 8) 
identified the involvement of cortical and subcortical areas, comprising the inferior and 
superior frontal gyri, the pericentral cortex, the insula ribbon, and the internal capsule (see 
Figure 3.3A). In comparison, the lesion overlap map for the HP group (n = 7) revealed a 
more focal lesion pattern involving mainly subcortical regions (see Figure 3.3B). Lesion 
volume (in cubic centimetres) was not significantly different between the AHP group 
(mean = 4.64, SD = 5.47) and the HP group (mean = 3.25, SD = 4.19; t (15) = 0.55, p = 
0.594). The lesion subtraction map identified mainly the anterior and posterior insular 
ribbon, the posterior basal ganglia, and dorsal pericentral areas to differ between the 














Figure 3.3 Group-level lesion overlay maps for patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) and hemiplegic (HP) controls 
Note: A. Overlay of lesions in patients with anosognosia (AHP; n=8); B. Overlay of patients without anosognosia (n=7). C. Statistical analysis 




VLSM analysis using the continuous Feinberg awareness scores, revealed that voxels 
within the posterior insula, the supramarginal, the angular and superior temporal gyrus 
(SMG, AG and STG), internal capsule, pericentral gyri, and the inferior frontal gyrus 
(IFG) were significantly associated with differences in awareness (p < 0.05) (see Figure 
3.4A). Similar results were found when co-varying lesion size. Additionally, VLSM 
analysis, looking at the experimental change in awareness scores (i.e. differential scores 
following negative emotional induction only), without and with co-variation of lesion 
size, identified significant voxels (p < 0.05) within the anterior arm of the internal 
capsule, the anterior insula, the anterior lateral putamen with a lateral extension into the 
external capsule and an additional region in the dorsal anterior periventricular white 
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3.4 Discussion  
The present study experimentally induced positive and negative emotions in patients with 
AHP and HP controls, and measured the resulting changes in motor awareness. It also 
investigated the brain lesions associated with the clinical diagnosis of AHP, as well as 
with performance on the experimental task. The main behavioural finding was that 
patients with AHP showed a significant improvement in motor awareness following a 
negative, but not a positive, emotion induction. The main finding of the analysis 
combining experimental and lesion data was that lesions to the putamen, the anterior 
insula, the capsules and the anterior periventricular white matter were associated with less 
awareness improvement on the experimental task. These findings are discussed in turn 
below. 
 
To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first experimental demonstration of the role of 
emotion in AHP. The results show that negative, self-referential emotion induced by 
social feedback can lead to temporary improvements in motor awareness, in patients who 
otherwise show stable AHP. These results are consistent with previous clinical 
observations of transitory awareness improvements and ‘catastrophic reactions’ following 
discussions of negative themes such as loss, separation or mortality (Kaplan-Solms & 
Solms, 2000). They are also consistent with experimental manipulations of perspective-
taking, in which taking a 3rd person perspective of one’s disability can lead to awareness 
improvements and increase of depressive emotions (Marcel et al., 2004; Fotopoulou et al., 
2009, 2011). It is proposed that these results cannot be accounted for by either the 
psychodynamic or ‘valence’ hypothesis (see Introduction, Section 3.1), and instead are 
best explained by theories that assume ‘top-down’, emotional abnormalities (Fotopoulou 
et al., 2010; Turnbull et al., 2005; Vuilleumier, 2004). Moreover, although changes to 
neglect and unawareness for neglect following emotion induction were tested in only a 
small subset of patients, it appears that the effects of negative emotion on awareness are 
specific to motor awareness and do not extend to neglect or its unawareness. These 
findings and their potential interpretations are in turn discussed below.  
 
While the results could be interpreted as psychodynamic ‘lifting’ of denial and repression, 
the psychodynamic hypothesis could just as easily predict the opposite result, namely a 
defensive, decrease of awareness due to the negative emotions experienced following 




clear. Similarly, although patients with AHP showed significantly less depressive feelings 
and symptoms than controls on a self-report measure (see also Fotopoulou et al., 2010), 
the experimental results could not be accounted for by the ‘valence’ hypothesis. This is 
because patients with AHP showed greater awareness changes following the negative 
emotion induction, suggesting that they were able to process such emotions at some level. 
Indeed, both groups reported feeling more negative emotions following negative versus 
positive feedback in a ‘manipulation check’ measure. Interestingly, during the 
experiment, patients with AHP reported feeling overall more positive emotion than 
control patients, but this effect was unrelated to the valence of the feedback provided. 
This may relate to the aforementioned, more general tendency of patients with AHP to 
report (rather than experience) less negative emotions (see also Turnbull et al., 2005). 
Thus, as the patients were able to experience increased negative emotions following the 
negative emotion induction and increased positive emotions following the positive 
emotion induction, these results suggest that their emotional difficulties do not consist of 
a primary deficit in emotional processing (as the valence hypothesis suggests). Instead, as 
their emotional difficulties seem to relate more specifically to their motor awareness (also 
see above), they may be suffering from a more specific, higher-order impairment in 
consciously, self-attributing negative emotions, i.e. attributing negative emotions to at 
least some of their higher-order self-representations (see also Fotopoulou, 2010; Turnbull 
et al., 2005, 2014).  
 
This interpretation is also supported by the findings of the lesion mapping analysis. 
Specifically, the presence (lesion overlay results) and severity (Feinberg VLSM results) 
of anosognosia were associated with lesions to a range of cortical and subcortical areas 
previously associated with AHP (Berti et al., 2005; Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Karnath et 
al., 2005; Moro et al., 2011; Vocat et al., 2010). However, worse performance on the 
critical condition of the experimental task (i.e. less awareness change following negative 
feedback) was associated with lesions to the putamen, the anterior insula, the capsules 
and the anterior periventricular white matter.  
 
The insula, and particularly its anterior sectors, is increasingly identified as the neural 
substrate for the conscious representations of internal bodily signals (interoception; 
Critchley et al., 2004; Craig, 2009), as well as for the processing of salience (Seeley et al., 
2007). Thus, in patients with AHP, damage to the right insula and related white matter 




the body (see also Karnath et al., 2005; Fotopoulou et al., 2010). It is possible to speculate 
that this deficit may affect how patients process the salience and emotional significance 
of signals arising in this body side, thus explaining how they can remain in denial of their 
paralysis and/or apathetic towards the normally alarming sight of a paralysed left arm 
(Romano, Gandola, Bottini, & Maravita, 2014). Similarly, the functional role of the basal 
ganglia and particularly the striatum has been associated with prediction error-driven 
learning (O’Doherty et al., 2003), as well as the aberrant salience theories of psychosis 
(Gray et al., 1991; Kapur, 2003). In AHP such deficits can be linked with both specific 
instances of aberrant motor monitoring in functionally specialised systems (Berti et al., 
2005), or more generally in global error monitoring, salience processing and belief 
updating (Davies et al., 2005; Venneri & Shanks, 2004; Vocat et al., 2013). For example, 
according to a probabilistic, predictive coding theory of AHP (Fotopoulou, 2012; 2014), 
such lesions could be understood to disrupt neuromodulatory circuits in AHP, leading for 
example to dopamine-depletion and a difficulty in optimising the precision (uncertainty) 
of prediction errors (Friston et al., 2012), affecting their salience and, ultimately, the 
learning of new information. Thus, even when signals about the current state of the body 
may be available, they may be ‘imprecise’, and thus unable to update prior beliefs about 
the self. This ultimately leads to aberrant inferences about one’s current abilities and 
abnormal adherence to past beliefs about the body.  
 
It is thus possible to speculate that in AHP patients who fail to update their emotions and 
beliefs about their current state of the body (i.e. their left-sided paralysis), the provision of 
negative feedback by social means can generate negative emotions about the self and new 
learning on the basis of other intact areas. Future studies will be needed to verify this 
prediction, perhaps using functional neuroimaging to detect residual emotional processing 
in AHP patients. In addition, given the potential specificity of the effects (concerning 
motor but not spatial awareness), future studies should explore the psychological and 
neural relation between emotional processing and the motor system. Indeed, a growing 
literature is suggesting a tight interrelation between emotion and motor representations 
(see Gentsch, & Synofzik, 2014; Pereira et al., 2011). Consistent with the current 
findings, previous studies have shown that while negative emotional processing competes 
for attentional resources with visual tasks to the detriment of performance on the latter  
(Erthal et al., 2005; Hartikainen, Ogawa & Knight, 2000; Tipples & Sharma, 2000), they 
may enhance processing in motor-related brain areas.  Indeed, several studies of non-




threatening contexts (e.g., Graziano & Cooke, 2006), while emotional threat has been 
found to be associated with increased motor cortex excitability in humans (Baumgartner, 
Willi, & Jäncke, 2007; Hajcak et al., 2007; Oliveri et al., 2003). Induction of fear has 
been found to modulate activity in primary motor cortex and putamen (Butler et al., 2007; 
Phelps et al., 2001). These findings have been interpreted in contemporary theories of 
emotion as consistent with the idea that aversive contexts engage motor circuits in order 
to prepare participants for action that may protect the organism from threat (Azevedo et 
al., 2005; Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001; Hajcak et al., 2007). The current 
results may indeed relate to such an enhancement of activity in residual motor-related 
areas and future, electromyography or neuroimaging studies can specifically test such 
speculations and predictions.   
 
3.4.1 Limitations  
The small sample size and the inherent limitations of the voxel-based lesion-symptom 
mapping approach (Rorden, 2007; Volle et al., 2011; Geva et al., 2012), only allow for 
preliminary evidence of the possible neural correlates observed. Nevertheless, the VLSM 
approach, compared to other lesion analysis methods, does offer several advantages, 
including the use of continuous scores of behavioural performance instead of the 
classification of patients into categorical groups. An additional limitation concerns the 
fact that a ‘neutral emotion’ or ‘no feedback’ control condition was not included in the 
experiment, which would allow for the comparison of both negative and positive emotion 
conditions. In addition, it was not possible to control for floor effects in the control group 
given the unique nature of anosognosia. Nevertheless, although there was a smaller 
margin for change in awareness scores for the control group, there was still a small 
change evident in the same direction as the AHP group. Furthermore, this control group 
allow for the control for other more basic confounding effects such as age, test adherence, 
cognitive functioning, practice, repetition, comprehension and fatigue effects. 
 
Importantly, the observed changes were temporary and generated under specific 
experimental conditions, and thus the results of the experiment are not directly relevant to 
clinical studies. However, these findings do have indirect implications for clinical work; 
they reinforce the previously demonstrated link between awareness improvement and 
depressive feelings, as well as more generally emphasise the role of emotion in the 





Chapter 4 Mentalising the body: spatial and social cognition in 
anosognosia for hemiplegia  
4.1 Introduction 
In cognitive neurology and neuroscience, the ability to integrate multimodal sensorimotor 
signals into an egocentric reference frame and assign a 1st person perspective to one’s 
bodily experiences has long being recognised as the sine qua non of human self-
consciousness (Blanke et al., 2002; Vogeley et al., 2001, 2004). By contrast, the cognitive 
ability to disengage from the 1st perspective and to adopt another person’s visuospatial 
and mental perspective is considered as a fundamental prerequisite for the metacognitive 
ability to understand and infer the thoughts and feelings of others, the so called ‘theory of 
mind’ (ToM), or ‘mentalisation’ abilities (Frith & Frith, 2007). In recent decades, both of 
these research traditions, namely 1st person, embodied cognition and 3rd person, social 
cognition have received ample, empirical attention. Yet far less neuroscientific studies 
have focused on the importance of the 3rd person perspective on our bodily self.  
 
In fact, most of the existing studies in cognitive neurology and neuroscience that have 
investigated the ability to mentally disengage from the 1st person, embodied perspective 
have focused on how we ‘project’ our psychological selves to other positions in space 
(Blanke, Landis, Spinelli, & Seeck, 2004), or to other bodies (Sinigaglia, 2012). For 
example, Blanke and colleagues investigated the underlying neural mechanisms of out-of-
body experience (i.e. to see one’s body and the world from a location outside one’s 
physical body while awake) and autoscopy (i.e. seeing one’s body outside extrapersonal 
space), showing that they share important key mechanism, such as proprioceptive, tactile, 
visual and vestibular sensations, and neuroanatomical damage around the temporal 
parietal junction.  Yet still the question of how we perceive the self from such 
disembodied perspectives has not been investigated. This is an important question as 
developmental, clinical and social psychology have long established that how we perceive 
or, imagine the self to be from the perspective of other people (e.g. as in physical mirrors, 
or during social mirroring) is critical for the development and maintenance of a coherent 
and resilient self that entails the integration of 1st and 3rd person perspectives (Rochat, 
2009). In fact, severe mismatches between 1st person perspectives and 3rd person 
objectifications of one’s bodily self seem to underlie symptom formation in several 
psychopathologies, such as eating disorders and schizophrenia (Langdon & Coltheart, 




increased understanding of the relation between self-awareness difficulties and 
mentalisation impairments in these disorders (Langdon, Corner, McLaren, Ward, & 
Coltheart, 2006; Russell et al., 2009; Tchanturia et al., 2004). 
 
More generally, while the interaction and the potential overlap of networks that support 
self-referent processing and social cognition in the brain has been long recognised (see 
Lieberman, 2007; Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange & Keenan, 2007, for reviews) the precise ways 
in which such systems interact to influence self-awareness remains to be understood. For 
example, distinctions have been recently proposed between a network of ‘cortical midline 
structures’, responsible for internally oriented processes that support reflections on one's 
own or others’ mental states versus an externally focused, lateral frontoparietal network 
that responds to one's own or others’ visible features and actions (Lieberman, 2007). 
Another view is to consider the right frontoparietal system involved in representing the 
bodily self and other, versus a cortical midline system involved in representing self and 
other in more reflective terms (Uddin et al., 2007). Despite the rich debates surrounding 
such proposals and the many functional neuroimaging studies conducted in healthy 
participants, the question of how taking a 3rd person perspective on the self may influence 
bodily self-awareness remains beyond the scope of these studies.   
 
In this respect, neurological disorders of bodily awareness can offer an additional window 
of insight into the complicated relation between self-awareness and social cognition. In 
particular, this study aimed to investigate the relation between bodily, self-awareness and 
social cognition in a prototypical neurological disorder of the bodily self, anosognosia for 
hemiplegia (AHP). Interestingly, patients with AHP typically remain anosognosic when 
they view their paralysed limbs from a 1st person perspective, as when their plegic arm is 
brought into the ipsilateral visual field and its paralysis is demonstrated by the examiner 
(Bisiach et al., 1986). They also remain anosognosic during conventional ‘mirror therapy’ 
(where a mirror is placed perpendicular to the body and the intact arm appears in the 
expected position of the paralysed arm, e.g. Ramachandran, 1995; Zampini, Moro, & 
Aglioti, 2004), or when 1st person, visual feedback of the paralysis is provided by realistic 
rubber hands (Fotopoulou, et al., 2008).  
 
By contrast, it has been shown that patients show dramatic improvements in body 
recognition and awareness when they are provided with visual feedback of their own 




via mirrors or video replays (Fotopoulou et al., 2009; Fotopoulou et al., 2011; Jenkinson 
et al., 2013; also see Chapter 6). Similarly, patients show more awareness of their 
paralyses when asked to make verbal judgments from 3rd person perspectives (Marcel et 
al., 2004; Fotopoulou et al., 2011).  These findings suggest that 3rd person, visual spatial 
perspectives as well as more abstract, 3rd person, verbal representations of the self may be 
intact in these patients, in the sense that they can perceive the current state of the body 
accurately from such perspectives. However, these results leave open the question of why 
patients do not habitually use such 3rd person perspectives and knowledge to inform and 
update their 1st person perspective on their bodily state. One possibility (Fotopoulou, 
2014) is that they have lost the cognitive ability to do so without explicit, experimental 
instructions, or manipulations, i.e. they are not as able as healthy individuals to 
spontaneously disengage from the 1st person perspective and take 3rd person visual spatial 
or, mental perspectives more generally.  
 
This possibility, which we tested in the present study, is also consistent with some of the 
lesion sites selectively associated with AHP in recent studies.  Specifically, among the 
critical cortical areas (e.g., inferior and middle frontal gyrus, insula, superior temporal 
gyrus; STG; temporo-parietal junction; TPJ) that have been selectively associated with 
AHP (Berti et al., 2005; Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Karnath at al., 2005; Moro at al., 2011; 
Vocat at al., 2010; also see Chapter 3). Areas such as the STG and the TPJ have also been 
implicated in the so-called “mentalising network” (Aichhorn et al., 2009; Gallagher & 
Frith, 2003; Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013; Siegal & Varley, 2002), while damage to areas 
around the right inferior and middle frontal gyri have been shown to relate to a difficulty 
to inhibit the self-perspective (Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan, & Humphreys, 
2005). Nevertheless, to the authors knowledge no behavioural, nor neuroimaging study 
has examined the relationship between AHP and social cognition. This was the aim of the 
current study. 
 
Specifically, this study aimed to examine both visual-spatial perspective-taking and 
reflective (verbal) facets of mentalising in a group of patients with right-hemisphere 
damage and severe AHP, compared to a control group of patients with right-hemisphere 
damage but no AHP, and a second, control group of neurologically healthy participants. 
To this end, a visual-spatial perspective taking experiment was designed and tested, as 
well as a set of ‘theory of mind’ stories that required participants to infer the mental states 




AHP patients may be unable to spontaneously take 3rd person perspectives and use such 
information to update their self-awareness (see above), it is expected that they would 
perform worse than both control groups in the 3rd person conditions on both tasks. It was 
also expected that such deficits would be associated with their degree of motor 
unawareness, as well as with some executive functions impairments. A secondarily 
prediction was that both right-hemisphere groups would perform worse than healthy 
controls on both tasks, consistently with the aforementioned previous studies.   
 
Finally, advanced lesion mapping methods such as voxel-based lesion symptom mapping 
(VLSM; Bates et al, 2003; Rorden et al., 2007) was used to identified the areas commonly 
damaged in patients, and the relation of the damaged brain areas to the behavioural scores 
in the experimental tasks. It is predicted that lesions of the inferior and middle frontal 
gyrus (IFG and MFG), the supramarginal gyrus (i.e. TPJ) and the STG would be linked 
with worse performance on the experimental tasks, with the last two areas being 
implicated more in visual spatial versus verbal perspective-taking, respectively.  
 
4.2 General Methods 
 
4.2.1 Participants  
Thirty right-handed, adult neurological patients with right-hemisphere lesions and 
contralateral hemiplegia (16 females, mean age = 68.44 years, SD = 12.73 years) 
participated in the study. Patients were recruited from consecutive admissions to three 
acute stroke wards using the inclusion criteria specified in Chapter 2. 
 
Patients were divided into two groups based on their clinical diagnosis of AHP. This 
classification was based on the Berti structured interview (Berti et al., 1996) and the 
Feinberg et al. (2000) scale as described in Chapter 2. Based on the Berti interview, 
fifteen patients were classified as having AHP (AHP; 9 females, mean age = 66.53 years, 
SD = 13.67 years, age range: 47-88 years) and 15 patients were classified as hemiplegic 
controls (HP; 7 females, mean age = 67.13 years, SD = 16.02 years, age range: 36-86 
years). This classification was then further confirmed by the Feinberg scale. Patient 
performance on the experimental tasks was compared to 15 age-matched healthy (non-
neurological) controls recruited at the same hospital sites, among visitors to the hospital 





4.2.2 Neurological and neuropsychological assessment  
In addition to the above anosognosia assessments, the neurological and 
neuropsychological profile of the patients was formally assessed using selective measures 
measures specified in Chapter 2. Specifically: motor strength of upper and lower limbs 
was assessed; proprioceptionas well as visual fields and tactile extinction tested; 
orientation, working memory and mood, as well as visual-spatial, representational and 
personal neglect were assessed. Patients, as well as healthy controls, were additionally 
assessed using the following neuropsychological measures detailed in Chapter 2: general 
cognitive functioning together with long-term verbal recall were assessed; premorbid 
intelligence and executive and reasoning abilities were tested.  
 
4.3 Experimental investigations  
 
4.3.1 Experiment 1: Visual-spatial perspective taking (VSPT) 
 
4.3.1.1 Design  
In order to assess visual-spatial perspective taking (VSPT), a visual-spatial task was 
designed that required participants to count the number of items observed from different 
visual-spatial perspectives (see task details below). A 3 x 3 design was used with one 
between-subject factor (Group: AHP vs. HP vs. HC) and one within-subject factor 
(Perspective: 1st PPT vs. 3rd PPT animate vs. 3rd PPT inanimate). The main dependent 
variable was the total number of correct responses.  Each trial was binary scored (1 = 
correct, 0 = incorrect). Total scores were converted into percentages for statistical 
analyses (see below).  
 
4.3.1.2 Materials and procedures  
To construct a suitable VSPT task for the patient populations, an existing task was 
adapted and piloted (Langdon & Coltheart, 2001; Samson et al., 2005). The task (see 
Figure 4.1 for an illustration) involved three visual-spatial positions and corresponding 
perspectives: (1) the participant seated at his/her wheelchair in front of a table (1st person 
perspective), (2) the experimenter seated directly opposite the participant (at a 180° angle; 
3rd person animate perspective) and (3) a photo-camera (placed on a table at the right-
hand side of the patient to account for left visuospatial neglect) at a 90° angle (3rd person 
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The position of the cups on the tray was changed after each trial, with the number of cups 
in the “front row” differing for each visual-spatial perspective (the participant, the 
experimenter and the camera). Five different arrangements were used (see Appendix I) 
for examples): two were used for the physical property control trials and three different 
arrangements were used for the VSPT trials. In total, the task consisted of six control 
trials and six VSPT trials (two per perspective condition).  
 
Example items and questions controlling for visual-spatial neglect (for patients only) 
preceded the experimental questions (see Appendix J). The experiment only proceeded if 
the participant could see the tray and count all cups during all practice items and at 
regular intervals between conditions. Results from the pilot study confirmed that 
experimental instructions were fully comprehensible and patients’ performance was not 
influenced by neglect.   
 
4.3.2 Experiment 2: Theory of mind (ToM) stories 
 
4.3.2.1 Design  
In order to assess verbal ToM abilities, previous story-based tests were adapted (Hynes et 
al., 2006) that required participants to understand the mental states (e.g., beliefs, 
intentions or emotions) of different people in the stories. The experimental design 
included one between-subject factor (Group: AHP vs. HP vs. HC) and two within-subject 
factors (Perspective: 1st PPT vs. 3rd PPT; and Order: 1st order vs. 2nd order). Perspective 
was manipulated by changing the ‘person’ in which the protagonist of the stories was 
presented. First person perspective stories were expressed in the 2nd person (e.g. “You are 
sitting by the TV…”), while 3rd person perspective stories were expressed in the 3rd 
person (e.g. “Eddie is sitting by the TV …”). Order was manipulated by altering the 
questions participants were required to answer so that the participants had to understand a 
character’s mental state (1st order) or a character’s belief about the mental state of another 
character in the story (2nd order). This design allowed for a 3 x 2 x 2 comparison on the 
main dependent variable of ToM accuracy, which comprised of a composite score of 
spontaneous and multiple-choice answers (minimum score = 0; maximum score = 2). 
However, supplementary statistical analysis were also run using multiple-choice answers 





4.3.2.2 Materials and procedures  
Twenty stories were created in total: sixteen target ToM stories and four control stories, 
of carefully matched characteristics. All stories consisted of at least two characters and 
were followed first by an open ToM question and then by three multiple-choice responses 
(Hynes et al., 2006). Ten of the stories (eight ToM and two control) were expressed in the 
1st person, while the other ten were expressed in the 3rd person (see Figure 4.2, and 
examples in Appendix K). Half of the ToM stories were followed by a question about the 
mental state of one of the character’s (1st Order), while the other half consisted of an 
extension of the original story and were followed by a question about the beliefs of one of 
the characters about the mental states of the other character (2nd Order). The control 
stories were similar to the ToM stories and involved social situations, but the questions 
required inferential reasoning and semantic knowledge rather than perspective taking. 
ToM and control stories in both conditions did not differ in word length (t (18) = 0.46, p 
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All scenarios and questions were read out-loud to the participants, in slow pace and 
neutral tone. Stories and questions were repeated on request of the participant or if the 
examiner felt it was necessary due to distraction or fatigue reasons. Participants were self-
paced and were given ample time for responding. The participants were first required to 
make a spontaneous response, which the examiner wrote down in full. Subsequently, the 
experimenter read the multiple-choice options and participants had to indicate their 
choice verbally, which all patients were able to do. Of the multiple-choice options given, 
there was only one possible correct answer, the other options being either (i) the incorrect 
belief or (ii) irrelevant or incoherent with the story. For each question a composite score 
was calculated using both the multiple-choice answers and the spontaneous answer. 
Multiple-choice answers were scored as 1 = correct and 0 = incorrect. Spontaneous 
answers were scored as 1 = correct, 0.5 = partially correct/inadequate and 0 = incorrect. 
Two raters scored the spontaneous answers independently. Interclass correlation 
coefficient of 0.95 indicated a good agreement between raters. Divergent scores (<1% of 
stories) were discussed and jointly agreed on. Total scores were converted into 
percentages and used in the statistical analyses.  
 
In the patient groups, testing was conducted in two successive sessions to avoid fatigue. 
The order of the presentation of the two sets (1st PPT and 3rd PPT) was counterbalanced. 
Each set began and ended with a control story. To check for comprehension, following 
each control story, all participants were asked to rate how well they understood the story. 
A 5-point Likert-type scale was used (i.e. “Using this scale from one to five, how well did 
you understand the story? One being the lowest score, where you understood very little, 
and 5 being the highest score, where you understood the whole story”). The scale was 
read aloud to participants and also presented visually as a vertical scale on an A4 sheet of 
paper (from one to five), positioned in the right visual field in order to minimise possible 
unilateral visual neglect effects in the patient groups. Participants were familiarised with 
the rating scale before the experiment. The task was piloted on twenty healthy controls 
and four neurological patients (two AHP and two HP) to test for comprehension of stories 
and questions, possible attentional biases in the patient group and other testing 
considerations. The results confirmed the suitability of the stories and questions but minor 






4.3.3 Control experiments  
 
4.3.3.1 Control false belief tasks  
Two classic false belief tasks were used as a baseline measure of the participants’ ability 
to understand that others may have representations of the world that are false and/or 
different from their own (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). Task 1 was an age-adapted 
version of the “Smarties” task (Gopnik & Astington, 1988). It involved a direct, 1st person 
scenario, where the participant is directly involved in the scenario by participating as an 
active agent. Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1985) “Sally-Anne” false belief task was used as the 
second task. Task 2 involved an indirect, 3rd person scenario, where the participant is not 
directly involved and is read a narrative about other agents (see Appendix L for full 
description of methods).  
 
4.3.3.2 Mental rotation task  
A mental rotation task (Vandenberg & Kuse, 1978; Neuburger et al., 2011) was added as 
an additional control task to assess whether deficits in visual-spatial perspective could be 
attributed to impairments in mental rotation ability. This was tested on a subset of patients 
(six AHP and HP patients, respectively). The mental rotation task involves two 
conditions: a letter condition where a picture of the letter “F” is used and an animal 
condition where a line drawing of an elephant is used. The patient is required to mentally 
rotate the stimuli in each condition. In each condition, the target stimulus is shown on the 
right-hand side and four comparison stimuli are also presented vertically on the right side. 
The comparison stimuli are presented using two of five possible rotation angles across 
both conditions: 90°, 135°, 225°, 270° and 315°. Two of the four comparison stimuli are 
correct (i.e. actual rotations of the target image) and two incorrect (left-right reversed 
mirror images of the target, rather than an angular rotation). The patient is asked to cross 
out the two correct comparisons. The order of presentation of the two conditions was 
counterbalanced.  
 
4.3.4 Statistical analysis  
All behavioural analyses were conducted in SPSS (IBM Corp, 2013.). Non-parametric 
tests were used as the data were not normally distributed. For analysis of neurological and 
neuropsychological tests, the alpha significance level was set to α = 0.01 to account for 
multiple comparisons. For the experimental tasks, Bonferroni corrections were used 





Furthermore, the pattern of correlations was examined between perspective taking and (1) 
frontal inhibition (i.e. go-no-go task from the FAB), as well as (2)  anosognosia (using the 
Feinberg awareness scores) and perspective taking  (3rd person condition scores in both 
the VSPT and the ToM tasks) in the AHP group. Non-parametric Spearman’s rho tests 
were used for all correlation analyses.  
 
4.3.5 Lesion mapping methods  
Routinely acquired clinical scans (CT and/or MRI) were obtained for 29 patients (clinical 
data set of one HP patient was unavailable) within the first week of symptom onset. 
Lesion mapping methods specified in Chapter 2 were followed for analysis below. 
Separate VLSM analyses were run for the following dependent variable (continuous 
scores): i) Feinberg awareness scores, ii) 3rd PPT scores in the visual-spatial tasks, and iii) 
3rd PPT in ToM stories. For these behavioural measures, a lower score corresponded to 
lower awareness and lower perspective taking ability in both the VSPT and ToM tasks. 
For the purpose of this paper the term temporal-parietal junction (TPJ) refers to the area 
centered around the supramarginal and angular gyrus at the convergence of the superior 




4.4.1 Demographic and neuropsychological results 
A summary of the neuropsychological and neurological profile of the participants is 
provided in Table 1.1. No significant difference was observed for age, years of education, 
pre-morbid IQ, long-term memory recall and general cognitive functioning between all 
three groups (all p’s > 0.15). As expected, there was a significant difference in awareness 
scores (Berti interview: Z = – 4.99, p < 0.001; Feinberg scale: Z= – 4.83, p < 0.001) 
between the patient groups (AHP vs. HP). The patient groups did not differ in their time 
of symptom onset and assessment interval, orientation, or working memory (p’s > 0.53). 
The scores of both patient groups were also within the normal range for the general 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale. AHP patients performed significantly worse on 
tests of proprioception compared with HP patients (Z = – 3.17, p < 0.001). Both patient 
groups presented with similar visual and sensory deficits, as well as visual-spatial and 
personal neglect. Neglect appeared to be more impaired in the AHP group, although such 
differences did not reach significant levels as set (alpha = 0.01; e.g., star cancelation: Z= 




Both patient groups performed outside the normal range on the Cognitive Estimates Test 
suggesting possible deficits in abstract reasoning, however, there was no statistical 
difference between groups (AHP vs. HP; Z = – 0.04, p = 0.98). There was a significant 
difference between patient groups on FAB scores, with AHP patients preforming 
significantly worse overall (Z = – 3.05, p <0.001), and on three subtests, specifically: 
conflicting instructions (Z = – 3.25, p = 0.001), inhibitory control (go-no-go test; Z = –
4.04, p < 0.001), and precision behaviour (Z = – 3.17, p = 0.002). The healthy controls 
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4.4.2 Experimental results  
 
4.4.2.1 Experiment 1: VSPT task 
 
Main effects  
All participants answered the control questions correctly without any exceptions. An 
independent sample Kruskall-Wallis test confirmed a significant main effect of Group (H 
(2) = 31.92, p < 0.001, r = 0.73). Subsequent pairwise comparisons, with Bonferroni 
corrections ( = 0.017) showed significant poorer performance in the AHP group (median 
= 33.3) compared with both HP patients (median = 83.3; Z = –3.95, p < 0.001, r = 0.72), 
and HCs (median = 100; Z = –4.87, p < 0.001, r = 0.89), as well as poorer performance in 
the HP group relative to HCs (Z = 2.90, p = 0.004, r = 0.53).  
 
A Friedman test revealed a significant main effect of Perspective (χ2(2) = 42.99, p < 
0.001, r = 0.97). Pairwise analysis with Bonferroni corrections ( = 0.017) showed a 
significant difference between 1st (median = 100) and 3rd animate conditions (median = 
50; Z = 3.40, p = 0.001, r = 0.5) as well as the 1st and 3rd inanimate conditions (median = 
50; Z= 4.33, p < 0.001, r = 0.65). However, there was no significant difference between 
3rd animate and 3rd inanimate PPT (Z = 0.928, p = 0.35, r = 0.14), as well as no significant 
difference within groups for 3rd animate and 3rd inanimate PPT (ps > 0.32). Therefore the 
3rd animate and 3rd inanimate conditions were combined to create a composite score for 
3rd PPT (median = 75) and used in subsequent analyses below (see Appendix M).  
 
Two-way effects 
The interaction between Group and Perspective was analysed by calculating the 
difference between 1st PPT and 3rd PPT scores and comparing these between groups using 
a Kruskal-Wallis test, showing a significant interaction (H(2) = 27.88, p < 0.001, r = 
0.63). Pairwise comparisons, using Bonferoni corrections ( = 0.017) showed no 
significant difference in 1st PPT abilities between AHP (median = 100) and HP patients 
(median = 100; Z = –0.92, p = 0.6, r = 0.16), the AHP and HC groups (Z = –1.43, p = 
0.48, r = 0.27), as well as the HP controls and HC’s (median = 100; Z = –1, p = 1, r = 
0.18). However, there was a significant difference in 3rd PPT between both the AHP and 
HP group (Z = –3.97, p < 0.001, r = 0.72), AHP and HC group (Z = 4.88, p < 0.001, r = 
0.89), as well as between the two control groups (Z = –2.91, p = 0.004, r = 0.53). AHP 
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An independent sample Kruskall-Wallis test confirmed a significant main effect of Group 
(H (2) = 20.65, p < 0.001, r = 0.47). Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections ( 
= 0.017) showed a significant difference between the AHP and HP groups (Z = –3.3, p = 
0.001, r = 0.6), AHP and HC group (Z = –3.94, p = 0.72, r = 0.72), and HP and HC 
groups (Z = –2.34, p = 0.02, r = 0.42). Therefore overall, the AHP patients (median = 
56.25) performed worse on the social stories when compared to HP patients (median = 
75) and healthy controls (median = 89.06). A Wilcoxon signed rank test showed a 
significant main effect of Perspective (Z = 3.92, p < 0.001, r = 0.58) with participants 
preforming significantly worse on 3rd PPT (median = 68.75) than 1st PPT questions 
(median = 81.25). The main effect of Order was also significant (Z = –5.23, p < 0.001, r = 
0.82), with participants performing significantly worse on 2nd order questions (median = 
59.38) compared to 1st order (median = 84.38).  
 
Two- and three-way interactions  
The interaction between Group and Perspective was analysed by calculating the 
difference between 1st PPT and 3rd PPT scores and comparing these between groups. A 
Kruskal-Wallis test revealed a significant interaction (H(2) = 22.73, p < 0.001, r = 0.52). 
Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections ( = 0.017) showed no significant 
difference in 1st PPT responses between AHP (median = 81.25) and HP patients (median 
= 78.5; Z = 0.23, p = 0.82, r = 0.04), AHP and HC groups (median = 87.5; Z = 1.44, p = 
0.16, r = 0.23) as well as HP and HCs (Z = 1.73, p = 0.85, r = 0.32). However, there was a 
significant difference in 3rd PPT between both the AHP and HP group (Z = 4.34, p < 
0.001, r = 0.79), the AHP and HC group (Z = 4.2, p < 0.001, r = 0.72), as well as between 
the two control groups (Z = 2.7, p = 0.006, r = 0.49). AHP patients (median = 31.25) 
therefore present with a specific impairment in 3rd PPT in ToM stories when compared 
with both HP patients (median = 68.75) and healthy controls (median = 87.5; Figure 4.4). 
 
The interaction between Group and Order, as well as the interaction between Perspective 
and Order was likewise analysed by calculating their relevant differential scores and 
comparing their difference using a Kruskal-Wallis test and Wilcoxon signed rank test 
respectively. Both interactions were not significant (H(2) = 2.39, p = 0.30, r = 0.05; Z =  –
0.94, p = 0.35, r = 0.14). The interaction between Group, Perspective and Order was 
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the worse the patients’ performance in the Go-no-Go subtest (i.e. inhibition/set-shifting) 
of executive functioning the worse their 3rd PPT ability in both experiments.  
 
4.4.2.4 Control tasks 
 
False-belief tasks 
In the AHP group, one of the 15 patients failed one false belief question in the age-
adapted “Smarties” false-belief task, and four of the 15 patients failed one false belief 
question in the Sally-Anne task (93% and 87% of questions passed respectively). All 
healthy controls, and 14 out of 15 HP passed all false belief questions in both experiments 
(100% and 97% of questions passed, respectively). The difference between the three 
groups was not significant for the adapted “Smarties” false-belief task (H(2)=1.12, 
p=0.55) or Sally-Anne task (H(2)=3.24, p = 0.2). For both the age-adapted “Smarties” 
false-belief and Sally-Anne task, all participants passed the reality and memory control 
questions without exception. 
 
Mental rotation task 
A Mann-Whitney-U test was used to compare performance on the mental rotation task 
between the two patient groups (the task was not administered in the healthy control 
group). The test revealed that there was no significant difference between groups (Z =  –
0.64, p = 1, r = 0.18; AHP: median = 50, SD = 10.2; HP: median = 50, SD = 12.9). 
 
4.4.3 Lesion mapping results 
Group-level percentage lesion overlay maps for the AHP group (n = 15) identified 
involvement of the fronto-parietal-temporal cortices. Commonly damaged areas included 
the inferior and medial frontal gyri, the insula ribbon, the supramarginal gyrus, and the 
dorsal frontal white matter (Figure 4.5A). The HP group (n = 14) in comparison presented 
with a more focal damage largely involving subcortical regions with extension into 
surrounding fronto-parietal white matter (Figure 4.5B). Lesion volume (in cubic 
centimetres) was comparable between the AHP (mean = 8.49, SD = 8.00) and the HP 
group (mean = 5.28, SD = 7.29; t (27) = –1.13, p = 0.27). Subtraction maps identified 
clusters around the insula ribbon, inferior and middle frontal gyri (IFG and MFG, 
respectively), superior temporal gyrus (STG), supramarginal gyrus (SMG), and the pre– 
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VLSM analysis using the continuous Feinberg awareness scores revealed that voxels 
within the insula ribbon, supramarginal gyrus (SMG) and STG, as well as the anterior 
arm of the internal capsule, were significantly associated with motor unawareness (Figure 
4.6A). VLSM analysis looking at deficits in 3rd PPT conditions (combining animate and 
inanimate conditions) in the VSPT experiment identified significant voxels (p < 0.05) 
within the IFG and MFG, SMG, precentral and postcentral gyrus as well as the head of 
the caudate nucleus and dorsal frontal white matter (Figure 4.6B). The cluster with the 
maximum Z (Z = 5.6) corresponds to the inferior frontal gyrus. The VLSM analysis for 
the continuous measure of ToM 3rd PPT ability returned significant voxels (p < 0.05) in 
the fronto-parietal cortices, including the IFG, precentral and postcentral gyus, and the 
supramarginal gyrus. Further, the STG and the dorsal frontal white matter were 
significantly associated with deficits in 3rd PPT in the ToM (Figure 4.6C). Also for ToM 
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4.5 Discussion  
To the investigators knowledge this is the first experimental study to investigate the 
relationship between bodily self-awareness and social cognition. The present study used a 
visual-spatial task and ToM stories to study perspective taking and mentalisation in AHP 
patients compared to neurological and healthy controls. The main behavioural finding 
was that AHP patients presented with selective deficits in 3rd PPT compared to 1st PPT 
relative to both HP control patients and healthy volunteers. Additionally, it appears the 
more severe their unawareness the greater the deficit in perspective taking. Importantly, 
there was a strong correlation between 3rd PPT and executive function, specifically set-
shifting abilities. The main finding of the lesion analysis, combining experimental and 
lesion data, showed that 3rd PPT in both visual-spatial and mental perspective taking were 
associated with lesions to the IFG, MFG, SMG, pre-and-post central gyrus as well as 
dorsal frontal white matter.  
 
This study also confirms the importance of the right-hemisphere for ToM processes. As 
predicted, all neurological patients compared to age-matched healthy controls showed 
selective deficits in social cognitive abilities, in both VSPT and ToM tasks, providing 
converging evidence of the right-hemisphere’s involvement in social cognition (see 
Happé et al., 1999). Crucially however, AHP patients presented with more severe and 
specific deficits in mentalising. In the visual-spatial tasks AHP patients had intact self - 
1st PPT. However, the capacity to take on other - 3rd person perspectives was markedly 
impaired in unaware patients. Similarly, AHP patients presented with significantly more 
impaired ability on 3rd person ToM stories, compared to 1st person stories.  
 
However, the ability to correctly attribute false beliefs was intact in all participants, 
suggesting that AHP patients are aware of ‘other’ minds and that basic ToM abilities are 
intact. The correlation between inhibition control and deficits in 3rd PPT is suggestive of a 
possible impairment of switching or inhibiting between 1st and 3rd person perspectives. 
More specifically, apparent deficits in 3rd PPT may not be attributed to ‘mind blindness’, 
as these patients are aware of ‘other minds’ and perspectives, but it is rather indicative of 
a difficulty to inhibit the 1st person perspective. Other lesion studies have also found 
unilateral right hemisphere damage to be associated with executive functioning, and more 
specifically set-shifting or inhibitory control (Griffin et al., 2006; Samson et al., 2005). It 




understood as an inability to switch between egocentric and allocentric perspectives, due 
to several cognitive deficits and/or an impairment in a control mechanises, resulting in a 
tendency to be developmentally stuck in an egocentric reality (Frith & de Vignemont, 
2005). Social cognitive difficulties in AHP may be similar to those in Asperger’s in that 
they are deficits to cognitive mechanisms that control switching between perspectives. As 
suggested in Asperger’s Syndrome, and possibly AHP, the social world becomes self-
centered, egocentrically driven, since they are unable to spontaneously switch or 
disengage between 1st person (egocentric) and 3rd person (allocentic) viewpoints. 
Therefore the allocentric, 3rd person, perspective may not exist by itself, but only in 
relation to the 1st person perspective (also see Turnbull et al., 2014). These egocentric or 
narcissistic tendencies of AHP patients have been also observed in clinical case studies 
(Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2002). 
 
Results of the VLSM using 3rd person perspective taking scores also highlight anatomical 
areas that have been previously identified as part of a ‘mentalising network’ (Koster-Hale 
& Saxe, 2013), specifically the supramarginal (TPJ) and pre-and postcentral gyrus. These 
results also highlight right frontal-parietal damage to be associated with AHP, which has 
also been implicated in distinguishing between 1st person and 3rd person mental states 
(Abu-Akel & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). The IFG and MFG showed the highest associations 
with deficits in 3rd PPT in both tasks. Previous studies have shown that the right inferior 
parietal cortex, precuneus and somatosensory cortex are specifically involved in 
distinguishing self and other mental states (Ruby & Decety, 2001). Additionally, the IFG 
(Uddin et al., 2007; Uddin et al., 2005) has been implicated in facilitating this distinction 
through attentional systems. Abdu-Akel & Shamay-Tsoory (2011) propose that both the 
ventral and dorsal attentional systems act together though the MFG, linking attentional 
and mentalising functions to process 1st person and 3rd person mental states. Furthermore, 
recent studies have suggested that the right IFG plays a particular role in set-shifting and 
inhibition, which is required for the suppression of responses (Samson et al., 2005). 
Therefore, this proposed impairment in spontaneously switching or disengaging between 
1st and 3rd person perspectives might be a consequence of damage to the IFG and MFG 
specifically.  
 
Fluctuations in awareness have also been reported following questions in the 3rd person 
rather than 1st person perspective (i.e. “In your present state how well can you move your 




experimental case studies have also shown that video replay, which provides 3rd person 
and offline (at a time different than the one in which the patient initiated the movement) 
visual feedback, either immediately or gradually restores motor awareness in some AHP 
patients (Fotopoulou at al., 2009; see Chapter 6). In comparison, results from our study 
suggest that AHP patients do not spontaneously see themselves from a 3rd person 
perspective. Therefore viewing themselves from a 3rd person perspective in mirrors, video 
playback or discussions in the 3rd person may help facilitate an integration of these 
perspectives. This may therefore result in an increase or reinstatement of motor awareness 
either immediately or overtime, depending on the severity of deficits in perspective taking 
or the size and location of the lesion.  
 
In regards to the general anatomical substrates of AHP, the results confirmed a 
combination of involvement of both cortical and subcortical areas, as well as dorsal 
frontal white matter. Previous studies identifying the neuroanatomical substrates of AHP 
have mostly drawn on non-statistical lesion overlay methods or binomial tests (Berti et 
al., 2005; Karnath et al., 2005). In contrast to such lesion subtraction studies, a voxel-base 
lesion-symptom mapping approach (Bates et al., 2003; Rorden et al., 2007; Vocat et al., 
2010) was used. In the current study, the presence (lesion overlay and substraction) and 
severity of AHP, using Feinberg VLSM results, highlight lesions to the IFG and MFG 
(premotor areas), as previously identified by Berti et al. (2005) and Kortte et al. (2014), as 
well as the insula ribbon as first shown by Karnath et al. (2005). The STG and SMG, the 
caudate nucleus, as well as dorsal frontal white matter were further anatomical correlates 
highlighted by these lesion mapping results, which have been confirmed by previous 
studies (Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Moro et al., 2011).  
 
4.5.1 Limitations  
However, it is important to recognise that interpretation of the neuroanatomical correlates 
identified are limited by the small sample size and inherit limitations to the lesion 
mapping approach (Geva et al., 2012; Rorden et al., 2007; Volle et al., 2012). 
Nevertheless, all previous lesion mapping studies in AHP are subject to similar 
limitations, with this study being one of the few that has directly compared experimental 
scores with lesion data. Future studies will have to use better structural lesion data and 
fMRI paradigms to be able to more accurately identify brain areas related to AHP and its 
association with experimental measures. Although all experiments have been based on 




by the use of non-validated measures. However, in working with acute brain damaged 
patients all experimental measures must be adapted to be used at the bedside with acute 
and elderly stroke patients. Furthermore, to the investigators knowledge this is one of the 
first studies to investigate both the mental states/perspectives of others using ToM stories, 
and visual spatial perspective taking, which elucidates the embodied nature of perspective 
taking. This embodied view of self-representation remains a relatively unexplored area in 
AHP and holds the promise of significantly enhancing our understanding of the dynamic 
interaction between the social and embodied view of the self. Lastly, the current study has 
shown that AHP patients present with specific deficits in mentalising abilities; however, 
future studies should investigate mentalisation and difference in perspective taking in 








Chapter 5 Partiality of motor awareness: self and other referent 
processes in anosognosia for hemiplegia 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As previously discussed in Chapter 1, the clinical presentation of anosognosia for 
hemiplegia (AHP) can vary considerably (Fotopoulou, 2012). Clinical characteristics, 
such as the degree, extension, partiality (i.e. if patients have partial knowledge or 
awareness of their motor weakness depending on the question asked or social context) 
and specificity of unawareness can differ noticeably between patients (see Chapter 1). In 
regards to partiality of motor unawareness, a conflicting clinical observation has been 
frequently observed in that unaware patients deny their motor weakness, but are still 
willing to stay in the hospital, participate in treatment, and/or use a wheelchair (Prigatano 
& Weinstein, 1996; Bisiach & Berti, 1995; also see Mograbi & Morris, 2013). These 
observations suggest that AHP patients may have some partial knowledge of their motor 
impairments. In a single case study House and Hodge (1988) demonstrated this partiality 
of awareness by showing an anosognosic patient photographs of patients with and without 
motor disabilities. The patient was able to correctly identify that specific patients had 
motor impairments in the photographs. Interestingly, when asked to identify the person in 
the photograph “most like her”, she choose a picture of a patient in a wheelchair as the 
most similar to herself. These results again demonstrate that, depending on the condition, 
some anosognosic patients may to have partial knowledge of their motor deficits.  
 
Marcel et al. (2004) and colleagues followed up on these clinical observations and 
conducted the first systematic study on partial knowledge of hemiplegia. The 
experimental task identified differences in how patients reported unawareness depending 
on if questions were directed to the patient’s own motor deficits or that of another 
paralysed person. Patients were asked to rate their own or the ‘other’ persons’ motor 
ability on bimanual and bipedal actions using an 11-point scale. The more patients 
overestimated their motor ability on the tasks the greater their unawareness of motor 
paralysis.  Between 15% and 50% of AHP patients with right-hemisphere damage 
showed greater unawareness ‘in the self’ condition than the other. Therefore, AHP 
patients tended to overestimate their own motor ability (i.e. more unaware in the self 





There is however some confusion in the literature as to what is defined as 1st and 3rd 
person perspective, compared to self referent and other referent differences. For example, 
in the original Marcel et al. (2004) paper, 1st person was equated to the self referent and 
similarly 3rd person was paralleled to other referent. There can be conceptual differences 
in visual perspective taking (e.g. using videos and mirrors) and verbal perspective taking 
(e.g. ToM stories, see Chapter 4). For the purpose of this chapter however, 1st versus 3rd 
person perspective taking is conceptually different from self referent versus other referent 
differentiation. This study will investigate the partiality of motor awareness using verbal 
1st person and 3rd person perspective taking, as well as testing if there is partial knowledge 
or differences between self referent versus other referent conditions on unawareness. 
Taken together, it is therefore important to recognise that what is defined here as a 3rd 
person perspective is conceptually different to that of Marcel et al. (2004), as well as 
House & Hodge (1988). 
 
In a case-series investigation with three AHP patients, Ramachandran & Rogers-
Ramachandran (1996) explored whether motor unawareness of one’s own paralysis 
generalises to include the disabilities of other people. Two of the patients denied the 
disability of a ‘stooge’ hemiplegic patient who was seated in a wheelchair next to them. 
The authors concluded that at least some anosognosic patients deny the paralysis of 
another patient. Moro and colleagues (2011) further investigated this hypothesis using 
self referent and other referent awareness interviews. Eleven AHP patients were asked to 
rate their own motor abilities on a set of complex actions (e.g. getting dressed, driving a 
car etc.). They were asked the same questions referring to the motor ability of an age and 
gender matched hemiplegic patient, who was seated in a wheelchair in front of them. Four 
patients were unaware only in the self referent interview and seven were unaware in both 
the self-and-other referent interviews. Using clinical CT scans and lesion mapping 
methods, Moro and colleagues identified anatomical areas associated with scores in the 
self-and-other awareness interview. Regions associated with the self and other condition 
included the central sulcus, the frontal inferior and superior area and supplementary 
motor area.  The ability to distinguish between the self versus the other has similarly been 
associated with right frontal and motor areas, including the inferior and middle frontal 
gyrus (IFG and MFG; Abu-Akel & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Superior-temporal areas (e.g. 
superior temporal gyrus, STG and temporal parietal junction, TPG) have likewise been 
commonly associated with mentalising or ToM abilities (Koster-Hale & Sax, 2013; see 





As previously discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 4, presenting visual 3rd person feedback 
using videos and mirrors can lead to either temporary or permanent remission of AHP, as 
well as disorders of body ownership (e.g. somatoparaphrenia; Fotopoulou et al., 2009; 
Fotopoulou et al., 2011; Jenkinson et al., 2013; also see Chapter 6). Additionally, in the 
previous chapter it was shown that AHP patients have a specific deficit in 3rd person 
perspective (PP) taking in a visual-spatial task and ToM stories. However, no study has 
investigated these deficits in perspective taking in relation to disability related items.  
 
The aim of the current study was to investigate the partiality of motor unawareness in two 
ways, through investigating differences in: (1) 1st person versus 3rd person perspective 
(PP); and (2) self referent versus other referent conditions. Accordingly, three 
experiments were conducted to explore perspective taking and self-other reference in 
motor awareness tasks. Experiment 1 was designed to investigate whether there are 
differences in motor unawareness when asked from a 1st PP verus a 3rd PP in a self 
referent condition. The purpose of Experiment 2 was to specifically test if AHP patients 
were aware of the paralysis of another paralysed patient shown in a video, and if there are 
differences in 1st PP and 3rd PP in an other referent condition. The aim of Experiment 3 
was to directly compare the difference between self referential and other referential 
processes in motor unawareness using disability related ToM stories. Furthermore, since 
Experiment 3 allowed for a direct comparison between self and other referent differences 
in motor awareness, the experimental results of the difference between self and other 
awareness was used in a voxel-based lesion-symptom (VLSM) analysis (see Chapter 2 for 
methods). This allowed for the comparison between the associated brain areas with 
anosognosia, and the difference in self and other referent awareness questions. It was 
predicted that AHP patients would overestimate their abilities when asked from a 1st 
person perspective, but have more accurate estimates when asked from a 3rd person 
perspective. Furthermore, it was expected that most patients’ anosognosia would extend 
to include the paralysis of another hemiplegic patient (i.e. be unaware of the motor 
deficits of another paralysed patient). Finally, a difference in the severity of unawareness 
was predicted, with AHP patients being more aware (i.e. less anosognosic) of the 





5.2 General methods and results  
5.5.1 Patients 
Thirty-eight right-handed, adult neurological patients with right-hemisphere lesions 
participated in the studies below (19 females, mean age = 65.97, SD = 16.13 years; age 
range: 33-97). Patients were recruited from consecutive admission to three acute stroke 
wards and one rehabilitation clinic using the standard inclusion and exclusion criteria 
described in Chapter 2.  
 
Patients were divided into two groups based on their classification of anosognosia using 
the Berti et al. (2005) and Feinberg et al. (2000) measures as specified in Chapter 2. 
Nineteen patients were classified as having AHP (11 females; mean age = 67.68, SD = 
16.32 years; age range: 33-86) and 19 patients were classified as hemiplegic (HP) 
controls (8 females; mean age = 64.26, SD = 15.95 years; age range: 41-87).  
 
5.5.2 Statistical analysis  
All behavioural analyses were conducted in SPSS (IBM Corp, 2013). For analysis of 
neurological and neuropsychological tests, non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests were 
used (owing to the non-normal data distribution) to analyse the difference between the 
two patient groups. For these analyses only, the alpha significance level was set to α < 
0.01 to account for multiple comparisons. Analyses of all experimental investigations 
below were also conducted using non-parametric tests (owing to the non-normal data 
distribution), applying a Bonferroni correction where appropriate.  
 
5.5.3 Neurological and neuropsychological testing  
In addition to the above anosognosia assessments, the neurological and 
neuropsychological profile of the patients was formally assessed using measures 
described in Chapter 2. A summary of the neuropsychological and neurological profile of 
the patients is provided in Table 5.1. No significant difference was observed for age, 
years of education, pre-morbid IQ, long-term memory recall and general cognitive 
functioning between groups (all p’s > 0.12). The groups did not differ in their time of 
symptom onset and assessment interval, orientation or working memory (all p’s > 0.37). 
As expected there was a significant difference in awareness between the AHP and HP 
patients (Berti interview: Z = – 5.55, p < 0.001, r =  0.9; Feinberg scale: Z= – 5.19, p < 
0.001, r = 0.84). Both groups were also within the normal range for the general Hospital 




proprioception compared with HP patients (Z = –3.17, p < 0.001, r = 0.51). Both patient 
groups presented with similar visual and sensory deficits, as well as visual-spatial and 
personal neglect (see Table 5.1). Although not significantly different, neglect was 
marginally greater in the AHP group (e.g., star cancelation: Z= –2.04, p = 0.04, r = 0.33; 
Comb/Razor test of personal neglect percentage bias: Z= –2.72, p = 0.01, r = 0.44). Both 
patient groups performed outside the normal range on the Cognitive Estimates Test, 
suggesting possible deficits in abstract reasoning, however, there was no statistical 
difference between groups (AHP vs. HP; Z = –0.52, p = 0.62). There was a trend towards 
significance between patient groups for the overall FAB score (Z = –3.05, p = 0.01, r = 
0.49) and a significant difference between groups on the go-no-go subtest (Z = –3.33, p < 
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5.3 Experiment 1: Self awareness 
 
5.5.1 Patients and design  
Of the 38 patients, five were excluded from this experiment due to time constraints (e.g. 
unavailability due to other clinical sessions and patient transfer); therefore 34 patients 
participated in the current study. Seventeen patients were classified as having AHP (10 
females, mean age = 67.65, SD = 16.89 years) and 17 as HP controls (8 females, mean 
age = 63.29, SD = 15.11 years) using the assessment criteria specified above (also see 
Chapter 2).  
 
The main experimental design included one between subject factor (Group: AHP vs. HP 
patients), and one within subject factor (Self Verbal Perspective Taking: 1st person vs. 3rd 
person). This allowed for a 2 x 2 experimental design on the main dependent variable: 
awareness ratings (see Section 5.5.2 below for details). Awareness ratings were calculated 
using a composite score, comprising of general awareness ratings and awareness for 
actions (5 bimanual actions and 2 bipedal actions based on Marcel et al., 2004) from a 
questionnaire (see below for details).  
 
5.5.2 Materials  
The experimental task was based on Marcel et al.’s (2004) estimates of current ability 
task. An awareness questionnaire was designed, based on validated measures (Bisiach et 
al., 1986; Marcel et al., 2004), consisting of 10 questions. The questionnaire was divided 
into two sections: (1) general awareness questions; and (2) awareness of ability to 
perform bimanual and unimanual actions. Three general awareness questions were first 
asked: “Is there anything wrong with your movement since the stroke?”; “Can you move 
your left arm as normal?”; and “Can you move your left leg as normal?”. In the second 
part, patients were asked to rate their motor ability on seven actions used by Marcel et al. 
(2004). The actions consisted of five bimanual and two bipedal actions, specifically:  tie a 
knot; clap hands; shuffle cards; row a boat; unscrew a bottle; climb a ladder; and jump. 
Two sets of the questionnaire were developed. Set one asked patients to judge their motor 
abilities from their own perspective- 1st person perspective (e.g. “Can you move your left 
arm as normal?”). Set two asked patients to judge their motor abilities from the 
perspective of the physiotherapist- 3rd person perspective (e.g. “If the physiotherapist 





5.5.3 Procedures and scoring  
The questions were all read out-loud to the patients, in a slow pace and neutral tone.  
Questions were repeated on request of the patient or if the examiner felt it was necessary 
due to distraction or fatigue reasons. The order of the presentation of the two sets (1st PP 
and 3rd PP) was counterbalanced and there was a five-minute break between the 
administration of both sets. On presentation of the 1st PP set, patients were asked to 
answer questions and judge their motor ability from their own perspective. On 
presentation of the 3rd PP set, patients were instructed to judge their own motor ability 
from the perspective of the physiotherapist (e.g. “If the physiotherapist was here now, 
would he/she think that you can…”).  
 
Patients were first asked to make a spontaneous response for the three general awareness 
questions, which the examiner wrote down in full. Patient were then asked to rate their 
ability on each of the seven action items using an 11-point Likert-type scale: “From your 
perspective, in your present state, how well compared with your normal ability, from a 
scale from 10 – you can do it as well as usual- to 0 –you cannot do it at all- can 
you…(e.g. tie a knot)”; or “From the physiotherapists perspective, in your present state, 
how well compared with your normal ability, from a scale from 10 – you can do it as well 
as usual- to 0 –you cannot do it at all- does the physiotherapist think you can…(e.g. tie a 
knot)”. The 11-point rating scale was read out-load to the patients and also presented 
visually as a vertical scale on an A4 sheet of paper (0 at the bottom and 10 at the top), 
positioned in the patient’s right visual field in order to minimise possible unilateral visual 
neglect effects. Patients were familiarised with the rating scale before the experiment 
began.  
 
The three general awareness questions were scored using a modified version of the 
Feinberg scoring method: 0 = no unawareness of deficit; 5 = partial unawareness of 
deficit; and 10 = complete unawareness of deficit (maximum score = 30; the higher 
scores indicate greater unawareness). The seven motor-related actions were scored using 
the ratings given by the patients from 0-10 (0 = cannot perform the action at all; 10 = can 
perform the action as well as usual). Therefore generating a total maximum score of 70 
for action related items (higher scores indicate greater unawareness). The general and 
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5.4 Experiment 2: Other awareness 
 
5.5.1 Patients and design  
As in the experiment above, of the 38 patients, five were excluded due to time constraints 
(e.g. unavailability due to other clinical sessions and patient transfer); therefore 34 
patients participated in the current study. Seventeen patients were classified as having 
AHP (10 females, mean age = 67.65, SD = 16.89) and 17 as HP controls (8 females, 
mean age = 63.29, SD = 15.11) using the assessment criteria specified above.  
 
The main experimental design included one between subject factor, Group (AHP vs. HP 
patients) and one within subject factor (Other Verbal Perspective Taking: 1st person vs. 
3rd person). This allowed for a 2 x 2 experimental design on the main dependent variable: 
awareness ratings. The awareness rating was calculated using the same composite score 
from the questionnaire as in Experiment 1.   
 
5.5.2 Materials  
A 40 second video clip of an ‘other’ paralysed person was filmed using a portable digital 
video camera (Sony Hanycam, DCR-SR57). Two videos were filmed of a female and 
male ‘stooge patient’, and shown to the patients according to gender. The video of the 
male and female ‘stooge’ patient was identical in regards to: the examiner assessing the 
patient; the room and wheelchair used; and the questions asked in the video. In each video 
the patient was sitting in a wheelchair, with the left-side of their body visually paralysed  
(i.e. the patient is in a wheelchair, and their left arm and leg are limp in the video). The 
patient’s face was not visible in the video, but the full body (both right and left upper and 
lower limbs) was visible. The examiner is kneeling beside the patient with full body and 
face visible. In the video, the examiner asks the ‘stooge’ patient to move his/her right arm 
and leg, which the patient is able to do. The examiner then asks the patient in the video to 
move his/her left arm and leg, which the patient was unable to perform. The patient first 
fails to move his/her left arm and then left leg. In the video, the examiner askes a series of 
questions that requires the patient to perform specific movements (e.g. “Please try and 
move your left arm for me now?” or “Good, but try and move your left arm, without the 
help of your right arm.”). The patient in the video does not offer any verbal reply, and 
only moves or attempts to move his/her arm and leg. The examiners questions (i.e. asking 





The same awareness questionnaire described in Experiment 1 was used to rate how aware 
AHP patients were of the motor disabilities of the ‘stooge’ patient in the video. Questions 
consisted of general awareness questions and ratings of seven action-related items. Both 
the 1st PP and 3rd PP set were used as described in Experiment 1. 
 
5.5.3 Procedure  
Firstly, a laptop computer (screen size 13) was placed on a hospital table directly in front 
of the patient, 50 cm from him/her and, to exclude possible effects of neglect deficits, 20 
cm right from the centre of his/her visual fields. Patients then proceeded to watch the 40-
second video clip described above with sound.  
 
Immediately after the video-viewing the same questionnaire, as described in Experiment 
1, was administered. However, patients were asked to judge the motor ability of the other 
paralysed patient they saw in the video. The questions were all read out-loud to the 
patients, in a slow pace and neutral tone. The order of the presentation of the two sets (1st 
PP and 3rd PP) was counterbalanced and there was a five-minute break between the 
administration of both sets. On presentation of the 1st PP set, patients were asked to 
answer questions judging the motor ability of the other hemiplegic patient in the video 
from their own perspective (e.g. “Can the patient in the video move their left arm as 
normal?” or “Referring to the patient in the video, how well can he/she tie a knot?”). On 
presentation of the 3rd PP set, patients were instructed to judge the motor ability of the 
other hemiplegic patient in the video from the perspective of the physiotherapist (e.g. 
“Would the physiotherapist think the patient in the video can move their left arm as 
normal?” or “If the physiotherapist was here now, would he/she think the patient in the 
video could tie a knot…”). The questionnaire was scored using the same scoring method 
described in Experiment 1.  
 
5.5.4 Results  
 
Main effects 
A Mann-Whitney U test confirmed that there was a significant main effect of Group (Z = 
– 2.53, p = 0.01, r = 0.43), with the AHP group (median = 24) being significantly more 
unaware regarding the abilities of the ‘other’ hemiplegic patient compared with the HP 
group (median = 7.5; see Figure 5.2). A Wilcoxon signed rank test on the main effect of 
Verbal PT revealed no overall significant difference between 3rd person Verbal PT 
condition (median = 17) and the 1st person Verbal PT condition (median = 18; Z = – 0.40, 
p
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patients performance on the disability related ToM stories, the more aware they were of 
motor deficits of the character in the story.  
 
5.5.2 Materials  
Disability related ToM stories were designed by adapting classical ToM stories used by 
Hynes et al. (2005). Sixteen stories were created: 12 target stories and 4 physical control 
stories, of carefully matched characteristics. All stories consisted of at least two 
characters and were followed first by an open ToM question and then by three multiple-
choice responses (as in Hynes et al., 2005; Figure 5.3). The content of the 12 disability 
related ToM stories always consisted of the character having had a stroke and losing left-
sided motor functions. Eight of the stories (six ToM and two control) were related to the 
self (e.g. “You have had a stroke…”), while the other eight were related to the other  (e.g. 
“Peter has just had a stroke…”; see Appendix N for examples of stories). Half of the ToM 
stories were followed by a question about the mental state of one of the character (1st 
Order), while the other half consisted of an extension of the original story and were 
followed by a 2nd order question. In eight of the disability related ToM stories the 
character was aware of their disabilities (four in the self referent condition and four in the 
other referent condition). In the remaining four of the disability related ToM stories the 
character was unaware of their left-sided paralysis (two in the self referent condition and 
two in the other referent condition). The physical control stories were similar to the ToM 
stories and involved social situations, but the questions required inferential reasoning and 
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5.5.3 Procedure and scoring  
The administration of the task was identical to that of the ToM stories described in 
Chapter 4. Accordingly, all stories and questions were read out-loud to the participants. 
The participants were first required to make a spontaneous response, which the examiner 
wrote down in full. Subsequently, the experimenter read the multiple-choice options and 
participants had to indicate their choice verbally, which all patients were able to do. Of 
the multiple-choice options given, there was only one possible correct answer, the other 
options being either (i) the incorrect belief or (ii) irrelevant or incoherent with the story. 
For each question a composite score was calculated using both the multiple-choice 
answers and the spontaneous answer. Multiple-choice answers were scored as 1 = correct 
and 0 = incorrect. Spontaneous answers were scored as 1 = correct, 0.5 = partially 
correct/inadequate and 0 = incorrect. Two raters scored the spontaneous answers 
independently. Interclass correlation coefficient of 0.92 indicated a good agreement 
between raters. Divergent scores (<2% of stories) were discussed and jointly agreed on. 
Total scores were converted into percentages and used in the statistical analyses.  
 
In the patient groups, testing was conducted in two successive sessions to avoid fatigue. 
The order of the presentation of the two sets (1st PPT and 3rd PPT) was counterbalanced. 
Each set began and ended with a control story. To check for comprehension, following 
each control story, all participants were asked to rate how well they understood the story. 
As in Chapter 4, a 5-point Likert-type scale was used (i.e. “Using this scale from one to 
five, how well did you understand the story? One being the lowest score, where you 
understood very little, and 5 being the highest score, where you understood the whole 
story”). The task was piloted on four neurological patients (two AHP and two HP) to test 
for comprehension of stories and questions, possible attentional biases in the patient 
group and other testing considerations. The results confirmed the suitability of the stories 
and questions but minor corrections were made on the readability of the specific stories.  
 
5.5.4 Lesion mapping methods  
Routinely acquired clinical scans (CT and/or MRI) were obtained for all 38 patients 
within the first week of symptom onset. Lesion mapping methods specified in Chapter 2 
were followed for analysis below. Separate VLSM analyses were run for the following 
dependent variables (continuous scores): i) Feinberg awareness scores; and ii) differential 
scores (other – self) from the disability related ToM stories. For these behavioural 




performance on disability related ToM stories. Feinberg awareness scores were not 
available for four patients (2 AHP and 2 HP), consequently those patients were excluded 
from the VLSM for Feinberg scores and analysis was run on 34 patients respectively. 
  
5.5.5 Behavioural results   
 
Control condition and comprehension ratings  
All participants performed close to the ceiling level for physical control stories with AHP 
patients passing 84.21% and HP patient passing 89.47% questions, respectively. There 
was no significant difference between groups (Z = – 1.63, p = 0.10, r = 0.26). All 
participants reported comprehension ratings between four and five. 
 
Main effects 
A Mann-Whitney U test confirmed that there was a significant main effect of Group (Z = 
– 4.80, p < 0.001, r = 0.78), with the AHP group (median = 45.83) performing 
significantly worse in the disability related ToM stories compared to the HP group 
(median = 78.12; see Figure 5.4). A Wilcoxon signed rank test on the main effect of 
Reference was not significant, however there was a trend towards significance (Z = – 
1.94, p = 0.052, r = 0.31). The main effect of Order was significant as shown by a 
Wilcoxon signed rank test (Z = – 4.54, p < 0.001, r = 0.74), with patients doing better in 
1st Order questions (median = 75) compared to 2nd order questions (median = 47.92). 
 
Interaction effects 
The interaction between Group and Reference was analysed by calculating the difference 
between self and other referent conditions, and analysing the effect of Group on this 
difference using a Mann-Whitney U test, revealing a significant interaction (Z = – 3.01, p 
= 0.002, r = 0.49). Bonferroni corrected post hoc analysis (α = 0.025) showed that in the 
AHP group patients preformed significantly better in the other referent stories (median = 
52.08) compared with the self referent stories (median = 33.33; Z = –2.85, p  = 0.003, r = 
0.46). By contrast, in the HP group there was no significant difference between the other 
referent (median = 77) and self referent (median = 77.03; Z= – 0.48, p = 0.654, r = 0.08).  
 
The interaction between Reference and Order was likewise analysed by calculating their 
relevant differential scores and comparing their difference using a Wilcoxon signed rank 
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5.5.6 Case study analysis 
Previous studies (Marcel et al., 2004; Moro et al., 2011) have shown that there were 
individual differences in scores within groups when looking at differences in self and 
other referent awareness ratings.  Therefore, in addition to the above group analysis, it 
was important to qualitatively investigate specifically how many AHP patients and to 
what extent they performed better in the other referent ToM stories compared to the self 
referent stories. This was done by calculating the difference between the self and other 
referent scores and looking at this difference on a case-by-case basis. Using this 
differential score, 63% (12 out of 19 AHP patients) had a difference of more than 25% 
(range: 25 - 58.3%) in performance in self and other referent stories. Of the remaining 
patients, three AHP patients did better on other referent stories (differential range: 4.17 - 
16.6%) and three AHP patients performed better on self referent stories. Accordingly, 
79% of AHP patients (15 out of 19 AHP patients) performed better in the other referent 
stories. 
 
5.5.7 Lesion mapping results  
 
Lesion overlay  
Group-level percentage lesion overlay maps for the AHP group (n = 19) identified 
involvement of the fronto-parietal cortices with lesions extending into the temporal 
cortex. Lesions involved cortical areas and more focal subcortical areas, extending to 
dorsal frontal white matter (Figure 5.5A).   The HP group (n = 19) in comparison 
presented with damage mostly around frontal and parietal areas, involving both 
subcortical and cortical regions (Figure 5.5B).  Lesion volume (in cubic centimetres) was 
comparable between the AHP (mean = 11.05, SD = 12.91) and the HP group (mean = 
5.94, SD = 7.88; t (30) = –1.47, p = 0.15). Subtraction maps identified clusters around the 
putamen, head of the caudate and insula ribbon, as well as the superior temporal gyrus 
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Voxel-based lesion symptom mapping (VLSM)  
VLSM analysis using the continuous Feinberg awareness scores revealed that voxels 
within the STG, inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), insula ribbon and dorsal frontal white 
matter, as well as the middle frontal gyrus (MFG), supramarginal, postcentral and angular 
gyrus, were significantly associated (p < 0.05) with motor unawareness (Figure 5.6A). 
VLSM analysis looking at the differential score (other - self) in the disability ToM stories 
identified significant voxels (p < 0.05) within the IFG, STG, insula ribbon, caudate, 
putamen, thalamus and internal and external capsule, as well as dorsal frontal white 
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5.6 Discussion  
The experiments described in this chapter examined the partiality of anosognosia (i.e. if 
patients have partial knowledge of motor deficits or “if unawareness of deficit is less that 
total” Marcel et al., 2004, pg. 20). Accordingly, three experimental studies were 
conducted in order to examine: (1) if there is a difference in motor awareness when asked 
from a 1st PP versus 3rd PP; and (2) if motor unawareness extended to the motor deficits 
of other patients and (3) if there is a difference in other referent awareness when asked 
from a 1st versus 3rd PP; and lastly (4) if there is a difference in the severity of 
unawareness in self referent versus other referent condition. The main behavioural 
findings were that AHP patients were more aware of their own paralysis when asked from 
a 3rd PP (the physiotherapists perspective) compared to a 1st PP (Experiment 1). AHP 
patients were also significantly more unaware of the paralysis of a ‘stooge’ patient shown 
in a video compared to HP controls. However there was no difference in other referent 
awareness when asked from a 1st versus 3rd PP; this may have been due to the overall low 
scores, which did not allow for enough variance between conditions (Experiment 2). 
Lastly, AHP patients performed better in other referent ToM stories than in self referent 
ToM stories, therefore being more aware of the others character’s motor deficits in the 
story than their own (Experiment 3). The main finding of our analysis combining 
behavioural and lesion data was that lesions to the IFG, STG, insula ribbon, as well as 
subcortical areas (i.e. the thalamus, putamen and caudate) and dorsal frontal white matter, 
were associated with the difference between other and self referent scores in the disability 
related ToM stories. 
 
In line with Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran (1996) case-series study, as well as 
Marcel et al. (2004) and Moro and colleagues (2011) results, this study has shown that at 
least in some AHP patients motor unawareness generalises or extends to include the 
paralysis of other patients. Nonetheless, although motor unawareness does extend in some 
cases, this is the first study to experimentally demonstrate that AHP patients are in fact 
less anosognosic for the other compared to the self. This difference in the degree of 
unawareness is directly shown in Experiment 3. The individual (case-study) analysis also 
confirmed that most AHP patients were more aware of the disabilities of the other 
hemiplegic patient in the ToM stories and less aware of their own disabilities in the self 
referent stories.  The same pattern of results are observed when comparing Experiment 1 




entails video viewing (offline) whereas Experiment 1 entails a ‘live’ (on-line) interview. 
Future studies could film patients from a 1st versus a 3rd person perspective to create 
comparable data. Importantly, in previous group studies (e.g. Marcel et al., 2004; Moro et 
al., 2011) and the current study, individual (case-study) analysis was conducted in 
addition to group statistics. In all cases, results demonstrated that although most AHP 
patients showed an improvement in awareness for other referent questions, this is not the 
case for all patients. In the current study, three of the 19 patients showed a trend in the 
opposite direction –preforming better in self referent awareness questions. Therefore the 
question arises as to why this effect does not apply to all anosognosic patients. One 
hypothesis could be that damage to different brain areas or the extent of the lesion (i.e. 
lesion size) could lead to a difference in self and other referent awareness (see Fotopoulou 
et al., 2010). An alternative suggestion being that co-occurring neuropsychological 
impairments, such as mental flexibility or general cognitive functioning, could lead to a 
difference in effect (see Marcel et al., 2004; Vocat et al., 2010). 
 
Additionally, mirror and video feedback provides a 3rd person visual perspective that has 
been shown to restore motor awareness and body ownership (Fotopoulou et al., 2009; 
Jenkinson et al., 2011). Comparatively the results of the present study demonstrate that 3rd 
person verbal feedback can also result in an increase in motor awareness in AHP. Here, 
patients perceive their motor deficits through the 3rd PP of the physiotherapist objectively 
rather than through a 1st person, subjective perspective. Similarly in confabulating 
patients, discussions in the 3rd person were an effective strategy when confronting 
potentially negative or disability related themes (Fotopoulou, 2008). However, in 
comparing results from Chapter 4 and this current study, at first glance, there appears to 
be an inconsistency found in AHP patients’ ability to use the 3rd person perspective. 
However, results from Chapter 4 do not demonstrate AHP patient’s ability to adopt the 
perspective of another person, nor the ability to integrate such perspectives. It simply 
demonstrates that they have a deficit in 3rd person perspective taking. In the current study, 
the ability to spontaneously take on the ‘other’ perspective is again not tested here, but 
rather examined each perspective separately, and found that anosognosic patients are 
more aware in the 3rd person perspective. Furthermore, the difference found in 3rd person 
perspective taking in general ToM stories (Chapter 4) and other referent disability related 
ToM stories (Experiment 3) may be attributed to the content of the questions or stories. In 
the context of negative, disability related information, AHP patients may be emotionally 




studies will have to directly investigate whether unaware patients have the ability to adopt 
a 3rd person perspective spontaneously.  
 
Undoubtedly these findings also relate to literature on action observation and the mirror 
neuron system, initially discovered in the macaque monkey (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi & 
Rizzolatti, 1996). The human mirror neuron system has been shown to comprise of the 
inferior frontal cortex and inferior parietal lobe and is typically associated with imitation 
behaviour (Iacoboni, 2005) and social cognition (Iacoboni et al., 2005). The right 
lateralised mirror neuron system, which strikingly overlaps with the right frontoparietal 
network, is said to be involved in mapping other-to-self representations through motor 
simulation mechanises and is essential to understanding a multimodal view of the 
embodied self (Uddin et al., 2007). Furthermore a simulation account of this action 
observation system has been widely suggested, proposing that when we see another 
persons actions or emotional responses we automatically project these responses onto our 
own actions, cognition or emotions (Gallese, 2003). The results of video viewing of the 
other hemiplegic patient in Experiment 2 may be closely related to this simulation 
account of action observation. Although AHP patients were still more unaware of the 
motor deficits of the patient in the video compared to HP controls, in comparison to the 
self referent task in Experiment 1 anosognosic patients showed less unawareness for the 
other compared to the self. Therefore it can be argued that offline video viewing of 
another paralysed patients actions (or lack of movement in this case) is automatically 
projected to the patient’s own understanding of their motor abilities through the mirror 
neuron system. However, motor observation was not directly tested in this current study 
and therefore the above interpretations needs to be investigated by future research.  
 
The lesion mapping results of our current study have also shown that this difference in 
self and other awareness in disability related ToM stories is associated with specific brain 
areas that are comparable to those of Moro et al. (2011). VLSM analysis found a 
relationship between differences in self and other awareness and damage around the 
dorsal frontal areas (IFG) extending to the temporal lobe (STG), and also includes 
subcortical areas (i.e. the thalamus, putamen and caudate) and dorsal frontal white matter. 
The ability to distinguish the self from the other, which has been shown in these 
behavioural results, has similarly been associated with right frontal and motor areas, 
particularly the IFG (Abu-Akel & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Keenan, Nelson, O' Connor & 




attributed to damage around the STG, which has been typically associated with 
mentalising and ToM abilities  (Koster-Hale & Sax, 2013; see Chapter 4 for details).  
 
Brain damaged areas associated with AHP in general were also investigated showing 
consistent results with the previous VLSM results in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Consistent 
with previous studies (see Vocat et al., 2010 and Fotopoulou et al., 2010) VLSM analysis 
using Feinberg awareness scores identified lesions to the insula Ribbon (Karneth et al., 
2005) and premotor areas, specifically the IFG and MFG (Berti et al., 2005). Damage to 
temporal and parietal regions were also associated with unawareness, including the 
supramarginal and angular gyrus, areas that are known to be associated with social 
cognition (see Koster-Hale & Sax, 2013). Unfortunately, this lesion mapping approach 
cannot precisely identify the specific white matter tracts damaged in AHP patients and 
associated with awareness scores.  However, damage to dorsal frontal white matter more 
generally is highlighted in the present study (see Chapters 3 and 4) and confirmed in 
previous papers (Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Moro et al., 2011). 
 
5.1 Limitations and conclusion 
It is also important to identify several limitations of the current study. The interpretations 
of the neuroimaging results are only tentative in nature, due to the inherent limitations of 
the lesion mapping approach and use of low resolution clinical scans. However, previous 
studies (e.g. Berti et al., 2005; Karnath et al., 2005; Vocat et al., 2010) investigating the 
anatomical correlates of AHP are all subject to the same limitations. An advantage of this 
current study was the use of the VLSM approach, which allowed for a direct statistical 
comparison between lesion and behavioural data. Future studies should try and acquire 
better quality structural scans to enhance the reliability of lesion findings. In regards to 
Experiment 1 and 2 there was no control for the floor effects in the HP group given the 
unique nature of anosognosia. However the same pattern of results was observed in 
Experiment 3, which was not affected by floor effects. Moreover, behavioural results 
from Experiment 3 are limited by the use of non-validated ToM stories. However, 
disability related ToM stories were based on previously validated measures, as well as 
being piloted on neurological patients. Additionally, although disability related ToM 
stories allowed for a direct comparison between self and other referent awareness, this is 
still in the context of a ToM question. Therefore is it not possible to distinguish exactly 
which errors were made due to general ToM impairments found in both groups and which 




confirm the results in Chapter 4, showing that right-hemisphere damaged patients (both 
AHP and HP patients) have general deficits in ToM stories. Future studies are needed to 
directly compare differences in self versus other referent perspective taking, using another 
research paradigm, to disentangle the ToM and partiality of awareness results.  
 
Overall, this study has provided experimental evidence suggesting that AHP patients do 
have partial awareness of paralysis depending on if they observe their disabilities from a 
1st versus a 3rd person perspective, and if the information relates to themselves or to that 
of another person. Future studies are needed to not only further specify the specificity of 
the differences found in partiality of motor awareness, but also investigate the other 
clinical varieties in the presentation of AHP, such as the degree or severity of 


























Chapter 6 Towards rehabilitation: self-observation in video replay 
improves motor awareness 
 
6.1 Introduction  
Anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) is often a transient phenomenon with spontaneous 
recovery occurring within days or weeks from onset (Vocat et al., 2010). However, the 
presence of AHP in the acute stage may significantly obstruct rehabilitation efforts and 
consequently impede long-term functional outcomes (Gialanella, et al., 2005; Jehkonen et 
al., 2006). Specifically, patients with unawareness symptoms may refuse treatments that 
considerably improve prognosis (Di Legge, Fang, Saposnik & Hachinski, 2005; Cherney, 
2006), may not take appropriate safety measures (Hartman-Maier, Soroker & Katz, 2001; 
Hartman-Maier, Soroker, Ring & Katz, 2002) and may not be realistic about their 
rehabilitation, housing, social and financial needs (Orfei et al., 2007; Prigatano & 
Morrone-Strupinsky, 2010). Thus, unawareness at the acute stage is linked to longer 
hospital stays (Maeshima et al., 1997), less likelihood of independent living (Pedersen, 
Jorgensen, Nakayama, Raaschou & Olsen, 1996), lower scores on measures of functional 
recovery (Gialanella et al., 2005; Maeshima et al., 1997) and activities of daily living 
(ADL; Maeshima et al., 1997). In fact, the impact of unawareness on ADL and functional 
outcomes is significant even when controlling for the extent of other cognitive deficits 
(Hartman-Maier et al., 2001). Thus, motor unawareness in acute stages is a specific, 
negative prognostic sign, compromising the course of recovery and rehabilitation and 
rendering the reintegration of these patients labour-intensive and costly. Moreover, it has 
been suggested that approximately 30% of AHP patients remain unaware of their motor 
deficits beyond the acute (<4 months) stage (Pia et al., 2004; Orfei et al., 2007).  Thus, 
the rehabilitation of AHP in the acute and chronic stage can be of long-term therapeutic 
significance.  
 
Recently some progress has been made in the management and rehabilitation of AHP 
(Kortte & Hillis, 2011; see Prigatano & Morrene-Stupinsky, 2010 and Jenkinson et al., 
2011, for review).  Nevertheless, to date no evidence-based treatment exists. Remission of 
AHP has been long reported using vestibular stimulation but unfortunately the effects of 
the stimulation are only temporary (Cappa et al., 1987). Transient improvement of 
awareness and neglect has also more recently been noted using a combination of 
treatments (Beschin et al., 2012). Beschin and colleagues investigated the effect of three 




(optokinetic stimulation, prism adaptation and transcutaneous electric nerve stimulation) 
in five patients with both anosognosia and neglect. Both left and right hemisphere 
damaged patients were included and were recruited 50 to 70 days post onset. The results 
indicated that patients responded differently to the same treatment, with anosognosia and 
not neglect temporarily improving with one patient, and only neglect improving with two 
other patients. Furthermore, in an extensive review of rehabilitation efforts in AHP, 
Prigatano and Morrene-Stupinsky (2010) outlined some practical guidelines for the 
management of unaware patients. Firstly, the severity, ‘types’ of AHP and the associated 
neurological and neuropsychological deficits should be clearly determined. Good rapport 
with both the patient and the family should then be established. Lastly, they suggest that a 
detailed and individualised rehabilitation plan should be developed (also see Jenkinson et 
al., 2011).  
 
Aside from these more general intervention programmes, the first, specific, 
psychophysical intervention able to lead to a lasting remission of AHP was reported in a 
recent single case study (Fotopoulou et al., 2009). Fotopoulou and colleagues used video 
replay to provide an AHP patient with visual feedback of her paralysis from a ‘3rd person 
perspective’ (from the outside) and ‘off-line’ (at a time different than the one in which 
she initiated the movement). Patients with AHP, including the patient described in the 
Fotopoulou and colleagues’ paper, typically remain anosognosic when their paralysed 
arm is brought to their ipsilateral visual field and their paralysis is demonstrated. By 
contrast, by providing a video-based feedback the authors noted a dramatic increase of 
motor awareness in this patient. Crucially, the effect was recorded immediately after the 
intervention and lasted at one-month follow-up.  
 
As some patients with AHP may show greater awareness in 3rd than 1st person verbal 
perspective taking tasks (Marcel et al., 2004; also see Chapter 5), the authors 
hypothesised that the 3rd-person perspective video-viewing may have facilitated the 
updating of the patient’s motor awareness. In addition, given the off-line nature of video 
replays, the fact that the patients motor intentions were not relevant at the time of video 
observation, may have facilitated awareness according to motor monitoring explanations 
(Berti et al., 2005; Fotopoulou et al., 2008). The aim of the current study was not to 
investigate these potential explanations of the effect but rather to examine the feasibility, 
effectiveness and optimisation of this video intervention protocol in further patients of 




while using a general video intervention protocol, two variations of the original video-
based methodology were developed and applied to the rehabilitation of two patients with 
severe AHP.  
 
Indeed, Fotopoulou and colleagues (2009) applied this video intervention for the first 
time, but their patient was in the acute phase and her improvement was complete and 
immediate. Nevertheless, the authors admitted that the eventuality of a spontaneous 
recovery was not excluded, as the interval between onset and the intervention was very 
short. There is therefore a need to test the video intervention with chronic patients to 
address this issue of spontaneous recovery, as well as because a third of AHP patients 
remain anosognosic beyond the acute stage (Pia et al., 2004). However, this aim applies 
in parallel to the aim of testing the potential feasibility and effectiveness of the video 
intervention in acute settings, as the highest incidents of anosognosia are reported in the 
acute stage (Vocat et al., 2010) with important clinical, long-term implications as outlined 
above. Moreover, the feasibility and effectiveness of important, additional components of 
the basic video intervention protocol as necessitated by certain patients in certain acute 
settings (e.g. lower limb mirroring, emotional support) have still not been tested with 
acute patients. Therefore, the effectiveness and feasibility of this intervention in both 
acute and chronic patients merits further investigation. 
 
Accordingly, in the first case (an elderly woman at the acute stage of recovery following 
stroke), a video replay and emotional support protocol was used in multiple intervention 
sessions targeting unawareness of both upper and lower limb hemiplegia and their 
functional consequences. On the basis of the aforementioned case report (Fotopoulou et 
al., 2009), the video intervention initially targeted only the left upper limb (LUL) and it 
was expected that viewing oneself unable to move one’s arm would have led to a more 
generalised awareness of paralysis for both her left arm and leg. However, unlike the 
2009 case study, the awareness recovery did not generalise to increased awareness for left 
leg movements. Therefore, both the LUL and the left lower limb (LLL) were targeted in 
separate, successive sessions, covering a period of 58 days.  
 
In the second case, a younger man at the chronic stage of recovery following stroke 
participated to a single session of the video intervention, which in this case included two 
different conditions, a self referent and an other referent condition, both including 




video clip showed the patient himself in a video replay, while the ‘other referent’ video 
clip showed a video of another hemiplegic patient, age and gender matched, but without 
anosognosia. Both self-and-other videos were shown on the same day, 89 days post 
stroke, and the effects of this single session video intervention were monitored at different 
time intervals, with specialised awareness interviews targeting both upper and lower limb 
motor awareness. The two case studies are presented in turn below. 
 
6.2 General methods 
The two video interventions were an extension of the original aforementioned 
methodology (Fotopoulou et al., 2009) and they were conducted in one acute stroke ward 
and one rehabilitation clinic. Both the patients presented with severe AHP (see below for 
formal assessments) and were recruited based on the inclusion criteria described in 
Chapter 2. The general method of the video intervention protocol used in both the case 
studies included five specific research phases (for a schematic representation see Figure 
6.1). The aim of this study was to extend the original Fotopoulou et al. (2009) approach, 
by examining the feasibility, optimisation and effectiveness of video-replay by: (1) testing 
both patient’s unawareness several times before the video replay intervention in order to 
show the stability of the symptom in both patients before the intervention; (2) applying 
this rehabilitation approach to two patients, in the sub-acute and chronic phases 
respectively, showing that the improvement was specifically due to the intervention, and 
not explained by spontaneous recovery, and to test the possibility and effectiveness of 
rehabilitation of AHP in both the acute and chronic stage; (3) introducing two new 
elements that are experimentally investigated, firstly the possibility to have specific and 
separate interventions for unawareness of upper and lower limb motor weakness; and 
secondly, the visual comparison with another patient as a possible instrument to enhance 
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are in bold) revealed impairment in executive functions (lack of fluency & concrete 
thinking), but showed only small motor perseveration and mild disinhibition. She also 
showed personal and extrapersonal neglect. Verbal and visual recall was poor to average, 
but consistent with age-appropriate memory decline. ED scored in normal range for 


































Table 6.1 ED’s neurological and neuropsychological profile in repeated assessments  
 
Function Test    (maximum score) Days from onset 
      7 58 post video 
Awarenessa Feinberg  LUL (10) 7* 1 
  Berti LUL (-2) 2 0 
   LLL (2) 2 0 
Motricity MRCb Power LUL (5) 0 1 
    Power LLL (5) 0 0 
Mood HADSc Depression (10) 2 Np 
   Anxiety (10) 5 np 
Memoryd MOCA Verbal recall  3 np 
Working 
Memory Digit Span Forwards 5 6 
   Backwards 2 3 
Personal Neglect Comb & Razore -0.38 np 
Extra  BITe Star omissions 50 np 
Personal Neglect  Line bisection (3) 0 1 
   Line Crossing (40) 5 np 
   Copy (3) 0 1 
Tactile 
Extinction Bisiach e Upper limb 3 1 
   Lower limb 3 2 
Visual 
Extinction  Bisiache Upper visual field 3 1 
    Lower visual field  3 1 
Executive  FABf Similarities 1 1 
Functioning  Lexical fluency 1 np 
   Motor Series 2 2 
    Go-no-Go (inhibitory control) 2 np 
Left-Right 
orientation   7 7 
 
aAwareness interview (Berti et al., 1996); AHP questionnaire (Feinberg et al., 2000)  
b MRC= Medical Research Council (Guarantors of Brain, 1986) 
cHADS=Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale, cut-off=8 points (Zigmond, A. S. & Snaith, R. P.,1983) 
dMOCA=The Montreal Cognitive Assessment (Nasreddine, 2005) 
eComb/Razor test (MacIntoch, Brodie, and Beschin, 2000); BIT= Behavioural Inattention Test (Wilson, 
Cockborn & Halligan, 1987); tactile and visual extinction= (Bisiach, Vallar, & Perani, 1986);  fFAB= 








6.3.1 Overview of video intervention and timeline  
The patient participated in a standard rehabilitation program of an acute stroke 
rehabilitation ward that mainly targeted the patient’s mobility, daily living, housing and 
occupational needs. Video awareness intervention was the only neuropsychological 
intervention the patient received. The video intervention schedule was determined by the 
patient’s hospital schedule, medical condition, emotional state and her willingness to 
participate in each session. Following the same, basic video-viewing procedures as in the 
original study (Fotopoulou et al., 2009), two video intervention sessions for awareness of 
upper limb paralysis (see below for details) were conducted in sessions scheduled 15 and 
20 days post stroke. The awareness improvement about the upper limb did not generalised 
to awareness about the left leg paralysis. Thus, motor unawareness for the left leg 
paralysis was subsequently specifically targeted with a modified protocol (see below for 
details) in sessions scheduled 41, 42 and 57 days post stroke. Monitoring of AHP 
throughout the intervention period was achieved by stand-alone, awareness assessments 
(see below for details) carried out in sessions scheduled before, in-between and following 
the video intervention sessions at regular intervals.  
 
6.3.2 Awareness assessment (Phase I, Figure 6.1) 
 
Measures 
AHP was assessed by two widely used measures, the Berti et al. (1996) interview and the 
Feinberg et al. (2000) scale described in Chapter 2. Feinberg et al. scale was also used as 
the pre-and-post measure during each video intervention session, as explained below. As 
the original Feinberg et al. scale addresses only the upper limb hemiplegia, a lower limb 
version was created as an additional measure for the second part of video intervention 
protocol (see below) by substituting ‘left arm’ for ‘left leg’ as needed, e.g. “Is your leg 
causing you any trouble?”, “Please try and move your left leg for me. Did you move it?”. 
As there are no norms for the Feinberg et al. interview, comparison data from a previous 
group study on AHP was used. Fotopoulou et al. (2010) tested a group of 7 patients with 
right-hemisphere damage, complete left sided hemiplegia and AHP (AHP group), and a 
control group of 7 patients with right-hemisphere damage, complete left side hemiplegia, 
but without AHP (HP group). The mean score of the AHP group was 5.64 (SD = 1.38) 






Initial asssessment results 
On initial assessment, 7 days following the stroke, ED showed complete unawareness of 
her deficit, scoring 2 (maximum score) on the Berti et al. interview both for her left upper 
limb (LUL) and left lower limb (LLL) paralysis. In addition, she had a score of 7/10 on 
the original, upper limb Feinberg et al. scale. ED showed intractable false beliefs about 
her ability to move, but did not produce any florid confabulations or imaginary excuses 
when asked if she could move her limbs. Instead, she generally remained silent or 
avoided direct questioning during confrontational questions. For example, when asked if 
she could touch the examiners right hand with her left hand, she stated: “I can move”, but 
failed to execute the movement. When the examiner asked “Did you move?”, ED 
remained silent, then replied “it is weak, but I can move it”. When asked about her LLL 
weakness she was adamant that “she has no problems” walking. ED consistently reported 
that she “feels alright”, but she acknowledged medical opinion, saying “The doctors tell 
me I have had a stroke, they must be right. I am not so sure, but the doctors are the 
experts, so I must have had a stroke”, and consistently reported that she “feels alright”. 
Neurological reports, the physiotherapist and the nurse responsible for her care 
additionally confirmed the patients “lack of insight”.  
 
6.3.3 Materials (Phase II, Figure 6.1) 
On days 13 and 14 post stroke, ED consented to the Berti et al. interview to be repeated 
and filmed by the bedside on a portable digital video camera (Sony Handycam, DCR-
SR57). Subsequently the film content was edited to create a 120 sec video clip showing 
the examiner standing on the left side of the screen, and the patient lying on the bed on 
the right side of the screen (her left side was on the right), with her torso being at a 
distance of approximately 1.5m from the camera. There was approximately 1m distance 
between patient and examiner. The patient was seen in front view with her upper body 
visible, including shoulders, arms, head and face. The edited clip contained awareness 
questions taken from the Berti et al. interview, including: a general question (e.g. “Why 
are you here?”), and two specific questions about the patient’s upper limbs (e.g. “Can you 
move your left arm?”) and two direct confrontations (e.g. “Please try reaching my hand 
with you left hand. Have you done it?”).  The same edited video clip was used for both 
upper and lower limb video intervention, with an additional 50 secs added to the end of 
the clip when targeting left leg unawareness (i.e. total 170 sec clip).  This later extra 50 
sec clip was created by editing a filmed clip recorded on day 23 post stroke. This footage 




this case also lower limbs fully visible. The same questions from the Berti et al. interview 
were used, this time referring to the left leg. Questions also relating to ADL’s (e.g. “Can 
you walk on our own/without help?” or “Can you get out of bed without help?” or “Can 
you go to the shops without help?”) were also asked (Marcel et al., 2004).  
 
6.3.4 Video intervention procedures (Phase III, Figure 6.1)   
 
Pre-video viewing procedures 
In each of the video intervention sessions the Feinberg et al. scale was first administered 
to ED as the pre-intervention awareness measure, including also the above mentioned 
questions relating to ADL’s (Marcel et al., 2004). In the lower limb session the modified 
Feinberg et al. scale was used.  
 
Subsequently, a laptop computer (screen size 13) was placed on a hospital table directly 
in front of the patient, 50 cm from her and, to exclude possible effects of neglect deficits, 
20 cm right from the centre of her visual fields. In the first video intervention session 
(five days after the video as initially recorded), the patient was first shown the paused 
frame of the above-described video clip and was asked whether she was willing to view a 
video of herself trying to perform an action and discuss it with the examiner. She was 
informed of the procedure, the possibly upsetting content of the video and was given the 
opportunity to ask questions, discuss any aspects of the video intervention and choose to 
continue. In subsequent video interventions, in addition to these procedures, the patient 
was reminded of the previous assessments and video replays, and again asked whether 
she wanted to ask anything and whether she wanted to watch the video clip again. 
Although as in the original study (Fotopoulou et al., 2009) the patient and the examiner 
had already established good relationship during previous assessments, it was considered 
important to ensure in each session that the patient felt emotionally safe and comfortable 
in undergoing the assessment with the examiner (also see Fotopoulou, 2008).   In 
addition, in each video intervention session, ED was first asked to describe what she saw 
in the paused frame  (e.g. “Where are you in the video?”) and to answer questions 
regarding the recognition of the identity of her own image (e.g. “Is that you in the 
video?”), body-parts discrimination and location, and left-right distinction (e.g. “Is that 







The examiner made sure the patient’s attention was drawn to the video and the 
aforementioned 120s edited video clip was played back. If the patient was distracted 
during video observation, the video clip was paused and her attention was redirected to 
the video. Halfway though the video, the clip was paused and the patient was asked the 
following two questions: “Can you see yourself trying to move in the video?” and “Did 
you move?”. The same procedure was followed for left lower limb paralysis (day 41, 42 
and 57), with the exception of the additional 50sec clip as described above. 
  
Post-video viewing procedures 
In each session, immediately following the video clip viewing, ED was asked the 
following set of questions: “Did you see yourself in the interview?”, “What did you see?”, 
and was given the opportunity to discuss her observations and feelings with the examiner. 
Subsequently, the Feinberg et al. scale was administered as the post-intervention 
awareness measure, including also the aforementioned questions relating to ADL’s 
(Marcel et al., 2004). In the lower limb session the modified Feinberg et al scale was 
used.  
 
6.3.5 Follow-up assessment (Phase IV Figure 6.1) 
One month after the last awareness intervention, the Berti et al. interview and the 




Left upper limb video intervention 
Prior to any video intervention sessions ED’s anosognosia was severe and stable. In fact, 
in the four initial pre-intervention assessments (including the pre-intervention assessment 
of the first video session), her scores were one standard deviation (SD) or more above the 
mean of the aforementioned, comparison AHP group (Fotopoulou et al., 2010).  
Following the first video intervention, her awareness for her left arm paralysis improved 
(Feinberg et al. scale scores decreased from 8/10 to 4.5/10, see Figure 6.3). For the first 
time from her stroke, the patient commented that “it is hard to move, and sometimes it is 
upsetting”. ED acknowledged her motor weakness, agreeing with the examiner that she 
had a stroke, and explained that she was fearful of losing the motor ability in her arms. 




responded: “You need your arms, don’t you?”. ED then started to avoid further questions, 
making various excuses about everyday tasks she needed to complete. The examiner thus 
discontinued questioning and instead provided emotional support and eventually used 
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Five days later, ED’s anosognosia had returned to pre-intervention levels with her scores 
falling within one SD above the comparison AHP patients’ mean scores (Fotopoulou et 
al., 2010). Nevertheless, following the video intervention, ED showed a dramatic 
reinstatement of motor awareness on the Feinberg et al. scale (score 1/10) and began to 
cry at the end of it. The examiner inquired as to why she was crying, ED replied “I feel 
sad because I can’t move it”. The examiner then asked: “What did you see in the video?”, 
ED: “That I can’t move my arm”. Examiner: “What else did you see?”, ED: “That I 
couldn’t move my arm, I feel sad because I couldn’t move it”. The patient went on to 
explain: “I can’t move on my own. I wish I could, but I can’t.” Emotional support was 
then provided to ED, including initially understanding her negative emotions and then 
reflecting on some of the positive possibilities her increased insight may allow in her 
general rehabilitation.  
 
The following day an increase in her anosognosia scores was noted again (5/10 on the 
Feinberg et al. scale), but this score fell within one SD below the mean of the comparison 
AHP group (Fotopoulou et al., 2010).  Moreover, in an informal conversation ED 
remembered the previous day’s session and was able to describe her memories of gaining 
insight and having related emotions.  
 
Left lower limb video intervention 
Eighteen days later (41 days after her stroke) ED was less fatigued and more alert. Her 
anosognosia for upper limb paralysis had recovered (Feinberg et al. scale score 0/10). 
However, her anosognosia for lower limb hemiplegia seemed unaffected by both the 
video interventions and spontaneous recovery, scoring consistently more than one SD 
above the mean of the AHP comparison group (Fotopoulou et al., 2010) (see Figure 6.3). 
Moreover, she claimed that “even with the stroke, I can still walk”. Accordingly, she rated 
herself as fully able in questions about bipedal tasks, especially walking (Marcel et al., 
2004). Interestingly, upon confrontation ED did not present with illusionary movements 
(Feinberg et al., 2000; Fotopoulou et al., 2008) and attributed her failures (e.g. not being 
able to walk at the moment) to third parties: “I can get out of this bed, but they put bars 
on to stop me” or “Yes I can walk, if they let me go out, I could walk” or “There is nothing 
wrong with my body, it’s the chair”. ED was rather resistant and avoidant to questions 
relating to her LLL paralysis, frequently making excuses, apparently in order to stop 




Immediately following the first LLL video intervention at 41days post-onset, ED’s 
anosognosia score on the modified Feinberg et al. scale decreased to 4/10. Towards the 
end of the assessment, when asked if she could get out of bed without help, ED replied 
“No I can’t, yet I think I can”. At this point, she appeared distressed and appealed to the 
examiner, remarking that if it was the examiner who could not walk, she would feel 
sadness for the examiner (“It would make me feel sad if you couldn’t walk, couldn’t go 
anywhere on your own”). The discussion continued in this emotional tone from both 
parties ensuring the patient’s distress had been understood and contained, and the formal 
assessment was concluded.  
 
The next day her scores concerning left lower limb paralysis awareness increased to 6/10 
(modified Feinberg et al. scale). However, immediately following a second video 
intervention her scores declined again (4/10, corresponding to more than one SD below 
the mean of the AHP comparison group, Fotopoulou et al., 2010). Immediately after the 
interview the patient began to cry and asked the examiner: “If I can’t get out of this chair, 
what am I going to do?”.  Again, the above described emotional support protocol was 
followed.  
 
On the next follow-up assessment, the patient remembered the previous sessions but 
became increasingly distressed during recall. Accordingly, emotional support was offered 
to the patient, any sort of further confrontation was avoided and a two-week interval was 
left before the next video intervention. During this interval the patient’s emotional state 
was monitored and supported in brief, informal visits. 
 
Two weeks later, the third and last video intervention was administered. The patient did 
not show any evidence of anosognosia for upper limb paralysis, but her scores on the 
modified Feinberg et al. scale for lower limb paralysis was 5/10 (within one SD below the 
mean of the AHP comparison group, Fotopoulou et al., 2010). ED commented: “I can 
stand, but I can’t get out of this chair and I don’t know why”. Following the video 
intervention, the interview showed a dramatic improvement in awareness (1/10 the 
modified Feinberg et al. scale). When the examiner asked: “Can you walk on your own?” 
ED remained silent for a while and hesitantly replied “Maybe a little, but not without a 
walking stick”. The patient was mildly agitated but not tearful as in previous sessions. 
When asked, “Can you move your left leg?” ED replied, “I don’t think so”. The examiner 




emotional support protocol was administered and the patient and examiner discussed the 
possibilities and opportunities for future, practical support with everyday activities.  
 
At another assessment the next day, 58 days post stoke, ED showed no evidence of 
anosognosia for both left upper and lower limb paralysis (0/10 LUL and 1/10 LLL, 
respectively). Furthermore, ED remembered the video interventions and was able to 
reflect on her general disabilities and the related negative emotions. The same results 
were noted in a final, follow-up assessment 82 days post stroke. These findings were 
further confirmed by administering the Berti et al. interview, in which the patient showed 
no sign of AHP (score =0/2).  
 
6.4 Case study 2 
FG was a 70 year-old right-handed man, a retired builder with 5 years of education. He 
suffered a large haemorrhagic stroke in the region of the right middle cerebral artery. 
Figure 6.4 illustrates the lesion of the patient as presented in the clinical CT scan. 
Lesioned areas mainly involved the basal ganglia structures and subcortical white matter 
(internal capsule, anterior, superior and posterior corona radiate, external capsule, 
superior longitudinal fasciculum and fronto-occipital fasciculum). Parts of the temporal, 
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Table 6.2 FG’s neurological and neuropsychological profile in the pre- and post-training 
assessments 
Function Test       (maximum score) 
Days from 
onset Post video 
      74 103  
Awareness a Bisiach LUL (3) 3* np 
   LLL (3) 3 Np 
  VATA-m (Max=36) Bimanual  22 12 
   Bipedal  10 7 
  Marcel-Moro Total score (23)            20 8 
  Modified interview General (2)                     2 2 
   Upper Limb (9) 7 3 
   Lower Limb (8) 7 1 
   Daily life activities  (4) 4 2 
Motricity  MRC b Power LUL (5) 0 0 
    Power LLL (5) 0 0 
Mood c B.D.I.  5 8 
Memory d Story Recall   12.08 12.07 
Working  
Memory Digit Span Forwards 4 4 
Personal 
Neglect Comb & Razore    -0.05 -0.11 
Extra  BITe Stars omissions (46) 42 Np 
Personal 
Neglect  Line bisection (9) 0 3 
   Line Crossing (40) 9 11 
   Copy (4) 0 0 
  Tactile extinction  0 0 
  Visual extinction  0 0 
Executive  FAB f Similarities 1 3 
Functioning  Lexial fluency 1 2 
   Motor Series 2 1 
   
Go-no-Go  
(inhibitory control) 1 0 
General 
Cognitive  MMSE g (30)   23.7 Np 
 
a Bisiach interview (Bisiach et al. 1986); VATA-m= Visual-Analogue Test for Anosognosia for motor 
impairments (Della Sala et al. 2009); Marcel-Moro modified interview (Moro et al., 2011) 
b MRC= Medical Research Council (Guarantors of Brain, 1986) 
c BDI= Becks Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward & Mendelson, (1961);  
dStory recall & digit span (Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987) 
e Comb/Razor test= test of personal neglect, bias is calculated according to MacIntoch et al. (2000); BIT= 
Behavioural Inattention Test (Wilson et al.,1987) 
f FAB= Frontal Assessment Battery (Apollonio et al., 2005) 





6.4.1 Overview of intervention and timeline 
The patient participated in a tailored rehabilitation program in an in-patient rehabilitation 
clinic. That program focused on his motor and neglect deficits. The video intervention 
was the first neuropsychological intervention the patient received for his AHP. In this 
patient, only one session of video intervention took place on day 89 post stroke. However, 
this was a “double” video session, in the sense that the viewing of a self-referent video 
clip as the one described in the previous case study, was followed by the viewing of a 
similar clip referring to another hemiplegic patient (‘other’ referent; see methods for 
details). Moreover, a specific “experimental” awareness task (see below) was applied as a 
pre-and-post awareness assessment measure on the day of the intervention. In addition, 
the same measure was applied on two other dates prior to the intervention day (72 and 82 
post onset) and three other dates post intervention (90, 103 and 113 post stroke). In all 
post intervention assessments this experimental awareness task was administered twice, 
one with reference to the “self-referent-clip” and one with reference to the “other-
referent-clip”. The intervention and assessment dates were determined by the patient’s 
hospital schedule, medical condition, emotional state and willingness to participate in 
each session.   
 
6.4.2 Clinical awareness assessment (Phase I, Figure 6.1) 
FG’s AHP was measured using three different methods (see Table 6.2): (1) the 4-point 
“Bisiach” interview (Bisiach et al., 1986); (2) the Visual-Analogue Test for Anosognosia 
for motor impairment (VATA-m; Della Sala et al., 2009); (3) the modified “Marcel” 
structured interview (Marcel et al., 2004; Moro et al., 2011). The Bisiach et al. interview 
uses a 4-point scale to evaluate the severity of the patient’s unawareness identified as 
mild, moderate or severe (0= aware, 1= mild unawareness, 2= moderate unawareness, 3= 
severe unawareness). The VATA-m is a measure of unawareness of motor deficits 
combining both the patient’s and caregiver’s evaluation of the patient’s motor abilities in 
a series of specific motor tasks (e.g. walking or drinking from a glass). A discrepancy 
score is then calculated with a maximum score of 36 (scores between 6.8 and 12.0 
indicate mild anosognosia, scores between 12.1 and 24 indicate moderate unawareness, 
and scores between 24.1 and 36 indicate severe unawareness). In addition, a modified 
version of the Marcel structured interview (Marcel-Moro’s interview, Moro et al., 2011) 
was used. The interview consists of 23 questions (each of them scored as 0 = aware and 1 
= unaware). The questions address four different aspects of awareness, namely: (i) 




awareness of sensory-motor abilities for lower limb; and (iv) awareness of abilities in 
ADL’s.  
 
In FG, no acknowledgement of the disorder could be obtained even after clear 
demonstrations of paralysis (scoring 3 on the Bisiach et al. interview). He also scored 
below the cut-off in the VATA-m, scoring 22 for bimanual and 10 for bipedal actions 
(both corresponding to severe AHP). During the modified Marcel-Moro’s interview, FG 
rejected any evidence of his motor deficits and again claimed complete autonomy in his 
ADL’s, scoring 20/23. In one instance during assessments, FG did admit to a certain 
degree of left upper limb weakness, but still continued to claim that he was “not 
paralysed”.  
 
6.4.3 Materials (Phase II, Figure 6.1) 
On day 82 post stroke, FG consented to his awareness testing to be filmed using a 
portable digital video camera (JVC GR-DVL 150 E). The patient was recorded while 
being seated, with the examiner standing on his left side. There was approximately 1m 
distance between the patient and the examiner. A 120 sec video clip was subsequently 
edited from this filming session. The video clip showed the patient in front view, with 
FG’s face and body, and both right and left upper and lower limb visible in the video. The 
edited clip contained general questions (e.g. “Why are you here?”), specific questions 
about the patient’s limbs (“Can you move your left arm?”), and direct confrontation 
questions (e.g. “Please try reaching my hand with your left hand? Have you done it?”) (as 
described in Fotopoulou et al., 2009). In the edited clip, when the patient was asked:  
“Can you move your left arm?”, he replied that he was able to do so and then 
spontaneously moved only his right arm.  At this point, the patient was asked to use his 
left hand to reach the examiner’s hand. The patient claimed that he had performed this 
action and that he was confident in his reply. When asked to indicate which one was his 
left arm the patient used his right arm to reach across and indicate his left arm, suggesting 
he was not suffering from left-right confusion.  
 
An identical interview to the one described above was conducted with another hemiplegic 
patient, matched for age and gender, who was however fully aware of his paralysis. This 
interview was recorded and edited resulting in a video clip as similar as possible in 
content and length to FG’s edited clip described above. Of course, the patient’s answers 




example, he reported to be at hospital because of his paralysis; he agreed that he was not 
able to move his left arm and leg, and, after the confrontation task, he recognised that he 
did not successfully reach the examiner hand. 
 
6.4.4 Video intervention procedures (Phase III, Figure 6.1) 
 
Pre-video viewing procedures 
On two sessions prior to the day of the video intervention session, as well as on that day 
(89 days post stroke), an experimental measure of anosognosia, the Judgment of Actions 
Test (JAT, Moro et al., 2011), was used as a pre- and post- intervention awareness 
measure (see also below). The JAT tests the awareness of motor deficits in 23 separate 
and specific actions. The patient is asked to judge his or another person’s ability to 
execute a series of unimanual, bimanual and bipedal actions (e.g. kicking a ball, climbing 
upstairs, picking up a glass). There are 23 questions, 10 of which refer to unimanual 
actions (UM, 5 for each hand), 8 to bimanual (BM) and 5 to bipedal  (BP) actions (Moro 
et al., 2011). Right unimanual actions are considered as control questions for subject’s 
comprehension and consistency. The patient is asked to judge his or another persons’ 
motor abilities on each action, using an 11-point scale (from 0 = “I cannot do this action 
at all” to 10 = “I am completely able to do this action”).  
 
Video viewing procedures of self referent clip 
Following the pre-intervention JAT task, a laptop computer (screen size 13’) was placed 
on a table directly in front of the patient, 50 cm from him and 20 cm right from the centre 
of his visual fields, to minimize possible neglect confounds. The patient was informed of 
the procedure, and given the opportunity to ask any questions. As in the case above and 
the original study (Fotopoulou et al., 2009) there was a good therapeutic relationship 
already established between the patient and the examiner. The video replay took place 
approximately seven days after the video was initially recorded.  
 
FG was first shown the video in pause mode and asked to identify himself in the video 
and discriminate between left and right body-parts (e.g. “Is that you in the video?”, “Is 
that your right/left arm?”). The examiner confirmed that the patient was comfortable to 





The clip was played back to the patient. He initially avoided directly looking at the video 
and the examiner gently guided his attention to the video clip. After the first 10 seconds 
the patient’s attention focused on the video, although he occasionally and spontaneously 
shifted his attention from the video to the direct view of his left hand and back.  
 
During the playback, general questions were first asked (e.g. “Where are you in the 
video?”).  In the video after the patient was asked “Why are you here?”, his response in 
the recorded video only acknowledged his back and neck pain, and no motor difficulties. 
At this point in the video clip, the video clip was paused and the examiner asked, “Do you 
agree?”. FG responded: “So, so, my arm and leg are not functioning very well, it is very 
bad actually”. The examiner then asked, “What is?”, FG: “I have to admit, the weakness 
is very bad”. Examiner: “Can you walk?”, FG: “No, I cannot”. At this point the video clip 
was restarted. While watching the confrontation task in the video (i.e. the patient is asked 
to move his left arm), the patient spontaneously remarked, “I thought that I would have 
recovered better”. The video was paused again and the examiner then asked: “How do 
you see yourself recovering now?”, FG: “I have not recovered very much”. After the end 
of the video playback the examiner asked: “Can you walk?”, FG answering, “Not so 
good”. Examiner: “Why?”, FG: “My left leg is weak”. The examiner then asked: “And can 
you lift it?”, FG replying: “Yes, I can, but in the video the leg did not move.” The JAT 
was subsequently administered.   
 
Viewing procedures of other referent video clip 
Thirty minutes after this self referent video intervention, the video referring to the other 
hemiplegic patient was played back in the same manner as the self referent video 
intervention. FG correctly identified that the person in the video was a hemiplegic patient 
(“The man in the video can not move”). During the confrontation task the video was 
paused and the examiner asked FG if the hemiplegic patient had managed to reach the 
examiners hand. He answered: “No, it is impossible.” FG made no other comments 
during the rest of the video. The JAT (referring to the other patient) was again 
administered directly following the end of the video as the post-intervention awareness 






6.4.5 Follow-up assessment (Phase IV, Figure 6.1) 
A follow-up assessment by means of the VATA-m and Marcel-Moro interview was 
conducted 14 days after the awareness intervention session (see Table 6.2). The JAT was 
also administered 24 days after the video session to monitor the patient’s awareness (see 
Figure 6.5). 
 
6.4.6 Statistical analyses 
Statistical analysis was performed on the pre- and post-intervention JAT scores. Left 
unimanual (UM), bimanual (BM) and bipedal (BP) actions were analysed separately. 
Unimanual scores referring to the right hand were excluded from the analysis as the 
patient performed at ceiling, confirming intact attention and comprehension during these 
control trials. The self referent and other referent scores were also analysed separately, 
apart from one final self vs. other referent comparison applied to the post-video 
assessments only (there were no other referent pre-intervention assessments). The 
Friedman test was used to analyse any significant differences between the JAT three 
baseline assessments. Since there was no difference in these scores, the average of the 
three baseline scores was calculated and used as a global baseline measure.  
  
For the self referent video condition, the mean baseline assessment score and the post-
intervention scores were compared. For the other referent video condition, only the post-
awareness assessment scores were compared. Lastly, for the self-other referent video 
comparison the results from all JAT evaluations were analysed, excluding the baseline 
measures. The Friedman rank sum test was used to verify if the observed improvement in 
awareness was statistically significant. If this test reached a statistical significance, the 
Wilcoxon tests for dependent data, with False Discovery Rate correction as post-hoc test, 
were used.  
 
Finally, to check if there was a stepper trend in the recovery of awareness in the self 
referent or in the other referent condition, a simple ratio index was computed as a 
qualitative index. Regression linear models were used on JAT values for right UM, left 
UM, BM and BP for other referent and self referent conditions on all the post-video 
evaluations. Then, for each typology of score, the ratio between the slope of the self 
referent linear model and the slope of the other referent linear model was calculated (self 
angular coefficient/other angular coefficient). If this ratio index is more than 1, it means 




indicates that the other referent awareness has a better improvement. Although this index 
is not thought to have a strong statistical validity (mainly because of the small amount of 
observations), it may be useful to show the differences in the trends of responses, which 




Self referent condition 
 Prior to any video intervention FG’s anosognosia was severe and stable. As shown in 
Figure 6.5 no change in awareness was observed in the assessments prior to the video 
replay (χ2(2) = 3.07, p = 0.215). All three pre-awareness assessments demonstrated severe 
anosognosia for left unimanual, bimanual and bipedal actions (see Figure 6.5). Following 
the video intervention, FG spontaneously remarked: “We have to work hard”. When the 
examiner asked to what he was referring to, the patient explained that he needed to work 
hard on his rehabilitation, agreeing that he was not well and he was unable to move. The 
JAT scores immediately after the video intervention show an increase in awareness for 
motor deficits of unimanual left and bimanual actions (see Figure 6.5). Crucially, in the 
following assessments FG’s trend of improvement seemed to continue particularly in LU 
and BM actions (see Figure 6.5). 
 
This gradual improvement was significant in BM actions (χ2(4) = 13.01, p = 0.011) and in 
LU actions (χ2(4) = 10.91, p = 0.028), and showed a trend of significance in BP actions 
(χ2(4) = 8.74, p = 0.068). Furthermore, the comparison between baseline and individual 
sessions shows that this gradual improvement becomes statistically significant in BM 
actions only in the follow-up sessions (post-hoc tests: baseline vs. 103 days: W = 36, p = 
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in the other patient better than in himself, the trend of recovery induced by the video 
rehabilitation indicates a more specific effect in self referent condition. For clinical 
observations, statistical analysis and further results concerning the other referent 
condition, see Appendix O. 
 
6.5 Discussion 
This study presented two patients with severe anosognosia for hemiplegia following 
stroke in different post-onset stages (acute versus chronic) and found that self-observation 
in video replay contributed to the reinstatement of motor awareness in both cases. Both 
patients showed stable and severe AHP in several assessments prior to the intervention 
and both patients showed evidence of marked improvement in motor awareness following 
the intervention. Although the precise intervention protocols applied, as well as the 
pattern of the recovery observed were different between the two patients, these results 
suggest that in both cases the awareness improvement cannot be accounted exclusively by 
spontaneous recovery. This conclusion is more obvious in the case of the chronic patient, 
who had showed stable and severe AHP for more than two months post-onset. 
Additionally, there was no change found in neglect following the video-replay, 
suggesting that the change in awareness can therefore not be explained by a change in 
neglect. These results are discussed below, in the context of the wider literature on AHP. 
 
AHP typically remits over time as a result of spontaneous recovery, but sometimes 
patients remain unaware also in the chronic stage (see Pia et al., 2004 for review). 
Moreover, the presence of AHP in the acute stage may significantly obstruct 
rehabilitation efforts and consequently impede long-term functional outcomes (Gialanella 
et al., 2005; Jehkonen et al., 2006). As outlined in the introduction, there have been recent 
advances in the management of AHP by providing specific rehabilitation guidelines and 
strategy’s (see Prigatano & Morrene-Stupinsky, 2010 and Jenkinson et al., 2011 for 
reviews), with temporary remission of AHP also being recently reported using a 
combination of techniques (see Beschin et al., 2012). Unfortunately, despite these 
rehabilitation efforts, there is currently no known, effective intervention for permanent 
restoration of motor awareness in patients with AHP (Kortte & Hills, 2011; Jenkinson et 
al., 2011). 
 
One potentially promising intervention has been successfully applied in a single case 




video-replay and reported the instant and permanent reinstatement of motor awareness in 
a patient who was previously showing severe AHP. Unfortunately, these observations 
have not been as yet replicated in other patients and the intervention protocol has not been 
standardised. The main aim of this study was to test the feasibility and effectiveness of a 
general video-feedback intervention for anosognosia for hemiplegia in acute and chronic 
AHP patients in different hospital settings, as well as to explore the variations of the 
intervention protocol so as to optimise its effectiveness. Different parameters of this 
method were applied to the two patients based on their own neuropsychological profile, 
setting and rehabilitation needs, consistently with the aims of the study and the applied 
single-case design. To this end, the present results provide confirmatory evidence for the 
restoration potential of video-based, self-observation in AHP but also suggest a number 
of areas that require modification and further exploration.   
 
Both patients in the current study showed indications of a sudden and unprecedented 
realisation of their motor impairments immediately following the video (e.g. ED: “I can’t 
move on my own. I wish I could, but I can’t.”, FG: “We have to work hard!”, referring to 
his rehabilitation). However, unlike in the original study (Fotopoulou et al., 2009), their 
awareness scores on the standardised and experimental measures used post-intervention 
did not reveal a corresponding, complete and generalisable recovery of awareness as 
compared with their pre-intervention scores.  Instead, the video viewing seemed to be 
only the first step in a longer and more complex rehabilitation process that required 
additional sessions (in the case of ED), several follow-up assessments (in the case of FG) 
and the provision of emotional support following and in-between sessions (both patients).  
In the case of FG for example, there was an immediate change in awareness following the 
video replay, but these results only become statistically significant after approximately 2 
weeks. This indicates a gradual and steady improvement of awareness over time, which 
was first initiated by the video replay. Moreover, the noted improvements in the 
awareness of upper limb paralysis following observation of the upper limb in the video 
did not lead to a more generalised awareness of the patients’ disabilities in uni-pedal or 
bi-pedal tasks. These required the passage of time and several, specific assessment 
sessions in the case of FG and a video intervention specifically targeting lower limb 
function in the case of ED. In both cases, unawareness for ADL’s, especially involving 





Previous studies have found AHP patients to overestimate their ability more on bipedal 
than bimanual actions (e.g. rowing a boat or jumping up). This difference may be 
explained by the fact that acute patients have less opportunities to attempt bipedal than 
bimanual tasks in the hospital, as well as by the fact that the practical and psychological 
implications of bipedal movement deficits (especially walking and driving a car), are 
potentially more catastrophic and thus harder to accept or acknowledge (Marcel et al., 
2004). Moreover, since in the current study the effects of the video intervention on upper 
limb awareness did not prove to automatically generalise to other domains, it is suggested 
that video intervention should progressively target AHP for different modalities: (1) AHP 
for upper-limb weakness, (2) followed by lower-limb unawareness, (3) and finally 
unawareness for ADL’s. Furthermore it is important to recognise that the intervention 
suggested here is not a “method” in the sense of a rigid procedure that needs to be 
followed in an identical way with all patients. Rather, it represents an approach that is 
identical in its construct (represented in Figure 6.1), but also needs to be adapted to each 
individual specific condition (e.g. in the number of sessions, emotional support, limbs 
targeted etc.). Such variability in methods and the individualisation of approaches can be 
considered as an advantage of early-stage clinically-orientated research following stroke. 
This represents a fundamental principle of good practice in rehabilitation, and has been 
recognised in complex syndromes like anosognosia, where the importance of the 
individualisation of the rehabilitation approach has been emphasised (Prigatano & 
Morrone-Strupinsky, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that video-observation brings about strong negative 
emotions in patients who otherwise deny their deficits and may appear as indifferent. This 
observation is consistent with findings from the original study that showed that awareness 
improvement was not accompanied by any changes in performance on 
neuropsychological tests of cognitive function but rather with a large increase in 
depressive feelings as captured by a self-report measure. More generally, the role of 
negative emotions and ‘catastrophic’ reactions (Turnbull et al., 2005; also see Chapter 3) 
needs to be taken into account in future protocols and perhaps more formal and longer 
sessions of emotional support need to be provided to patients. Whether these awareness-
related emotions are a primary manifestation of the disorder itself, or a secondary 
consequence of other primary causes has long being debated in the literature (see Chapter 
3 for discussion). This study cannot directly address such debates, but it nevertheless 




any successful intervention for AHP (see also Prigatano, 2005), as also shown in similar 
syndromes such as confabulation following acute frontal damage (see Fotopoulou, 2008) 
and unawareness in generalised and neurodegenerative disorders such as dementia 
(Ownsworth, Clare & Morris, 2006).   
 
In the case of FG, the same day as the video intervention, an other-referent video was 
shown he was asked to comment on the “other” patient’s disability.  FG showed greater 
awareness for motor disorders in this other referent condition than the self referent 
condition. In comparison, Ramachandran and Rogers-Ramachandran (1996) reported 
three cases of anosognosic patients, two of whom extended their denial of paralysis to 
another “stooge” student pretending to have left hemiplegia. Similarly to FG however, the 
third patient immediately recognised the motor deficits of the “stooge” patient. In 
comparison to the results in Chapter 5, patient FG’s anosognosia did not fully extend or 
generalise to the patient in the video, but there was no control group for comparison thus 
making the results unclear. However, FG was more aware in the other referent condition 
compared to the self referent condition, as shown in the experimental findings in Chapter 
5. Furthermore, although the result of this study did show a greater trend of recovery over 
time for the self referent condition, the fact that he was more aware in the other referent 
condition to begin with, suggest that he had less of a margin for improvement. This again 
highlights the difference in the degree or severity of unawareness between self referent 
and other referent conditions as discussed in Chapter 5. Interestingly, “self” and “other” 
video replays have also been recently used as an effective treatment in increasing insight 
in schizophrenic patients (David et al., 2012).  
 
6.5.1 Limitations and future research  
Before firm conclusions can be drawn, it should be noted that this study has a number of 
limitations. Firstly, this study was limited to two single case studies. Furthermore, the 
lack of a control condition in both cases is a confounding variable in these studies. 
Accordingly, the results of this study need to be replicated in a carefully controlled group 
study, using a standardised protocol and also comparing the results with a control group. 
However, at this stage single-case study experimental designs offer an important and 
unique methodology for providing the appropriate empirical evidence for the 
effectiveness of the intervention (Perdices & Tate, 2009), and allowing for necessary 
calibrations before future, larger studies can be successfully designed.  To the 




population. There is also very little prior knowledge available in stroke research about the 
video intervention to be used. It was thus considered vital to evaluate the feasibility of 
applying this bedside intervention `in the real world', as well as testing the acceptability 
of and adherence with the intervention and estimating important design parameters before 
planning larger scale studies, including a randomised controlled trial.  
 
Furthermore, different intervention protocols were used in each case. The number of 
video observation sessions was different in ED and FG’s intervention, and the results of 
ED’s video intervention were restricted by a lack of statistical analysis. Nevertheless the 
basic methodology was the same for both patients, permitting them to be discussed 
together. Furthermore, the application of this protocol differed between both patients on 
the basis of specific factors. Specifically, for patient ED, the selectivity of her recovery 
(awareness for arm and not leg paralysis) that required specific video feedback of leg 
paralysis; her emotional reactions that required careful emotional responding; and her 
age, fatigue and cognitive profile made any further videos and assessments as those 
applied to Case 2 seem too demanding. In comparison to patient FG, where the general 
comments this patient made about his mobility did not necessitate a further video 
targeting any particular body parts. Furthermore, the different, more complex tests used to 
test the generability of the intervention was considered optimal in this patient, given the 
chronic stage of his anosognosia; finally, his age, cognitive profile and positive response 
to assessments, and the research as a whole, allowed for the use of an additional, other-
based video, as well as more lengthily assessments. 
 
However, it should be noted that it was not the intention of this study to suggest a 
generally applicable intervention for the rehabilitation of AHP, which may indeed differ 
from patient to patient and hospital to hospital. The general aim was to test the feasibility 
of the approach in two further patients, test its potential for awareness restoration in these 
particular patients, and examine particular extensions of the original protocol. The current 
study thus allows for calibration of the intervention and contributes important key 
practical, biological, psychosocial and organisational parameters that can lead to 
sufficient acceptability, adherence and effectiveness, and determine suitable subgroups in 
future studies (Arain et al., 2010). In clinical practice, the precise protocol for each 
individualised rehabilitation program is conditioned by personal and institutional 
variables. In the case of anosognosia, it seems pivotal to tailor rehabilitation goals and 




motor impairment (Perdices & Tate, 2009). For example, it is important to consider that 
not all patients may be appropriate for video intervention and that it is important to 
individuate the times when it is possible to suggest it. Moreover, severe spatial neglect 
that cannot be by-passed by prompting may prevent some patients from seeing left side of 
the screen when watching the video replay.  Severe attention and memory problems may 
also reduce the effectiveness of the video observation. A preserved capacity for 
introspection and the ability to discuss one’s emotions, may also prove to be important 
moderators of the intervention’s effects. In all cases, these results suggest that in order to 
establish a good clinical relationship with the patient, it is not advisable to begin the 
intervention too soon after first meeting the patient.  
 
Although it was not the aim of this current study, the potential difference and 
explanations in 1st and 3rd person perspective taking, and the off-line nature of video 
replay merit further investigation. Accordingly, future studies are needed to compare 
possible variations in motor awareness using both video replay and mirror feedback, in 
order to distinguish between online (observing one’s actions while trying to move, as in 
the mirror) and off-line (self-observation while not trying to move, as in video replay) 
aspects. Lastly, although there was no change in neglect scores following the video-replay 
intervention, one cannot entirely exclude the possible casual effect of neglect. Attracting 
the patient’s attention to the left side of space can temporarily restore neglect.  Therefore, 
watching the video replay may have simply helped the AHP patient see their motor 
disability, and allow them to update the new information into long-term memory. 
Although double dissociations between anosognosia and neglect have been found (e.g. 
Davis et al., 2005), both syndromes are indeed complex and have varying clinical 
presentations. Therefore one can argue that double dissociations can be accounted for due 
to different types of neglect and anosognosia. However this wider question of the 







Chapter 7 General discussion  
 
7.1 Introduction  
The general aim of the present thesis was to advance the current state of knowledge on 
the neurocognitive, emotional and social causes of anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP). 
Based on insights gained from both clinical and recent experimental research on AHP (for 
reviews see Fotopoulou, 2012; Turnbull et al., 2014), this thesis has argued in favour of a 
methodological and a theoretical perspective shift. Specifically, it was argued (see 
Chapter 1) that a revision of purely cognitive theories of AHP is necessary. This new 
account of anosognosia moves away from traditional modular theories of anosognosia, 
towards a dynamic model of the construction of the bodily self. Accordingly, as outlined 
in Chapter 1, the thesis aimed to: (1) investigate the emotional and social factors that 
underlie motor unawareness in stroke patients; (2) identify the neurocognitive factors and 
neuroanatomical correlates that underlie motor awareness; and (3) develop potential, 
multifaceted bedside, rehabilitation interventions for AHP that target all the above 
factors.  
 
These aims were achieved by using an integrative methodological approach, which 
combined neuropsychological testing, psychophysiological experiments and 
neuroimaging methods (see Chapter 2). A series of experimental studies (group studies 
and case studies) were conducted to address the overall aims (Chapter 3-6) with stroke 
patients with right-hemisphere damage. The experimental results of this thesis support the 
hypothesis presented in Chapter 1 that AHP patients live in an emotionally-laden, 
egocentric reality, where the ability to adopt a 3rd person perspective or the link between 
1st and 3rd person thinking is defective. The neuroanatomical correlates of AHP found 
further support for the involvement of emotional and social factors in the aetiology of the 
phenomena. These findings on the role of emotion and social processes in AHP were in 
turn used to develop future rehabilitation strategies for AHP. 
 
In this concluding chapter, the findings of the experimental studies will be reviewed 
collectively and revisited in relation to the proposed shift in perspective from purely 
cognitive theories of AHP to a new account of unawareness following right-hemisphere 
stroke, which integrates emotional and social factors. Current finding on self-observation 
using video replay as a rehabilitation intervention are discussed, as well as implications 




on the construction of the bodily self are discussed and general limitations presented. The 
thesis will conclude with tentative proposals for future avenues of research.  
 
7.2 Summary and interpretation of experimental findings 
 
7.2.1 Emotional processes in AHP 
The possible role of emotion in AHP has long been debated between psychodynamic and 
neurocognitive theories. However, affective factors in anosognosia have been previously 
disregarded and insufficiently studied, with only a handful of cases studies focusing on 
this topic (e.g. Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000; Turnbull et al., 2005; Nardone et al., 2007). 
Therefore a specific aim of this thesis was to experimentally investigate the precise role 
of emotion in AHP. The study presented in Chapter 3 aimed to investigate how negative 
and positive emotions influence motor unawareness in anosognosia.  
 
This is the first study to conduct a systematic, experimental investigation of the relation 
between emotion and motor awareness in right-hemisphere stroke patients with AHP.  In 
this experiment positive and negative emotions were induced under carefully controlled 
experimental conditions in right-hemisphere stroke patients with AHP (n = 11) and HP 
controls with normal awareness (n = 10). The results of the study showed that motor 
awareness is sensitive to the induction of only negative emotions in a social context. The 
positive emotion induction has showed no effect on motor awareness. Lesion mapping 
methods, specifically lesion overlay and Voxel-Based Lesion Symptom Mapping 
(VLSM) approaches, were used to investigate the anatomical areas correlated with 
performance on the experimental task (i.e. change in awareness) following negative 
emotion induction. The insula ribbon, putamen and anterior periventricular white matter 
were identified as areas associated with less awareness change following negative 
emotion induction.  
 
The results of this study suggest that anosognosia and the observed lack of negative 
emotions about motor weakness cannot be adequately explained by either purely 
motivational or neurocognitive accounts. Instead, it is speculatively proposed that lesions 
to such regions may impair interceptive signals and neuromodulatory pathways associated 
with motivation. Ultimately, such deficits result in an inability to update priors beliefs 





This experimental study contributes to understanding the intricate and often fluctuating 
clinical presentation of AHP patients, such as catastrophic reactions (sudden influx of 
negative or depressive feelings, Goldstein, 1939). As discussed in previous chapters, AHP 
patients usually do not present with catastrophic reactions or depressive feelings, but are 
typically overly positive or optimistic about their prognosis (Orfei et al., 2007). However, 
it has been observed in clinical case studies that following discussions of negative themes 
(not related to illness or paralaysis), such as loss, separation or death, anosognosic 
patients present with a sudden influx of depressive feelings and related behaviours, 
together with transitory awareness about their illness  (Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000). In 
comparison, the induction of negative emotion in a social context in the current study (the 
manipulation also being wholly unrelated to the prognosis) resulted in a similar 
experience of negative feeling and transitory awareness of motor deficits.  These results 
also add confirmatory evidence to the proposal that recovery from anosognosia may lead 
to increased depression (see Fotopoulou et al., 2009).  In this regard however, it is also 
important to highlight that depression maybe linked to impairments of executive 
functioning, which may in turn have an influence on unawareness (see Spalletta et al., 
2006; Narushima et al., 1998). It is also important to acknowledge that specific studies 
have in fact shown the opposing results (e.g. Starkstein et al., 1992; Cocchini et al., 2013) 
reporting a weak relationship between depression and anosognosia. The question of 
hemispheric asymmetry of depression and anosognosia again comes in question here.   
 
This study highlights a specific abnormality or over reactivity in the experience of 
negative emotion in AHP patients and its relationship with motor unawareness 
specifically. It is also inline with the proposed emotion regulation hypothesis (Turnbull et 
al., 2014). According to this hypothesis, in anosognosia the neurocognitive processes that 
control a higher-order mechanism of the regulation of emotions is compromised and 
therefore AHP patients present with abnormal emotional responses to events. The results 
of the current study show that there is a direct relationship between changes in emotion, 
specifically negative emotion, and motor awareness. In this respect the proposed damage 
to the emotion regulation mechanism in AHP influences how aware patients are of their 
motor weakness. Moreover, one possible hypothesis is that the more anosognosic patients 
experience the ‘correct’ or appropriate emotional response, the greater their awareness of 





However this was only the first group experimental investigation in the role of emotion 
and anosognosia, and thus requires further empirical investigation. Future studies could 
add physiological measures to track changes in emotion (e.g. positive or negative 
emotion), rather than relying on only subjective reports from the patient.  For example, 
automatic responses, such as heart rate variability, skin conductance and temperature 
changes, can be measured in response to the induction of emotions, while also measuring 
differences between behavioural and physiological responses to emotion related stimuli. 
Furthermore, other anosognosia phenomena that are directly related to emotional 
experiences have mostly been clinically described in the literature (see Cutting, 1978) and 
lack empirical study. For example, emotional indifference to illness and/or paralysis, first 
described by Babinski (1914) as anosodiaphoria, and extreme hatred for the paralysed 
limb (misoplegia; Critchley, 1974), have only been described as associated beliefs or 
disorders, but their exact relationship to anosognosia remains obscure.  Babinski initially 
proposed that anosognosia and anosodiaphoria are in fact the same syndrome, but lie on a 
spectrum of severity with anosodiaphoria being a less severe presentation of AHP. 
However it has never been empirically shown if AHP gradually remises into 
anosodiaphoria or if this emotional indifference may exist without associated explicit 
denial of deficit. In contrast the presentation of misoplegia does not involve being overly 
optimistic or indifferent to ones deficits, as is common in AHP and anosodiaphoria, but 
the exact opposite emotional reaction. As Critichely originally described, misoplegia 
commonly co-occurs with AHP, but this apparent discrepancy in emotional experience is 
rarely clinically discussed or empirically studied. Only a handful of studies have reported 
single case’s in adults (Loetscher, Regard & Brugger, 2006) and children (Moss & 
Turnbull, 1996), with the phenomenon only being clinically described but without 
complementary experimental investigations. Although both anosodiaphoric and 
misoplegic patients are a rare population group, there is still massive scope for future 
systematic studies on the exact presentation and mechanisms involved in these 
phenomena, and there relationship with anosognosia.  
 
Interestingly, the proposed negative correlation between depression and anogosnosia, and 
the experimentally demonstrated relationship between negative emotion and anosognosia 
in this current study, has similarly been found in Alzheimer’s disease (AD). In AD low 
mood is associated with less anosognosia, while there is a greater emotional indifference 
toward deficits and the illness itself with increased severity of anosognosia (Mograbi & 




apathy and the severity of unawareness. Anatomically, there is evidence suggesting that 
apathy and anosognosia in AD are related to frontal lobe functioning as indicated by 
deficits in executive functioning as tested by neuropsychological assessments (Michon, 
Deweer, Pillon, Agid, & Dubois, 1994) and neuroimaging studies (e.g. Amanzio et al., 
2011). Abnormalities in white matter tracts, specifically the anterior cingulate, has also 
been associated with emotional indifference in AD (Apostolova et al., 2007). Therefore, 
one can propose that the relationship between apathy and unawareness AD is not only 
regulated by frontal lobe functioning, but also by connectivity between the frontal parietal 
and temporal lobes. These anatomical correlates are strikingly similar to the neural 
correlates of AHP (see discussion in Section 7.2.4 of this Chapter), particularly the frontal 
lobes and white matter networks. Furthermore the anterior cingulate has also been 
implicated in error monitoring (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; Carter et al., 1998), 
which has been closely related to AHP by cognitive theories (Berti et al., 2005; Garbarini 
et al., 2012). This also speaks to recent experimental findings on the direct relationship 
between motor representations and emotion (see Chapter 3 for discussion; Gentsch & 
Synofzik, 2014). Taken together this may be indicative of a shared relationship between 
these phenomena, and emotional processes and error monitoring.   
 
Furthermore, it was commonly observed by the investigator that during assessment 
sessions AHP patients often presented with behaviours (both verbal and behavioural), 
which could be interpreted as attempts to avoid questions in experimental tasks and 
clinical assessments. These avoidance behaviours presented in a variety of ways, 
including: misdirection (e.g. asking to use the bedpan or for some water; suddenly 
speaking about family or something entirely unrelated); omitting responses; using humour 
or irony to answer questions; minimising the extent of their motor weakness (e.g. “Is their 
any weakness in your left arm?” “I suppose so, but I am not worried about it, as I do not 
use it much. It’s nothing I can’t get over.”); exaggerating the ability of their right hand 
(e.g. “I have always been stronger with my right hand anyway.”); indirect or vague 
responses (e.g.  “Well I don’t know, I’m not sure. I guess I don’t think so.”); and various 
behavioural responses (e.g. ignoring the examiner; physically turning away from the 
examiner; averting eye contact; and remaining silent and then “falling asleep” 
temporarily). It has been suggested that avoidance is a marker of implicit awareness of 
deficit (Prigatano, 2013, 2014), since avoidance requires knowledge of what is being 
avoided, perhaps implicitly. Within this context, denial in brain-damaged patients is 




Avoidance in this respect is also defensive in that knowledge of deficits is upsetting 
therefore possibly motivating patients to remove such thoughts from conscious 
awareness. Unfortunately there are only a limited number of appropriate observer-based 
measures available to measure the construct of avoidance (Kortte et al, 2009). Future 
research will have to develop rating scales, based on these existing measures, to track 
avoidance behaviour in AHP stroke patients specifically. Future studies are therefore 
needed to systematically investigate these qualitative observations to understand the 
underling mechanisms behind the presentation of avoidance behaviours and explore 
strategies to overcome avoidant behaviour in rehabilitation interventions.  
  
7.2.2 Social processes in AHP 
The study presented in Chapter 4 was the first to investigate the relationship between 
perspective taking, Theory of Mind (ToM; as two core modalities of social cognition) and 
self-awareness through the study AHP. More specifically, the study aimed to examine the 
role of visual-spatial perspective taking (VSPT) and ToM in self-awareness. First and 3rd 
person perspective taking abilities were assessed using both VSPT and ToM tasks, in 
patients with AHP compared to HP and neurological healthy controls. Patients presented 
with specific deficits in 3rd person perspective taking in both the VSPT and ToM 
investigations. There was also a strong correlation found between 3rd person perspective 
taking and executive functioning, particularly set-shifting abilities. Furthermore, the more 
severe the patient’s motor unawareness the worse their performance in 3rd person 
perspective taking. Additionally, lesion-mapping methods identified brain areas 
commonly damaged in neurological patients in relation to VSPT and ToM behavioural 
scores taken from experimental tasks. The results showed that 3rd person perspective 
taking, in both the VSPT and ToM tasks, were significantly associated with frontal areas 
around the inferior and middle frontal gyrus (IFG and MFG) and extending temporally 
around the supramarginal gyrus (TPJ) and pre-and-post central gyrus, as well as dorsal 
frontal white matter. These anatomical correlates of AHP have also been identified as part 
of a ‘mentalising network’, specifically the supramarginal (TPJ) and pre-and postcentral 
gyrus (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013). This is the first study to investigate the relationship 
between social cognition and self-awareness. This study suggests that in anosognosia 
there is a specific deficit in ability to spontaneously disengage or integrate the ‘self’ – 1st 
person perspective and ‘other’ – 3rd person perspective, which is mediated by 
impairments in executive functioning and lesions to the IFG, MFG and dorsal frontal 





The question of perspective taking was then further explored in Chapter 5 in a series of 
experimental investigations, which specifically examined perspective taking in relation to 
anosognosia-related material.  It has been previously demonstrated that the presentation 
of motor awareness can be partial depending on if awareness questions were asked from 
the perspective of the patient referring to his/her paralysis (self referent) versus the motor 
weakness of another paralysed patient (other referent; Marcel et al., 2004; Moro et al., 
2011). In these studies, AHP patients were more aware of the motor deficits of another 
paralysed patient compared to their own. In comparison, case-study investigations have 
suggested that at least some AHP patients are in fact also unaware of the paralysis of a 
“stooge” hemiplegic patient (Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996). A 
limitation of such case reports is that they do not measure the degree or severity of 
unawareness. Therefore the patient can be mildly unaware of the other patient’s motor 
deficits, yet the degree or severity of unawareness differs (i.e. the degree of unawareness 
is not as severe as for their own motor deficits). The aim of the experimental 
investigations in Chapter 5 was to examine this partiality of unawareness in two ways: 
difference in 1st person versus 3rd person perspective; and (2) self referent versus other 
referent variances, together with difference in severity of unawareness for the self and 
other patient. Specifically, Experiment 1 investigated whether there were differences in 
anosognosia when asked from a 1st versus a 3rd person perceptive in a self referent 
condition. Experiment 2 the explored differences in 1st versus 3rd person perspective 
taking in an other referent condition, using a video of another paralysed patient. Lastly, 
Experiment 3 directly compared differences in motor awareness between self referent and 
other referent conditions using disability related ToM stories. 
 
Results indicated that there were changes in motor awareness in relation to social or 
verbal perspective taking. AHP patients were more aware of their own paralysis when 
asked from a 3rd person (objective) perspective, compared to a 1st person (subjective) 
perspective. AHP patients were also unaware of the motor deficits of another paralysed 
patients shown in a video compared to HP controls, with no differences found when 
asked from a 1st versus a 3rd person perspective. However in comparing results of 
Experiment 1 and 2 it was observed that patients rated the severity of motor weakness for 
the other patient in the video as greater than their own motor deficits. Therefore 
indicating that although they are still anosognosic for the other paralysed patient 




AHP patients were still more aware of the motor weakness and functional outcome of 
other paralysed patients compared to their own disabilities. In Experiment 3, both AHP 
and HP patients presented with overall deficits in disability related ToM stories. This 
confirms the results of Chapter 4 that right-hemisphere damaged patients, in general, have 
impairments in ToM tasks. More specifically, AHP patients again preformed better in 
other referent ToM stories compared to self referent disability related stories. Therefore, 
AHP patients were more aware of the paralysis of the other patient in the story than their 
own motor weakness. Using lesion mapping methods, it was also found that lesions to the 
IFG, superior temporal gyrus (STG), insula ribbon, as well as subcortical areas (i.e. the 
thalamus, putamen and caudate) and dorsal frontal white matter, were significantly 
associated with the difference between other and self referent scores in the disability 
related ToM stories. 
 
Taken together, results from Chapter 4 conclude that AHP patients have specific deficits 
in 3rd person compared to 1st person perspective taking in general social cognitive tasks. 
However, in comparison AHP patients were in fact better in 3rd person compared to 1st 
person perspective taking in experimental investigations presented in Chapter 5. Similarly 
it has been shown that AHP patients show dramatic improvement in body awareness 
when provided 3rd person visual feedback of their own body using videos (Fotopoulou et 
al., 2009; Chapter 6) and mirrors (Jenkinson et al., 2011). Here, there appears to be an 
apparent discrepancy in the ability of AHP patients to see reality from a 3rd person 
(objective) vantage point. Although the results of the current study suggest (Chapter 4) 
that AHP patient’s social world becomes self-centred and egocentrically driven, it also 
appears that at some level these patients still have the cognitive capacity to draw on 3rd 
person perspectives (Chapter 5) depending on the context of the questions. However it is 
not suggested that AHP patients have a fixed or permanent deficit in 3rd person 
perspective taking (i.e. are completely unable to take on this perspective within any 
context), but rather there is a lack of spontaneous integration or updating of 1st person and 
3rd person perspectives in anosognosia. The question here remains why AHP patients do 
not spontaneously integrate the 3rd person viewpoint, or possibly update their 1st person 
perspective on the body using knowledge from the 3rd person. Here, the content of the 
questions asked, or the wider social context in general, becomes crucial. As shown in 
Chapter 4, in visual-spatial or mentalising tasks that have a ‘general’ or non-specific 
content, AHP patients are egocentrically driven and tend to rely on the subjective, 1st 




disability related experimental tasks, which pose a potential threat to their current bodily 
representations, AHP patients spontaneously disengage from the 1st person perspective 
and assume an objective, 3rd person position. Therefore, it can be argued that anosognosic 
patients can be motivated or driven by the context of the question in an experimental 
manipulation, or the wider social context, to use a 3rd person perspective, but do not 
spontaneously integrate 1st and 3rd person perspectives in general. These proposals are 
however only tentative in nature and need to be validated by further experimental 
evidence.  
 
These tentative proposals can also help explain why video feedback can lead to the 
successful remission of AHP. These results conclude that AHP patients do not 
spontaneously integrate or update perspectives, resulting in a discrepancy between their 
own (1st person) perspective on their body and the objective (3rd person) reality, which 
causes the presentation of anosognosia. Third person visual feedback and to a lesser 
extent conversations in the 3rd person, when presented in an emotionally safe environment 
(see Chapter 6), can facilitate an integration of perspectives causing AHP patients to 
update their bodily beliefs. Another speculative interpretation here is in line with 
advances in current research on spontaneous perspective taking - how persons 
spontaneously adopt another persons (3rd person) perspective among multiple 
environmental stimuli (see Furlanetto, Cavallo, Manera, Tversky, & Becchio, 2013). In a 
recent study, Furlanetto and colleagues examined what factors (e.g. eye gaze and action) 
influence spontaneous perspective taking of others by testing a large contingent of 120 
healthy participants in two experimental tasks. Their results showed that when there were 
only objects and no other people in a visual scene, participants assumed a 1st person 
viewpoint. However when a visual scene included both another person and inanimate 
objects, participants were more likely to adopt a 3rd person perspective (i.e. the other 
persons viewpoint). This effect is then intensified by the other person interacting with the 
object (i.e. either looking at or reaching for the object). In a related behavioural study, 
Ambrosini, Pezzulo and Costantini (2014) conducted an action prediction task, finding 
that both gaze direction and arm movements from the actor in the task influenced 
participants’ action predictions. Taken together these studies offer some insight into how 
the brain integrates multiple sources of information to influence spontaneous predictions. 
However, this question of spontaneous perspective taking is yet to be explored in AHP. It 




person perspectives; visual versus verbal feedback) is and is not being spontaneously 
integrated in anosognosia and in turn influences awareness.  
 
However, the wider subject as to why AHP patients spontaneously recover over time 
comes to question. Anosognosic patients do not only encounter 3rd person viewpoints 
from simple experimental manipulations, but are confronted with this perspective through 
social and medical conversations and other daily occurrences (e.g. mirror viewing during 
physiotherapy or routine grooming). These continued social interactions and subsequent 
confrontations with the 3rd person perspective may in time result in AHP patients 
gradually reintegrating 1st and 3rd person perspectives. This may also account for the 
apparent fluctuations in awareness often noticed in the clinical presentation of 
anosognosia over time. For example, it has been commonly observed during the patient 
recruitment phase of this thesis, that a number of patients make similar comments that 
“the doctors tell me I have had a stroke, I’m not so sure” or “that’s what they tell me, I 
don’t think I had a stroke, but the doctors tend to think so”. Here, patients can understand 
the 3rd person viewpoint, but do not spontaneously integrate this objective perspective 
into their own subjective reality. However, over time when asked the same question 
patients responded that “yes, I think I had a stroke” or “I understand now that I’ve had a 
stroke” showing that patients have the capacity to reintegrate perspectives. Why or how 
quickly this happens may be due to the social and visual stimulation of various 
perspectives in everyday activities or by experimental interventions, but may also be 
associated with brain plasticity and white matter connectivity. However, this thesis has 
argued in support of AHP being a multifaceted phenomenon, therefore it is not only 
deficits in perspective taking that can account for the presentation of anosognosia and 
consequently spontaneous recovery, but various neurocognitive and motivational factors. 
Therefore AHP can persist into chronic stages (> 4 months after onset) due to a number 
of interrelated causes, such the severity and location of brain damage (see Vocat et al., 
2010).   
 
In summary, this thesis has drawn on both behavioural and neuroimaging methods to 
demonstrate the tight relationship between social processes (e.g. spatial and mental 
perspective taking), together with related anatomical areas, and anosognosia. It has 
experimentally demonstrated for the first time initial clinical findings (see Kaplan-Solms 
& Solms, 2000) that AHP patient’s social world becomes egocentrically and 




faculty that allows for an integration of 1st and 3rd person perspective taking (see 
Fotopoulou, 2014). It has further demonstrated the relationship between visual-spatial 
cognition (as a modality of social cognition and perspective taking, see Vogeley & Fink, 
2003) and anosognosia through both manipulating patients visual-spatial perspective in a 
non-motor task and visual viewpoints through video replay (also see Turnbull et al., 
2014). However, future studies are needed to further specify this relationship between 
social cognition and anosognosia to understand the precise mechanisms and anatomical 
correlates of 1st and 3rd person perspective taking on the body.  
 
7.2.3 Neurocognitive correlates  
An additional aim of this thesis was to examine the neurocognitive correlates of AHP by 
using neuropsychological testing. Both neurological groups, AHP and HP controls, were 
assessed using a battery of bedside assessments, as described in detail in Chapter 2, which 
tested cognitive functioning in a number of domains. In all studies, there was no statistical 
difference between groups in age, years of education, and time of system onset and 
assessment interval. Furthermore, there was no impairment or difference between groups 
in pre-morbid IQ, long-term and working memory, orientation and general cognitive 
functioning in all studies. Therefore these factors cannot account for the presentation of 
anosognosia as they are comparable between groups in the current studies and in previous 
investigations (see Orfie et al., 2007 for review). 
 
Both patient groups showed both visual and sensory impairments, with no significant 
difference being found throughout this study between groups. Similarly, both 
neurological groups presented with impairments in visual spatial neglect consistently in 
each study. Although there was no statistical difference found, there was however a trend 
toward significance in two studies (Chapter 4 and 5) between the AHP and HP group, 
with the AHP group presenting with more severe impairments.  Here, it is important to 
recognise that although a strong correlation has been found between AHP and visual-
spatial neglect (Orfie et al., 2007; Vocat et al, 2010), double dissociations have been 
found between neglect and AHP (Bisiach et al., 1986). Therefore co-occurrence of visual-
spatial neglect and AHP cannot be indicative of a causal relationship. 
 
In two of the empirical studies (Chapter 4 and 5) there were impairments in executive 
functioning in both groups, but the AHP group presented with significantly worse 




correlations there were double dissociations found in some patients between executive 
impairments and AHP, and therefore cannot be indicative of a causal role in anosognosia. 
Additionally, in one study (Chapter 3) there was a significant difference in the HADS 
measure of depression, with the HP group being significantly more depressed than the 
AHP group. This is inline with the Chapter’s experimental findings on the role of 
negative emotion and AHP, with depression showing a negative correlation with motor 
unawareness.  However, this result was not replicated in larger group studies (Chapter 4 
and 5) in this thesis and in previous investigations (Orfie et al., 2007; Vocat et al., 2010).  
 
Lastly, in all three group studies (Chapter 3-5) impairments in proprioception were found 
in both the AHP and HP group, and there was a statistical difference between groups with 
the AHP patients presenting with more severe proprioceptive deficits. This result has also 
been confirmed in previous studies (Levine, 1991; Vocat et al., 2010; also see Orfei et al., 
2007). Although proprioceptive loss cannot fully account for the presentation of AHP due 
to some patients presenting with anosognosia without proprioception deficits, it may still 
be an important indicator and contributor to the severity of unawareness symptoms, their 
potential for spontaneous recovery, and may also predispose patients to AHP when other 
contributing factors are present (e.g. loss of mental flexibility; Marcel et al., 2004; Orfei 
et al., 2007). Furthermore, proprioception involves sensory motor predictions about 
movement in the body, which in turn is related to internal predictions arising from within 
the body as opposed to exteroceptive signals (Fotopoulou, 2014). Here Fotopoulou 
suggests that proprioceptive deficits in AHP may contribute to a reduced ability to 
generate new predictions about their body, and consequently their potential for left-sided 
movements. However, it is likely that a combination of deficits involving the ‘internal 
body’, including proprioception and interoceptive sensations (see Craig, 2009 and section 
7.5.1 of this Chapter), may lead to weak or faulty interocpetive signals about the current 
physiological state of the body, including motor abilities.  
 
These findings are inline with the proposal that multiple factors underlie the phenomena 
(Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2010; Orfie et al., 2007; Vuilleuimier, 2004). These results 
indicate that the presence of AHP also co-occur with other neurological and 
neuropsychological deficits, such as neglect, proprioception and dysexectuive syndrome. 
However, although there is a co-occurrence of specific neurological and 
neuropsychological disorders with anosognosia, this does not imply a causative role. No 




number of deficits, including emotional, motivational and social factors, and brain 
damage to critical lesion sites (see discussion below) may result in the presentation of 
AHP.  
 
7.2.4 Neuroanatomical correlates in AHP 
AHP is most frequently caused by right perisylvian lesions, but is also reported in left-
sided brain damaged patients (Cocchini et al., 2009). Lesions of the right posterior insula 
(Karnath et al., 2005) and premotor areas, including the IFG and MFG (Berti et al., 2005), 
have been selectively associated with AHP. More recent results point to additional, 
critical lesion sites including subcortical structures (basal ganglia, hippocampus, 
amygdala) and deep white matter tracts (Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Vocat et al., 2010; Moro 
et al., 2011). The current study used both classic lesion overlay methods, as well as a 
novel and advanced statistical approach, VLSM, to advance our understanding of the 
neuroanatomical correlates that underlie motor awareness.  
 
In each of the group studies presented in this thesis (Chapter 3, 4, and 5) lesion overlay 
and VLSM approaches were used to investigate the brain lesions associated with the 
diagnosis of anosognosia.  Clinical CT and/or MRI scans were acquired and used for each 
analysis comparing the AHP group to the brain damaged areas in the HP group. In 
Chapter 3, the scans of 15 right-hemisphere damaged patients (AHP = 8, HP = 7) were 
used for analysis. Twenty-nine scans were acquired and used in Chapter 4 (AHP = 15; HP 
= 14) and in Chapter 5 the scans of 38 patients (AHP = 19; HP = 19) were used for lesion 
mapping. In comparing the results of the lesion mapping across all studies, there was no 
statistical significant difference between overall lesion size of the AHP and HP group. 
However, the overall lesion size of the AHP group was still consistently larger in 
comparison to the HP patients. Lesion overlay results across studies also consistently 
identified involvement of both cortical and to some extent subcortical areas in the AHP 
group, comprising of the inferior and middle frontal gyri extending to the temporal 
cortex, insula ribbon and internal capsule, as well as dorsal frontal white matter. In 
comparison, the lesion overlay maps for the HP group mostly revealed more focal 
damage in mainly subcortical regions. Subtraction maps of the AHP group overlay from 
the HP group overlay across studies consistently identified clusters around the insula 
ribbon, the IFG and MFG. The STG was identified in Chapters 4 and 5, and specific 
subcortical areas were found across studies: the posterior basal ganglia in Chapter 3; and 





The VLSM approach is an advanced method that characterises the statistical relationship 
between tissue damage and behaviour on a voxel-by-voxel basis, regardless of the 
classification of patients into categorical groups or by implementing a cut-off for 
pathology (Bates et al, 2003; Rorden, Karnath & Bonilha, 2007). In using this VLSM 
approach to investigate the anatomical areas associated with AHP, continuous Feinberg 
awareness scores were used, as it provides a measure of the severity of unawareness 
symptoms. This statistical method was used across group studies in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
In comparing the results across all three studies, VLSM analysis using continuous 
Feinberg scores revealed that voxels within the insula ribbon, the IFG and MFG, 
extending to temporally to the supramarginal and superior temporal gyrus, as well as 
dorsal frontal white matter were consistently significantly associated with motor 
unawareness (p < 0.05). The internal capsule was also significantly associated with AHP 
in studies presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.  
 
These results are in support of previous lesion mapping investigations in AHP, while 
adding both confirmatory and novel empirical evidence. Firstly, the presence (lesion 
overlay results) and severity (Feinberg VLSM results) of AHP were associated with a 
range of cortical and subcortical areas that have been previously linked to anosognosia 
(Berti et al., 2005; Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Karnath et al., 2005; Moro et al., 2011; Vocat 
et al., 2010). The area that showed the maximum Z score across all studies was the IFG 
and later the MFG (premotor areas), which have been previously identified as the critical 
areas for anosognosia. Although to a lesser extent, the VLSM analysis also revealed 
lesions to the insula ribbon to be an important indicator of AHP.  Interestingly, the 
anatomical evidence generated from this thesis is much aligned to the recent lesion 
mapping study of Kortte and colleagues (2014).  The authors Region of Interest (ROI) 
analysis showed a strong correlation between lesions to the right IFG and AHP. A 
secondary voxel-wise analysis confirmed these results, but also identified insula damage 
to be associated with motor awareness, although to a lesser extent. Furthermore their 
analysis showed that subcortical regions, such as the basal ganglia were not significantly 
associated with AHP. Although the current study did identify some involvement of 
subcortical areas, previous studies have shown and hypothesised a critical role of 
subcortical structures, and especially the basal ganglia (Small & Ellis, 1996; Fotopoulou 




with basal ganglia strokes will need to specifically investigate the involvement of these 
and other subcortical structures with anosognosia.   
 
Interestingly, the studies presented in this thesis consistently found areas in the temporal 
cortex to be significantly associated with AHP that has not previously been emphasised as 
key markers for anosognosia. Other studies (Vocat at el. 2010; Moro et al., 2011) have 
also found significant association in clusters around the supramarginal gyrus (TPJ) and 
STG, however damage to these cortical areas have not been integrated into current 
neuroanatomical models of AHP. Traditionally more emphasis has been placed on AHP 
resulting from damage to frontal-parietal areas (Pia et al., 2004), with more recent 
research highlighted the critical role of the insula and frontal areas around the premotor 
cortex. The results of this study do confirm these previous finding, but also bring to focus 
the importance to damage in temporal areas, especially, in around the STG and SMG, in 
contributing to the presentation of AHP in at least some patients. This is in line with our 
experimental findings of the relationship between anosognosia and social perspective 
taking, which has a well-established link to the both the STG and SMG (Abu-Akel & 
Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013). 
 
Damage to white mater tracks and consequently the role of connectivity has also been a 
secondary hypothesis to more topological or cortical theories. Each VLSM analysis, as 
well as lesion subtraction analysis, in all three studies found consistent evidence of 
lesions around dorsal frontal white matter tracks to be associated with the presentation of 
anosognosia. Only two previous studies (Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Moro et al., 2011) 
reported damage to white matter in the AHP groups specifically using lesion overlay 
methods. However, in the current studies presented in this thesis it was unfortunately not 
possible to specify exactly which white matter tracts were damaged in the statistical 
analysis due to a number of reasons, including, poor quality of the clinical scans and 
small sample size. More advanced methodological approaches need to be used (e.g. 
Diffusion Tensor Imaging, DTI), which required high quality MRI scans, to be able to 
specifically identify which white matter tracts have been damaged.   
 
However, from the current results of this study it is possible to make some preliminary 
predictions of specific white matter tracts involved, which are found in clusters 
highlighted by the analysis within the dorsal frontal white matter. Firstly, damage to the 




system. This hypothesis could account for the emotional irregularities commonly 
observed in clinical presentation and shown by experimental studies (Chapter 3). 
Furthermore, damage to the cingulum also impairs the pathway between frontal, parietal 
and temporal areas, therefore connecting both traditional theories of frontal-parietal 
damage and current findings of more temporal damage associated with AHP. Secondly, 
lesions to the SLF I (Superior Longitudinal Fasciculus) could result in damage to the 
pathway connecting the medial frontal lobe (including the IFG and MFG) and 
supplementary motor areas to the dorsal parietal cortex and frontal eye-fields. This 
hypothesis provides further support of the importance of damage not only to premotor 
areas, but also account for the importance of connectivity between the premotor cortex 
and the parietal lobe in anosognosia. Although only speculative at this stage, this possible 
account of anosognosia as a disconnection syndrome draws together various 
neuroanatomical explanations of AHP. A similar hypothesis has been proposed for the 
relationship between apathy and Alzheimer’s disease. Although evidence from 
neuroimaging studies indicates that cortical areas (e.g. frontal lobes) are associated with 
emotional indifference in AD (e.g. Amanzio et al., 2011), lesion evidence has identified 
white matter abnormalities to account for a disconnection between the frontal and 
temporal poles (Apostolova et al., 2007). In the same respect, the anatomical correlates of 
unilateral spatial neglect have been identified by most studies in clusters around the 
posterior parietal cortex (Vallar, 2001; Mort et al., 2003) and less frequently around the 
superior temporal gyrus (Karnath, Berger, Kuker & Roden, 2004). However, advanced 
DTI analysis has found direct evidence for frontal white matter pathways, connecting the 
parietal and frontal lobes, damaged in neglect patients (Thiebaut de Schotten et al., 2005).  
Further research is therefore necessary to further explore and confirm these hypotheses on 
the role of connectivity and white matter damage in AHP.  
 
7.2.5 Implications for rehabilitation  
The wider implications of this thesis have both theoretical and clinical significance. In 
terms of clinical significance, AHP has lasting negative implications for the management 
and rehabilitation of patients (see Chapters 1 and 6 for discussion). AHP is often a 
transient phenomenon with spontaneous recovery occurring within days or weeks from 
onset (Vocat et al., 2010). Yet the presence of AHP in the acute stage may significantly 
obstruct rehabilitation efforts and consequently impede long-term functional outcomes 
(Gialanella et al., 2005; Jehkonen et al., 2006). Furthermore, approximately 30% of AHP 




et al., 2007).  Therefore, the rehabilitation of AHP in the acute and chronic stage can be 
of long-term therapeutic significance. Although recently some progress has been made in 
the management of AHP (Jenkinson et al., 2011, for review), to date no evidence based 
treatment exists.  
 
A recent, bedside psychophysical intervention, namely self-observation by video replay, 
led to a lasting remission of severe AHP in an acute stroke patient (Fotopoulou, et al., 
2009). Video-replay provides the AHP patient with visual feedback from a 3rd person 
perspective (from the outside, objective) and ‘off-line’ (at a time different than the one in 
which the patient initiated the movement). This rehabilitation intervention for AHP is in 
need of further validation and is in the feasibility stage. Accordingly, this procedure was 
adjusted and applied in a case series study in Chapter 6. This study aimed to investigate 
the feasibility, effectiveness and optimisation of video replay as a possible rehabilitation 
intervention for AHP in both acute and chronic patients. 
 
This video-replay procedure formed the basis of two intervention protocols administered 
independently to two patients with severe AHP. The first study used multiple, successive 
sessions of video-based self-observation in an acute patient, targeting first the awareness 
of upper limb and subsequently lower limb paralysis. The second study used a single 
session of video-based, self- and other- observation in a patient at the chronic stage 
following onset. Both protocols also involved elements of rapport building and emotional 
support. Four specific research steps were presented as a guideline for the video-replay 
intervention, including: conducting an initial awareness assessment; editing a short video 
of a previous awareness assessment; video viewing; and lastly, the follow-up assessment 
(see Figure 6.1 in Chapter 6). 
 
The results revealed that video-based self-observation had dramatic, immediate effects on 
awareness in both acute and chronic stages and it seemed to act as an initial trigger for 
eventual symptom remission. Nevertheless contrary to the results of the original case 
study (Fotopoulou et al., 2009), these effects did not automatically generalise to all 
functional domains. This study provides provisional support that video-based self-
observation may be included in wider rehabilitation programmes for the management and 





The results provide further support for the finding that video-based, self-observation can 
reinstate motor awareness in AHP, by providing 3rd person and off-line feedback. It 
further highlights that while this simple, psychophysical intervention seems potent, it may 
not be sufficient for awareness restoration in all patients and it needs to be embedded in 
wider and perhaps individualised intervention protocols. These protocols would involve 
the targeting and training of specific facets of awareness (e.g. awareness of upper and 
lower limb function) and the management of related emotions and self-perceptions. This 
conclusion is consistent with recent theories of AHP that suggest it is a multifaceted 
syndrome entailing a dynamic interplay between neurological and psychological 
components (Vocat et al., 2010; Moro et al., 2011; Fotopoulou, 2013).  
 
In line with these findings, previous studies with schizophrenic patients and related 
disorders have also found that video viewing of themselves in previous acute psychotic 
states improves insight or awareness of illness (Davidoff et al., 1998). In a more recent 
study, David and colleagues (2012) tested whether there was a difference in improvement 
of insight after viewing self referent versus other referent (gender matched) videos. This 
study was conducted with 40 patients admitted with a psychotic disorder, where they 
watched either self referent or other referent (control) videos. All patients showed a 
significant improvement in insight or awareness scores regardless of the actor (self or 
other) in the video. There was a trend, but no statistically significant difference between 
self versus other referent video viewing. Similarly, the case series in Chapter 6 also 
integrated the experimental design presented in Chapter 5 using both self referent and 
other referent video replay as part of one intervention strategy. Accordingly, the patient 
was more aware of the motor deficits of the other paralysed patient in the video (as shown 
experimentally in Chapter 5), and it is possible to tentatively speculate that watching both 
the self-and-other referent video feedback influenced the patient’s eventual symptom 
recovery. Taken together, these results are therefore in agreement with the findings of the 
potential for video viewing as a rehabilitation intervention for unawareness, however the 
question of the specificity of the effect in anosognosia, as in schizophrenia, is yet to be 
resolved.  
 
However, the video-replay rehabilitation intervention is still only in the feasibility stage. 
Larger group studies and future clinical trials are needed to validate this approach and 
explore variations of its application in order to optimise its effectiveness. There is also a 




factors, into future rehabilitation strategies.  In particular, the unique role of negative 
emotion needs to be taken into account in the application of any rehabilitation 
intervention with AHP patients, as they may be particularly vulnerable of lapsing into 
depression. It may also be possible to use this knowledge of negative emotion and 
awareness recovery within a carefully controlled therapeutic environment, as part of a 
holistic rehabilitation approach.  Importantly, social perspective taking, such as verbal 3rd 
person feedback or conversation in the 3rd person, may also assist in reintegrating the 3rd 
person (objective) reality into the 1st person (subjective) reality of the unaware patient. 
Furthermore the use of mirrors, which provides 3rd person (from the outside) and online 
(at the same time in which the patient initiated the movement) feedback can also offer a 
cheap and easy bedside therapeutic approach, similar to video replay. However, future 
studies are needed to tease apart the difference between providing offline (using videos) 
and online (using mirror) feedback.  
 
Future studies will therefore need to further translate empirical data on emotional 
processes and social factors involved in motor unawareness into new and innovative 
bedside rehabilitation studies.  The emotional and social factors in recovery from stroke 
are only just beginning to be recognised and studied (Eslinger, Parkinson & Shamay, 
2002). The affective elements involved in AHP have been highlighted by the field of 
neuropsychoanalysis, which combines principles from both neuroscience and 
psychoanalysis (see Solms & Turnbull, 2002). Kaplan-Solms and Solms’ (2000) 
psychoanalytic observations of AHP patients described above provides a in-depth account 
of how to use neuropsychoanalysis to produce psychoanalytic observations in 
understanding and therapeutically treating AHP patients. Prigatano and Morrone-
Strupinsky (2010) similarly recommend the use of psychotherapy with patients who use 
denial as a defensive coping mechanism. Furthermore, a better understanding of the role 
of 3rd person visual (using mirrors and videos) and verbal (1st versus 3rd person) 
perspective taking can be integrated into strategies for rehabilitation interventions. For 
example, in working with confabulating patients, Fotopoulou (2008) proposes that 
conversations using a “3rd person” perspective with the patient may be an alternative 
method used for enhancing both therapeutic rapport and patients’ awareness of brain-
related injury. As discussions in the “3rd person” may be a powerful tool used in 
rehabilitation interventions, Fotopoulou (2008, 2010) also suggests that the social context 
of the anosognosia/confabulation and the patients’ social environment are equally as 




techniques, such as video and mirror feedback, verbal discussions in the 3rd person, other 
referent video replay and psychotherapy, if the patient is willing. It may be further 
beneficial to provide specific rehabilitation guidelines and strategies that are 
individualised for each patient (see Prigatano & Morrene-Stupinsky, 2010 and Jenkinson 
et al., 2011 for reviews).  
 
7.3 Implications on theories of the bodily self 
Overarchingly, this thesis has aimed to contribute to the wider question of how we 
construct the reality of our bodily self. For centuries this question of how best to 
conceptualise the self has been a topic of debate among philosophy, neurology, 
psychology and more recently neuroscience (see Feinberg & Keenan, 2005). To aid in the 
scientific study of the self, researchers across various domains have divided the self into 
several dimensions, starting from the early work of William James, who conceptualised 
the self as both the subject and object of experience (1890; also see Neisser, 1988 and 
Robins et al., 2001 for more recent models of the different levels of the self). As 
introduced in Chapter 1, a recently developed philosophical approach integrates 
interdisciplinary viewpoints by dividing these approaches into two important aspects of 
the self: the ‘minimal’ self and the ‘narrative’ self (Gallagher, 2000). The narrative self 
involves the collection of self-defining experiences across time (e.g. autobiographical 
memory, Conway, 2005) and is based on the development of the more basic minimal or 
bodily self. Accordingly, minimal self-awareness involves the perception and experience 
of the world through our bodies, unextended in time, and is comprised of both a sense of 
ownership (the sense that it is my body that is moving) and the sense of agency (the sense 
that I am the initiator of that action). The focus of this thesis has been on advancing our 
understanding of this embodied view of the self, specifically through the study of a 
disorder of body agency.  
 
This thesis has presented the view that the bodily self, as in anosognosia, involves the 
interaction between exteroceptive, proprioceptive and interoceptive signals (Brugger & 
Lenggenhager, 2014; Tsakiris et al., 2007), but is also developed and exists in the 
presence of others (Fotopoulou, 2014). This ability to integrate multimodal signals into an 
egocentric (1st person) perspective forms the fundamental basis for how we become self-
aware (Blanke, 2012; Vogeley & Fink, 2003). However in contrast, the bodily self does 
not develop in isolation but in the context of other people, which involves the ability to 




mental, is essential for the perception of body agency and ownership (Vogeley et al., 
2001). Typically AHP patients remain unaware when their ipsilateral arm is brought into 
their right visual field indicating a primary deficit in 1st person perspective taking. Yet, 
the results of this study (Chapter 5 and 6) have shown that unaware patients are aware of 
their left sided paralysis when confronted with either 3rd person visual (i.e. video replay) 
or verbal (3rd person or other referent) perspectives. Therefore, this thesis has 
experimentally demonstrated that there is a distinction between the egocentric  (1st 
person) and allocentric  (3rd person) perspective in the construction of the bodily self. 
This therefore also tentatively suggests that the integration between the two perspectives 
takes places developmentally (see Reddy, 2008). In close relation, the ability to disengage 
from a 1st person perspective and draw on the metacognitive ability to understand or infer 
thoughts of feelings to other people is often referred to as a Theory of mind or 
mentalising (Frith & Frith, 2007).  As discussed previously, embodied cognition (1st 
person perspective taking) and social cognition (3rd person perspective taking) has 
received extensive empirical attention when studied independently. However, this study, 
for the first time, has found the importance of 3rd person perspective taking or 
mentalisation on the bodily self (Chapter 4).   
 
Accordingly, the results of this thesis demonstrate that the development of body 
awareness is not only dependent on the 1st person perspective, but on a dynamic interplay 
between 1st – and – 3rd person perspectives. Therefore the proposed hypothesis that both 
cognitive and emotional processes allow for flexible perspective taking and the 
integration of perspectives (Fotopoulou, 2014) has now been confirmed by experimental 
evidence in this study. This proposal of the ‘mentalisation of the body’ (Fotopoulou, 
2014) has also been confirmed by the lesion mapping studies of this thesis, showing that 
temporal areas in the proposed mentalising network (supramarginal gyrus and STG) are 
consistently damaged in AHP patients and are associated with both spatial and mental 
perspective taking results. Thus showing an overlap of neural networks for both 
embodied cognition and social cognition. It additionally confirms the proposal that our 
embodied experience of the world is not solely dependent on neural mechanisms, but is 
embed within the social context (i.e. our environment; Gallagher, 2008). From a 
developmental perspective, it has been argued that from the very beginning our 
understanding of the world is influenced by others and the social environment (Decety & 
Sommerville, 2003). Although this question of intersubjectivity has not been directly 




distinguish between the self and other, and consequently shared representations between 
the self and other.  
 
Closely related to the above conclusion, are the implications of the present results for the 
field of affective neuroscience (Pankseep, 1998). The study of anosognosia serves as a 
powerful example of how neurological and behavioural deficits should be broadened not 
only to include emotional influences, but to recognise affective factors as primary causes. 
The results of this thesis provide confirmatory evidence to the longstanding debate on the 
lateralisation of emotion valance, confirming the unique role of the right hemisphere, 
particularly for the regulation of negative emotion (Chapter 3; see Craig, 2009; Davidson 
& Irwin, 1999; Turnbull et al., 2005). Although there has been conflicting evidence, it has 
been traditionally suggested that the lateralisation of brain damage plays a causal role for 
the onset of depression in patients (Carson et al., 2000; Robinson et al., 1984). Thus 
inferring an assumed dichotomy in the lateralisation of emotional processing: the left 
hemisphere for “positive” emotion and the right for “negative” emotion. However, the 
results from this study, together with previous findings (Turnbull et al., 2005), have 
shown that patients with right lateralised lesions can have the ability to experience a range 
of emotions, however the regulation of emotional processes may be compromised. 
Furthermore, this study highlights the relationship between affect and conscious 
awareness (see Panksepp, 2003) by identifying the neural correlates (insular and striatal 
regions) for not only motivation and interoception, but affective processing of bodily self-
awareness. These findings are additionally in line with recent findings on the tight 
interrelation between emotion and the sense of agency (see Gentsch & Synofzik, 2014; 
see Chapter 3 for discussion). 
 
In summary, through the study of anosognosia, this thesis has therefore contributed to the 
to philosophical, as well as neuroscientific and psychological understanding, of body 
awareness. Firstly, the thesis showed that emotions (negative emotion, in particular) can 
influence our sense of movement and agency. Importantly, it has also provided 
confirmatory experimental and anatomical evidence of the relationship between bodily 
self-awareness and social cognition. The results of this thesis further propose that there is 
in fact an interplay between cognitive and emotional aspects of 1st and 3rd person 
perspective taking on the development of the bodily self.  In that we come to construct a 
sense of body awareness through the influence of others, and more specifically through 1st 




together with neurobiological mechanisms, work together to form representations of the 
social construction of the self.  
 
7.4 General limitations 
The limitations of each specific study have been addressed in detail in the previous 
chapters and in the discussion above. However, there are wider limitations affecting the 
thesis as a whole that must be taken into considerations when drawing conclusions from 
this study. These limitations are in turn presented and discussed below.  
 
Firstly, although larger than most group studies in AHP, the overall sample size for 
individual experiments is relatively small in comparison to other clinical neurosceintific 
studies. Furthermore, the participation of each patient in the entire series of experimental 
studies varied. Resulting in some patients participating in only one experiment, while 
others participated in all of the experiments. Ideally, the same cohort of patients would 
complete all experimental investigations, in order to reduce individual and clinical 
differences that make comparisons across experiments problematic. However, this was an 
unavoidable limitation owing to a combination of factors involved in working with acute 
neurological patients with a rare disorder, such as: medical complications; patient transfer 
and discharge; resolution of AHP; working around patients’ time with other clinical 
services (e.g. physiotherapy or ward rounds); fatigue; and/or changes or additional 
experimental protocols being developed in latter stages of the study and therefore not 
being completed by patients recruited early on. However, previous empirical studies on 
AHP have been conducted with relatively small sample sizes (e.g. Berti et al., 2005; 
Fotopoulou et al., 2008; Fotopoulou et al., 2009; Jenkinson et al., 2009; Vocat et al., 
2012), which demonstrates that important theoretical findings can be obtained with 
relatively small sample sizes that are comparable to the present research.  
 
Additionally, fatigue and the level of arousal in working with acute stroke patients is 
often variable, especially in working with elderly populations. This might lead to possible 
fatigue effects on the patients overall performance. However, every effort was made to 
conduct testing sessions when the patient was alert and awake. Patients were tested over 
multiple testing sessions and randomisation and counterbalancing procedures were also 
followed that help counteract the possible effects.  Furthermore, advancing age is also 
found to lead to general cortical atrophy (Mueller et al., 1998) with some specific brain 




(Raz & Rodrigue, 2006) and white matter tracts (Madden, Bennett, & Song, 2009; 
Mueller et al., 1998). However, in working with focal brain injury following stroke, it is 
almost unavoidable to draw on elderly population groups due to the risk factors of stroke 
(e.g. hypertension, diabetes, cerebrovascular pathology) that commonly occur with aging 
(see Torner, 2005). Nonetheless, the potential influence of arousal and fatigue, as well as 
age, on performance cannot be entirely excluded, although this limitation would apply to 
all studies using acute brain damaged patients.  
 
When considering the neuroanatomical finding of this present study, a fundamental 
limitation was the use of clinical CT and/or MRI scans (see Lezak et al., 2012). These 
structural scans, although still useful, are often of poor quality and therefore have low 
resolution. A better alternative is to use structural MRI scans acquired for research 
purposes using a tailored protocol. Furthermore, in working with structural imaging, such 
as CT and MRI, these scans do not fully indicate exactly where the functional impairment 
occurs, since they show the gross pathology, such as edema (Betz, 1997; Kreisler et al., 
2002). It is additionally important to recognise that brain pathology is often a dynamic 
phenomenon, consequently the time of onset, scan acquisition interval and time of 
neuropsychological testing must all be considered (Bode & Heinemann, 2002; Lezak, 
2012). Although there was no statistical difference found between time of onset and 
behavioural results between groups in the current study, future studies can further 
investigate this dynamic interplay by scanning patients at different time intervals paired 
with multiple neuropsychological evaluations at different time periods. However, in 
working with a rare clinical population of acute stroke patients, often of an elderly age, 
makes scanning patients difficult, also many elderly patients do not meet safety 
requirements.  
 
Furthermore, although the clinical presentation of AHP can vary considerable (see 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 5), the current study grouped together patients presenting with the 
various ‘subtypes’ of anosognosia. This was due to the infrequent occurrence of AHP. 
For example, patients with different degrees of severity were all categorised as 
anosognosic patients, and sub-groups of AHP patients were not used due the limited 
number of patients. However, the use of the Feinberg scale, which gives an indication of 
the degree of severity of unawareness, was used to correlate anosognisa with performance 
on experimental measures, as well as for the VLSM neuroimaging analysis. Future 




AHP groups into sub-categories based on their various clinical presentation. Nevertheless, 
such grouping is not uncommon in clinical research, especially while working with rare 
patient populations, such as confabulating patients. However, this issue of ‘patient 
grouping’ also pertains to the wider debate of the value of the single case-study versus 
group studies (see Shallice, 1979; Caramazza et al., 1988; Vallar, 2000). It cannot be 
denied that the single-case approach in neuropsychology, has not only set the historical 
foundation of the field, but has made significant contributions to our understanding of 
behavioural and brain processes (Shallice, 1979; Caramazza et al., 1988). Group studies 
cannot escape the heterogentity of neurological disorders, requiring results across various 
domains (e.g. age, lesion size, premorbid intelligence etc.) to be averaged. A consequent 
disadvantage for group studies being the use of broad categries to allow for larger group 
sizes, but that lead to the loss of clinically diverse presentations found in the single-case 
approach. Accordinly, this present study aimed to use both group and case-study 
methods, as well as conducting individual analysis on experimental results in group 
studies when appropriate. Nevertheless, group studies are essential for the advancement 
of anosognosia research, in that inferences cannot be entirely made based soley on data 
from isolated case studies and without comparable control groups (Shallice, 1979). Group 
studies offer the added advantage of generating more accurate empirical evidince into 
brain-behaviour correlations (Damasceno, 2010). One alternative for future studies is to 
use multiple single case studies (as in Chapter 6) compared to sutiable control patients or 
groups (Damasio & Damasio, 1997).  
 
Lastly, the recruitment of patients from multiple hospital sites from both Italy and the 
UK, presents a range of limitations.  Although the same clinical tests and experimental 
protocols were used, nevertheless assessments were conducted in both Italian and 
English. This wider issue of language and translation of tests can compromise both the 
validity and reliability of assessment measures (Artiola i Fortuny & Mullaney, 1998). 
However, most of the assessment measures used were standardised and validated for both 
English and Italian populations. However, due to the anosognosia being a relatively rare 
phenomenon, it was necessary to increase the number of hospital sites in order to recruit 
larger numbers of patients needed for group studies within a specific time frame.  More 
broadly, this subject is related to the issue of the measurement of cognitive abilities across 
‘racial’, cultural and ethnic groups (see Mackintosch, 1998), exploring how racial and 
ethic differences may be contributing factors in brain development and organisation 




in conducting cross-cultural studies, which also allow for wider generalisation of results 
(Glymour et al., 2008; Pedraza & Mungas, 2008; also see Byrd et al., 2010). Accordingly, 
AHP cannot be mistaken as a culturally specific phenomenon, but rather as a prototypical 
disorder of self-awareness that transcends societal or cultural boundaries.  
 
7.5 Directions for future research 
Implications for future research have been specifically discussed in relation to each 
individual experiment in the previous chapters (see Chapters 3-6) and integrated into 
Section 7.2 of this current Chapter. However, this present study generates broader 
research questions that would be of particular interest for further investigation. These 
directions for future research are each considered in turn below.  
 
7.5.1  Emotion and interoception 
The role of emotion in AHP can be advanced by investigating how interoceptive bodily 
signals work together to produce a feeling of embodied self-awareness. There has been a 
recent advances in psychology and cognitive neuroscience by the influential discovery of 
a specialised introceptive system that represents the internal, homeostatic state of the 
body (Craig, 2003). Interocetion has been defined here as afferent signals that track the 
physiological state of all tissues of the body (i.e. the feeling that we perceive from our 
bodies), such as temperature, pain or pleasant touch (Craig, 2009). Consequently, the 
study of interocetion is intimately involved in the study of emotion and self-awareness. 
Recent accounts of self-awareness have linked interoception with how we become aware 
of our bodies from within (Critchely et al., 2004; Craig, 2009). However, no study has 
looked at AHP, as a prototypical disorder of self-awareness, and the influence or 
impairment to the interoceptive system, in relation to any interceptive modality (e.g. pain, 
temperature or pleasant touch).   It has also been proposed that the anterior insula plays a 
crucial role in the representation of interoceptive signals. Interestingly, the role of the 
insula in AHP has been shown consistently in previous studies (see Karneth et al., 2005; 
Fotopoulou et al, 2010; Vocat et al., 2010) as well as the studies in the current thesis (see 
Chapters 3-5). Therefore theoretical proposals of interoception and neuroanatomical 
correlates on the insula both support future research on the relationship between 
interoception and AHP.  
 
One specialised interoceptive modality is called pleasant or affective touch. Pleasant 




found only on hairy skin (Olausson et al., 2002). Although only speculative in nature, in 
the current studies the investigator has noticed how patients themselves spontaneously 
engage in slow velocity stroking on their left (paralysed) arm by using their right hand. 
One patient in particular reported that her left arm was her “alienated arm” and only by 
“loving and stroking” her arm it would become hers again and “correspond to her”. 
These qualitative observations suggest that pleasant or affective touch, as a specific 
modality of interoception, is of particular interest for future experimental and 
physiological studies in AHP.  
 
7.5.2 Body ownership disorders and other anosognosia phenomena 
At the beginning of the thesis it was suggested that self-awareness, specifically the bodily 
self, involves both a feeling of ownership and sense of agency. This study has focused on 
AHP as a disturbance of body agency, however it was observed that the presentation of 
AHP commonly co-occurs with disturbances of body ownership, which includes both 
asomatognosia and somatoparaphrenia. Although this was a common clinical observation, 
the study of these additional anosognosic phenomena (Cutting, 1978) was beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Future studies, should firstly establish better assessment tools and 
specific diagnostic criteria for such body ownership disorders. Recent studies have shown 
preliminary evidence that anosognosia and somatoparaphrenia can be dissociable 
(Invernizzi et al., 2013; Brugger & Lenggenhager, 2014), yet it has been previously 
observed by larger group studies that body ownership disorders only occur with a 
simultaneous presentation of anosognosia (Marcel et al., 2004; Karneth at al., 2005). 
Future studies are needed to tease apart this intricate relationship between body agency 
and ownership disorders. Lastly, somatoparaphrenia, where patients attribute ownership 
of their arm to another person, often a close relative (Gerstmann, 1942), is better 
described in the literature (Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). Where as asomatognosia, the inability 
to recognise one’s own body (Cutting, 1978), has not received the same empirical 
attention and it’s clinical presentation is ill described in the literature (Feinberg, Venneri, 
Simone, Fan & Northoff, 2010). Future studies need to better define the difference 
between the two disorders, develop better assessment methods and establish the 
association with these disorders and anosognosia, therefore contributing to a wider 
theoretical debate on the developmental progression of body ownership and agency.  
 
In a recent review, Vallar and Ronchi (2009) described a classic taxonomy of disorders of 




heaviness, dread or lifelessness to one half of the body (sometimes referred to as 
hyperschematia).  Although possibly not directly related, patients recruited in this study 
often referred to their left paralysed arm as being “dreadfully heavy”, “like a dead 
weight”, or compare it to a “rock” or “stone”. Such qualitative descriptions of AHP’s 
patients paralysed left limb, as well as emotionally related phenomena, such as 
misoplegia and anosodiphoria, merit more systematic assessment methods and future 
empirical studies.  
 
7.5.3 Belief updating and AHP 
It has been suggested that AHP can be compared to the development and presentation of 
delusions in other disorders (see Davies et al., 2005), which can reflect abnormalities in 
belief formation. It has also been suggested that beliefs are constantly updated in order to 
integrate new information and expectations, while at the same time adhering to an 
existing “web” of beliefs (Fotopoulou, 2014). More recent theories of belief updating and 
delusions are based on neurobiological principles known as predictive coding 
(Fotopoulou, 2014; Friston, 2009). Fotopoulou (2012, 2014) has provided an alternative 
model to explain the multifaceted nature of AHP using this Bayesian ‘predictive coding’ 
framework (Friston, 2010). This framework allows for a single and neurobiologically 
plausible formulation that incorporates both bottom-up and top-down mechanisms of 
perception and belief formation. In this context, AHP can be linked to a general 
antagonism between ‘prior beliefs’ (predictive internal models of the world based on 
pervious learning) and ‘prediction error’ (discrepancies between expected and actual 
inputs based on interoceptive and exteroceptive signals).  
 
Future studies can test this proposed model in respect to deficits in belief updating 
commonly found in AHP (Fotopoulou, 2012; Vocat et al., 2013). A recent study by Vocat 
et al. (2013) experimentally demonstrated that AHP patients tend to stick to their former 
beliefs and do not modify their original expectations, despite new evidence to the 
contrary, when asked to solve a simple riddle task. Future studies are needed to further 
explore this suggested fixation of prior beliefs. Furthermore, evidence from recent 
neuroimaging and lesion studies has suggested that the right IFG is selectively associated 
with deficits in updating undesirable information in non-anosognosic studies investigating 
unrealistic optimism in healthy participants (Sharot et al., 2012). Interestingly, as 
previously discussed in this study, damage to the IFG has also been consistently 




between belief updating and the role of the right IFG provides further evidence for the 
need to test these prediction in future interdisciplinary studies.  
 
7.5.4 Neuroimaging analysis 
Directions for future AHP neuroimaging studies have already been discussed in Section 
7.2.4, however four key recommendations will be highlighted here. Although this thesis 
has drawn on novel methodological advances in lesion mapping, there are still more 
refined and advanced neuroimaging technologies that can be utilised in AHP research. 
Firstly, the use of better quality structural scans (e.g. research based MRI scans), rather 
than routinely acquired clinical scans, will enhance the accuracy of the lesion mapping 
results and allow for the use of more advanced programs (e.g. Matlab and Statistical 
Parametric Mapping; SPM) that allow for more sophisticated analysis. Secondly, using 
MRI scans to conduct white matter analysis to explore specific hypotheses surrounding 
the role of damage to white matter tracks and anosognosia. Thirdly, designing and 
implementing functional MRI (fMRI) studies will help test the role of various behavioural 
theories (e.g. emotional regulation; motor control and planning; motor observation; and 
social perspective taking) with anatomical correlates in AHP patients. Lastly, the 
scanning AHP patients at different time intervals using MRI scanners, will help track the 
patho-anatomical changes in the evolution of anosognosia symptoms from acute to post-
acute stages. Therefore helping to resolve the long-standing question of spontaneous 
recovery in AHP.  
 
To advance our understanding of the anatomical correlates of anosognosia, future 
research should take advantage of recent advances in neuroimaging methods.  As 
discussed in Section 7.2.4 of this Chapter, the recent advent of diffusion tensor imaging 
(DTI) has allowed for the study of the anatomy of white matter tracts (Catani, Howard, 
Pajevic, & Jones, 2002; Thiebaut de Schotten et al., 2005, 2011). The use of DTI analysis 
can help uncover the role of connectivity and damage to specific white matter tracts in 
anosognosia. Furthermore, the majority of neuroimaging studies employ general linear 
models to examine the relationship between each voxel and a specific model or behaviour 
(Fox & Friston, 2012). Univariant approaches also suffer a general limitation in that they 
ignore the fact that no brain areas work in isolation (Carter et al., 2012). One alternative is 
to utilise a multivariant approach, which can investigate large-scale networks (Smith et 
al., 2014) and also facilitates analysis of multiple brain areas, as opposed to isolated 




necessary resources to acquire better quality MRI scan should draw on more advanced 
tractography and multivariant approaches to better understand both the white matter tracts 
and larger networks of cortical areas involved in motor unawareness. 
 
7.6 Concluding comments  
This thesis explored how we construct our sense of self, more specifically our bodily self, 
through the study of a prototypical disorder of self-awareness, AHP. More specifically, 
the present thesis aimed to examine the complex and dynamic emotional and social 
factors, and related neurocognitive and neuroanatomical correlates, involved in motor 
unawareness following right-hemisphere stroke. It revealed that AHP patients live in an 
emotionally-laden environment and egocentric reality, where there is an inability to 
spontaneously integrate or update 1st and 3rd person thinking, arising possibly as a 
consequence of damage to the inferior and middle frontal gyrus. These results were 
further confirmed by a potential overlap found in neural networks for embodied cognition 
and social cognition. Furthermore, these deficits in perspective taking lead to faulty 
inferences about the self and an inability to update premorbid beliefs about the body, 
which is mediated by brain lesions that impair interceptive signals and neuromodulatory 
pathways. This thesis has contributed not only to the advancement of our theoretical 
understanding of AHP, but has great clinical significance as well. The thesis has shown 
that social perspectives taking, as well as emotional and motivational processes, 
contribute to a dynamic understanding of AHP as a multifaceted syndrome. The 
translation of these findings has wider implications for the future treatment and 
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free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  A decision to withdraw at any time, or a 
decision not to take part, will not affect the standard of care you receive. 
According to your notes you have not participated in any other research, but please note that if you 
have been involved in any other research project, you should not take part in this study. 
 
4. What will happen to me if I take part? 
You are asked to take part in this study by participating in different psychological studies and tasks. 
These will take place in four to six different sessions, which will last a maximum of an hour each and will 
be scheduled, at your convenience, on non-consecutive days. In the first session you will be 
encouraged to describe the experience of your neurological illness and give its history. A number of 
standard cognitive tasks of memory, attention and problem-solving will also be administered in the 
subsequent. For example, you will be asked to complete a number of tasks concerning knowledge (e.g. 
defining words), thinking (e.g. interpreting proverbs), attention (e.g. identifying common patterns in 
figures), memory (e.g. recalling pictures) and body awareness (e.g. questions about your body). In the 
following sessions you will be asked to answer a number of questions regarding your present emotions 
and the view you have of yourself following your illness. Later, you will be asked to perform certain 
cognitive tasks such as completing sentences, and memorising words or phrases. You need to be 
concentrated in order to complete these tasks. In subsequent sessions, we will explain the details of 
certain of the administered tests in ways that we will not be able to reveal until you have completed the 
tasks. If you wish you may also ask for feedback on your answers, although the full results of the study 
will not be available at that stage. Your answers may be audio- and video- recorded. If out-patient 
appointments are arranged (subject to your agreement and convenience) we will reimburse your travel 
expenses to and from the hospital. 
Please note that these sessions are independent of your clinical care and treatment, and they should 
not interfere with the latter at any stage and for any reason. Please also note that they are not needed 
for your care.   
 
5. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There are no anticipated risks involved in this research, but if you should experience mental and/or 
physical fatigue, or any form of psychological distress please be aware that you could inform the 
investigator immediately and discontinue the session or even the study, if you wish and without 
consequences.  
 
6. What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
There is no direct benefit to yourself from taking part in the study. The information we get from this study 
may help us to understand and treat future patients with similar brain damage better.  
 
7. Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly 
confidential.  Any information about you which leaves the hospital will have your name and address 
removed so that you cannot be recognised from it.  All audio- and video- recordings made will be 
suitably anonymised, securely stored and made accessible only to the investigators. Anonymous data 
will be extracted from these recordings and the tapes will be destroyed 3 years after the completion of 
the study. Anonymous data will be retained for 5 years following their potential publication.  
 
In the process of checking that this study is being carried out properly and the data collected is correct, 
authorised individuals (monitors or auditors) who may be employees of the company funding this 
research, or employees of external bodies, the ethics committee or regulatory authorities, may be 
granted access to any information held about you. This includes medical information and medical 
records. Anyone granted such access will also treat the information as highly confidential. By signing 
the consent form you agree to this access. 
 
We will place a copy of this information sheet and a copy of the signed consent form in your hospital 
notes. 
 




Sometimes during the course of a research project new information becomes available. If this happens 
we inform the Ethics committee. If there is any substantial change the forms and information given to 
volunteers will be modified from the original used in previous volunteers. 
We are a leading establishment in this area of research and if any new information relevant to this study 
becomes available the researchers will discuss this with you.  You are free to withdraw from the study at 
anytime. 
 
9. What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
If you withdraw from the study we will destroy all identifiable information about you. We will retain and 
continue to use any data collected before such withdrawal of consent unless you request that you do not 
want us to use any data collected from you. 
 
10. What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the research will form the basis of future scientific papers. These will be submitted for 
publication approximately one year following the completion of the study. Your identity and the 
confidentiality of your answers will be protected.  
 
11. What if something goes wrong? 
If you are harmed by taking part in this research project, there are no special compensation 
arrangements.  If you are harmed due to someone’s negligence, then you may have grounds for a legal 
action but you may have to pay for it.  Regardless of this, if you wish to complain, or have any concerns 
about any aspect of the way you have been approached or treated during the course of this study, the 
normal National Health Service complaints mechanisms should be available to you. 
 
12. Who is funding the research? 
The study is funded by two Volkswagen Foundation Grants and is sponsored by the Institute of 
Psychiatry.  
 
13. Who has reviewed the study? 
The study has been reviewed by the South East London Research Ethics Committee. 
 
14. Contact for Further Information 
 If you have any questions regarding this study, or concerns regarding the manner in which the study 
was conducted or would like to be informed of the results when the study is completed, please feel free 
to contact the investigators: 
 
 
•   Address for all communications: 
Dr. Katerina Fotopoulou 
Academic Unit of Psychiatry, 3rd Floor, Block 8, South Wing, St Thomas’s Hospital, London, SE1 













Version 3: 25.05.11 
Study Title: Awareness of Illness Following Brain Damage 
Please initial the following  
  
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
dated ............................(version ............) for the above study and have had 
the opportunity to ask questions. 
  
    
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time, without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal 
rights being affected. 
  
    
3. I understand that the data collected during the study will be analysed and 
used in the final report and follow-up publications.  However, I have been 
made aware that data will be anonymised. 
  
 
    
4. I understand that sections of any of my medical notes may be looked at by 
members of the research team or regulatory authorities where it is relevant 
to my taking part in research.  I give permission for these individuals to have 
access to my records. 
  
 
    
5. Do you understand that some of your answers in the study will be audio- 
and video-taped for scientific purposes? Do you consent to the unattributed 
and confidential use of these recordings for scientific purposes? 
  
    





Participant                                                                                                                     
Signed .............................................………................     Date ........................................... 
 
(NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS) ......................................................………........................ 
 
Researcher 
Signed .............................................………................     Date ........................................... 
 
(NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS) ......................................................………........................ 
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free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  A decision to withdraw at any time, or a 
decision not to take part, will not affect the standard of care you may receive at the trust in the future. 
 
4. What will happen to me if I take part? 
You are asked to take part in this study by participating in different psychological studies and tasks. 
These will require from a minimum of one to a maximum of six different sessions, which will last a 
maximum of an hour and a half each and (if more than one) will be scheduled, at your convenience, on 
non-consecutive days. If you take part in a single session study you will be taking part in only one of the 
following assessments: a number of standard and experimental cognitive tests of memory, attention, 
body perception, and problem-solving will also be administered in subsequent sessions. For example, 
you will be asked to complete a number of tasks concerning knowledge (e.g. defining words), thinking 
(e.g. interpreting proverbs), memory (e.g. recalling pictures), body ownership (e.g. questions about your 
body) and attention (e.g. identifying common patterns in figures). During these tasks we will also 
measure certain physiological functions.  The researcher will specify which one, show you the basic 
materials before you begin and will also give you a debriefing sheet that fully explains the study in the 
end. If you take part in the entire study you will be participating in all the tasks described above. In the 
session(s), you will be asked to answer a number of questions regarding your present emotions and the 
view you have of yourself. In the following sessions, you will be asked to perform certain cognitive tasks 
such as completing sentences, and memorising words or phrases. You need to be concentrated in 
order to complete these tasks. At the last session, we will explain the details of certain of the 
administered tests in ways that we will not be able to reveal until you have completed the tasks. If you 
wish, you may also ask for feedback on your answers, although the full results of the study will not be 
available at that stage. Your answers may be audio- and video- recorded. 
 
Please note that these sessions are independent of any academic performance, assessment and any 
clinical care and treatment, and they should not interfere with these at any stage and for any reason.   
 
5. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There are no anticipated risks involved in this research, but if you should experience mental and/or 
physical fatigue, or any form of psychological distress please be aware that you could inform the 
investigator immediately and discontinue the session or even the study, if you wish and without 
consequences.  
 
6. What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
There is no direct benefit to yourself from taking part in the study. The information we get from this study 
may help us to understand and treat future patients with similar brain damage better.  
 
7. Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly 
confidential.  All audio- and video- recordings made will be suitably anonymised, securely stored and 
made accessible only to the investigators. Anonymous data will be extracted from these recordings and 
the tapes will be destroyed 3 years after the completion of the study. Anonymous data will be retained 
for 5 years following their potential publication.  
 
In the process of checking that this study is being carried out properly and the data collected is correct, 
authorised individuals (monitors or auditors) who may be employees of the company funding this 
research, or employees of external bodies, the ethics committee or regulatory authorities, may be 
granted access to any information held about you. Anyone granted such access will also treat the 
information as highly confidential. By signing the consent form you agree to this access. 
 
8. What if new information becomes available? 
Sometimes during the course of a research project new information becomes available. If this happens 
we inform the Ethics committee. If there is any substantial change the forms and information given to 
volunteers will be modified from the original used in previous volunteers. 
We are a leading establishment in this area of research and if any new information relevant to this study 





9. What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
If you withdraw from the study we will destroy all identifiable information about you. We will retain and 
continue to use any data collected before such withdrawal of consent unless you request that you do not 
want us to use any data collected from you. 
 
10. What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the research will form the basis of future scientific papers. These will be submitted for 
publication approximately one year following the completion of the study. Your identity and the 
confidentiality of your answers will be protected.  
 
11. What if something goes wrong? 
If you are harmed by taking part in this research project, there are no special compensation 
arrangements.  If you are harmed due to someone’s negligence, then you may have grounds for a legal 
action but you may have to pay for it.  Regardless of this, if you wish to complain, or have any concerns 
about any aspect of the way you have been approached or treated during the course of this study, the 
normal National Health Service complaints mechanisms should be available to you. 
 
12. Who is funding the research? 
The study is funded by two Volkswagen Foundation Grants and is sponsored by the Institute of 
Psychiatry.  
 
13. Who has reviewed the study? 
The study has been reviewed by the South East London Research Ethics Committee. 
 
14. Contact for Further Information 
 If you have any questions regarding this study, or concerns regarding the manner in which the study 
was conducted or would like to be informed of the results when the study is completed, please feel free 
to contact the investigators: 
 
 
•   Address for all communications: 
Dr. Katerina Fotopoulou 
Academic Unit of Psychiatry, 3rd Floor, Block 8, South Wing, St Thomas’s Hospital, London, SE1 




























Version 3: 25.05.11 
 
Study Title: Awareness of Illness Following Brain Damage 
 
Please initial the following  
  
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
dated ............................(version ............) for the above study and have had 
the opportunity to ask questions. 
  
    
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time, without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal 
rights being affected. 
  
    
3. I understand that the data collected during the study will be analysed and 
used in the final report and follow-up publications.  However, I have been 
made aware that data will be anonymised. 
  
 
    
4. I understand that sections of any of my medical notes may be looked at by 
members of the research team or regulatory authorities where it is relevant 
to my taking part in research.  I give permission for these individuals to have 
access to my records. 
  
 
    
5. Do you understand that some of your answers in the study will be audio- 
and video-taped for scientific purposes? Do you consent to the unattributed 
and confidential use of these recordings for scientific purposes? 
  
    







Participant                                                                                                                     
Signed .............................................………................     Date ........................................... 
 
(NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS) ......................................................………........................ 
 
Researcher 
Signed .............................................………................     Date ........................................... 
 
(NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS) ......................................................………........................ 
                             


















Appendix D. Patient demographic and medical history form 
Code   DOB   
Age   Education level (years)   
Ward/Hospital   Occupation   
Gender   Hearing aids/glasses/other   
Assessors   Handedness   
Date of onset   Admission date   
Place of 
admission   Referral [date & place]   
Inclusion 
criteria 
      
Unilateral R 
lesion     
<4 months     
Motor disorder     
Anosognosia     
Clinical notes        
Admission        
Circumstances     
Presentation       
Diagnosis       
Type of Lesion     
Scans done     
Radiology 
reports       
Neurological 
Exam       
Date & 
Description     




        
Date & 
Description       
      
      
        
 
Relevant Medical Info Ethanol   
  Drugs   
  Smoker   
  Diabetes    
  Blood pressure   
  Family history   
  Sleep   
  Appetite   
  Past medical history   
      
Medication     
      
Psychiatric History     
      
Family History     
      
Social History 
(Optional) Married/Divorced/Widow   
  Relationship   
  Children   
  "race"/culture   
  Place of birth   
  Hobbies/Interests   
  "religious"   
Mood 
(reported/observed) Anxiety   


















  Irritable/cooperative   
Speech Fluent/Spontaneous    
  Monotonous   
  Impoverished/quality    
Clinical impressions Appearance   
  Mood   
  Alert/Concentration    
  Avoidance   
  
Egocentric 
characteristics   




Appendix E. Proprioception clinical protocol based on Vocat et al. (2010) 
 
Proprioception is intact sense of position of the body and limbs- sign of normal primary 
sensory functioning. The protocol based on Vocat et al.’s (2010) clinical procedure. 
 
ASK:  “Please close your eyes for me.” 
 
Then before each body part is moved, SAY: 
 
“I am going touch your… (finger, wrist, elbow) to ask you which direction your… 
(finger, write or elbow) is moving, either up or down”.  
 
Apply a small movement at the three joints [middle finger, wrist, elbow] listed below, in 
three separate attempts. Only touch the sides of the finger, wrist or elbow. Move them up 
or down and ask the patient to tell you what direction it is moving.  
Rate the movements as: 
 
 Correct, mark as: ✔ 
 
 
 Wrong, mark as: ✗ 
 
 
Joint 1st Attempt 2nd Attempt 3rd Attempt 
Middle Finger    
Wrist    
Elbow    
 







Appendix F. Assessment for left-right disorientation 
 
This assessment is designed to clinically assess left-right disorientation.  
 
1. Lift the patient’s right arm and ask:  
Which hand is this? 
 
2. Take the patient’s left arm by the elbow and move the patient’s hand into the right 
hemispace, and ask:  
Which hand is this? 
 
3. Ask:  
Use your right hand to point to my left hand. 
 
4. Ask:  
Use you right hand to point to my right hand. 
 
5. Point to the patient’s right ear and ask:  
Is this your right or left ear? 
 
6. Point to the patient’s left ear and ask:  
Is this your right or left ear? 
 
7. Ask:  
Use you right hand to point to my right ear. 
 
8. Ask:  
Use your right hand to point to my left ear. 
 
9. Touch the patients left leg and ask:  
Is this your left or right leg? 
 
10. Touch the patients right leg and ask:  











Appendix G. Table of groups’ demographic characteristics and neuropsychological 
profile using non-parametric analysis 
	
AHP(n=8) HP(n=8) Mann-Whitney  Test 
   Median Range Median Range Z-Score P 
Berti awareness left  2 1 0 1 -3.23 0.00 
MRC left upper limb 0 1 0 1 -0.52 1.00 
MRC left lower limb 0 2 1 3 -0.79 0.49 
Digit Span Forwards 6 3 6 3 -0.89 0.52 
MOCA memory 3.5 2 4.5 2 -0.83 0.56 
Comb/razor test left 3.5 14 4.5 7 -0.69 0.53 
Comb/razor test ambiguous 5.5 5 4 8 -1.41 0.18 
Bisiach one item test 1 1 0 1 -1.46 0.31 
Copy 0 2 1 3 -1.03 0.39 
Cognitive estimates 18 14 16 6 -0.94 0.37 
     
Berti awareness interview= Berti et al. (1996); MRC= Medical Research Council (Guarantors of Brain, 
1986); MOCA=The Montreal Cognitive Assessment (Nasreddine, 2005); Comb/razor test = tests of 
personal neglect (MacIntoch, Brodie, & Beschin, 2000); Bisiach one item test= test of personal neglect; 
Copy = conventional sub-test of Behavioural Inattention Test (Wilson, Cockborn & Halligan, 1987). 
a Scores below tests’ cut-off points, or more than 1 SD below average mean. 
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Appendix I. Visual-spatial perspective taking task: example of visual arrangement  




























Appendix J. Control questions and arrangements for visual-spatial perspective taking 
(VSPT) task 
Say:    
“Now we are going to do something a little different. I am going to ask 
you a few questions involving this tray and cups. The questions will be 
about the position of the cups. I will ask you some questions about how 




“Can you see the Camera?”, if they cannot see the camera, try to move it to their right 
visual gaze. 
 
Then focus their attention to the tray and cups [how?], and ask, “Can you see the tray 
and cups?” Try and move the tray and cups until it is their full visual field.  
 
Ask the following questions to confirm that the patient can clearly see the tray and cups: 
“How many cups do you see?”, “What colour is the tray?” 
Only continue after you have made sure the patient can see the tray and all the cups. 
 
Set up the trays and cups as in the diagram below, again make sure the patient can see all 




















Appendix K. Examples of Theory of mind (ToM) stories from both 1st person 
perspective taking and 3rd person perspective taking set 
 
 Set 1 Set 2 
Perspective 1st person ToM story 3rd person ToM story 
Narrative Late one night you are 
leaving the supermarket. You 
always get the bus home 
because you are afraid that if 
you walk home in the dark 
someone may attack and rob 
you. When leaving, you see a 
small child, about to walk 
home alone. You approach 
the child and ask, “Would 
you like me to walk you 
home?” 
Lisa is terrible at returning 
books. Lisa often loses the 
books she borrows. Paul 
takes his book collection 
very seriously and would be 
very unhappy to lose a book. 
Lisa asks to borrow a book 
from Paul’s collection, Paul 
replies, “Oh that one, it is not 
very good!”  
 
1st order question Why do you say that? Why does Paul say that? 
Multiple choice questions a) You believe the child may 
get robbed and attacked.  
b) You are making a joke. 
c) You want to rob the child. 
a) Paul wants to discourage 
Lisa from borrowing the 
book. 
b) Paul does not like to read. 
c) Paul found the book 
terribly boring. 
Extended narrative The child has been warned 
by his parents not to talk or 
go anywhere with strangers, 
and tells you that he is fine 
on his own. 
After hearing Paul’s advice, 
Lisa thinks she now needs to 
choose another book. 
2nd order question  Why does the child think you 
offered to walk him home? 
Why does Lisa think she 
needs to choose another 
book? 
Multiple choice questions a) The child thinks you are 
being nice. 
b) The child thinks you might 
hurt him. 
c) The child thinks you are 
old and confused. 
a) Lisa thinks the first book 
is too long. 
b) Lisa thinks Paul suspects 
her of losing the book. 
c) Lisa thinks Paul does not 





Appendix L. Full description of false belief control tasks used in Chapter 4 
 
Task 1 – Age-adapted “Smarties” Task 
 A modified version of the “Smarties” task (Gopnik & Astington, 1988) was used. In 
order to make the experiment more appropriate for the target sample (i.e. elderly adults 
instead of children) the “Smarties” box (a box of sweets popular in North America and 
the UK) was replaced with a cigarette box, which was considered to be both age 
appropriate and easily recognisable. During the “cigarette” false belief task, participants 
are first shown a clearly recognisable cigarette box, which (unbeknownst to the 
participants) contained coins instead of cigarettes. Participants are then asked a control 
question “What do you think is inside the box?” and are expected to respond by stating 
the expected contents of the box (i.e. cigarettes). Answering this question correctly was a 
prerequisite to continue the task and is not included in the experimental questions below. 
Subsequently, the box is opened and emptied in front of the participants revealing that the 
content is in fact coins, showing that their initial belief is false. The coins are then 
returned to the box and the participants are asked a false belief question: “If your friend 
comes to visit you now, what will he/she think is inside the box?”. Participants are then 
asked two control questions: “What did you think was inside when I first showed you the 
box?” and “ What do you think is inside the box now?”. As in the original “Smarties” task 
(Gopnik & Astington, 1998), a score of 1 was given for each question answered correctly 
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Appendix N. Examples of disability Theory of Mind (ToM) stories 
 Set 1 Set 2 
Reference  Self referent ToM story Other referent ToM story 
Awareness  Aware Unaware Aware Unaware 
Narrative You are in the 
hospital, recovering 
from a recent stroke. 
You are very hungry 
and are looking 
forward to lunch. 
You can use your 
right hand, but you 
are still unable to use 
your left. The nurse 
delivers your lunch 
at twelve o’clock. 
You ask the nurse to 
cut your food.  
 
You are in the 
hospital. The doctors 
tell you that you have 
had a stroke and that 
you are paralysed on 
the left side of your 
body. You are tired 
of sleeping and 
decided to sit in the 
chair instead. You try 
to get out of bed 
yourself, and fall 
down. 
Amanda has just 
had a stroke and 
is recovering in 
the hospital. 
Amanda is left-
handed, but her 
left arm and hand 
are very weak and 
she cannot use 
them. Amanda is 
very unhappy and 
bored in the 
hospital. The 
nurse, David, 
does not know 
that Amanda is 
left handed, and 
remembers 
Amanda has 
many friends who 
have sent her 
cards. He 
suggests she 
writes one of 
them a letter and 
gives Amanda a 
pen and some 
paper. Amanda 
gives back the 
paper and pen. 
Samantha is in the 
hospital. The 
doctor says 
Samantha has had 
a stroke and that 
she cannot use the 
left side of her 
body. Samantha’s 
friend Tom comes 
to visit her. 
Samantha 
immediately tries 
to stand and greet 
Tom. Tom rushes 
to Samantha’s 





Why do you ask the 
nurse to cut your 
food? 
Why did you fall 
down? 
Why does 
Amanda not write 
a letter? 
Why did 








a) You think the 
nurse has nothing to 
do. 
b) You cannot use 
both hands to eat. 
c) You are feeling 
lazy. 
a) The floor was wet 
and slippery. 
b) There was 
something wrong 
with the bed. 
c) You are not able 
to stand without help.
a) Amanda does 
not like the nurse 
and wants to 
upset him.  
b) Amanda cannot 
write, because she 
is left handed.  
c) Amanda is 
busy and has no 
to time write. 
a) Samantha 
thinks she is able 
to stand and 
wants to greet her 
friend.  
b) Samantha does 
not like her friend 
and wants to 
leave. 
c) Samantha 




The nurse is new to 
the ward, and knows 
nothing about your 
current medical 
condition. She 
kindly tells you that 
it is better for you to 
cut your own food. 
The doctor is in the 
room when you fall 
and rushes to help 
you, reminding you 
that you should not 
try and stand without 
help. 
Amanda thanks 
David, but tells 
him she cannot 
write the letters.   
Tom tried to 
explain to 
Samantha that she 
must not try and 
stand without 
help, but she 
continues to tell 
him that she is 
well rested and 
will enjoy coming 
out of bed.  
2nd order 
question  
Why does the nurse 
think you asked 
him/her to cut your 
food? 
Why does doctor 
think you fell down? 
Why does David 
think Amanda 










a) The nurse thinks 
you simply do not 
like the exercise.  
b) The nurse thinks 
you cannot use both 
hands to eat.  
c) The nurse thinks 
you do not know 
how to use a knife.   
a) The doctor thinks 
you are paralysed on 
the left and cannot 
stand by yourself.  
b) The doctor thinks 
the floor is wet and 
slippery and made 
you fall.  
c) The doctor thinks 
you are too tired and 
a) David thinks 
Amada is too sad 
to write the 
letters.   
b) David thinks 
Amanda has no 
friends to write to.  




thinks Tom thinks 
she is too tired to 
stand. 
b) Samantha 
thinks Tom thinks 
she is paralysed 
on her left side 





cannot stand without 
help. 
hand prevents her 
from writing.    
thinks Tom 
doesn’t like 

























Appendix O. Case study 2: other referent condition additional methods and results 
 
Clinical observations 
 At the end of the ‘other’ video replay, FG immediately commented: “This man has to 
work hard, but I have to work more than him for rehabilitation.” At the end of the video 
and in all subsequent sessions, the Judgement of Actions Test was used both in first and 
third person (for unimanual left and right, bimanual and bipedal actions) and the patient’s 
awareness recovery was monitored over time comparing self-referred responses and 
other-referred responses in the JAT. 
 
Statistical analysis 
In the other referent condition the same trend of results was hypothesised as in the 
selfreferent condition. Nevertheless, since we did not have a baseline measure, all the post 
video evaluations were compared with each other (i.e. 89 v. 90 , v. 103 and v. 113 days; 
90 v. 103 and v. 113 days; 103 v. 113 days; one-tailed tests).  
 
Results 
BM responses showed a gradual increase of awareness (89 days = 5.00 (4.17 - 8.00); 90 
days = 8.00 (6.17 - 9.82); 103 days = 4.50 (3.17 - 8.00);113 days = 5.00 (2.17 - 7.82)). 
Statistical tests confirm the improvement in other-referred JATs for BM (χ2(3) = 9.2838, 
p = 0.02575) in particular after 90 days session, as confirmed by post-hoc tests (89 vs. 90: 
W = 0.0, p = 1.000; 89 vs.103 W= 23.0, p = 0.393; 89 vs. 113 W = 12.0, p =  0.278; 90 
vs. 103 W= 33.5, p= 0.052; 90 vs. 113 W = 34.5, p = 0.052; 103 vs. 113 W = 15.5, p= 
0.519) (Figure 5).  The improvement for LU actions  (median (95% C.I.) 89 days = 4 
(3.00 - 6.90); 90 days = 6 (3.30 - 7.90); 103 days = 4 (3.00 - 5.80);113 days = 2 (2.00 - 
4.00)) is not confirmed by post-hoc tests that do not show any significant differences 
between the single sessions (χ2(3) = 9.2093, p = 0.02663; post-hoc tests: 89 v. 90    W = 
0.0, p = 1.000; 89 v. 103 W =  4.0, p = 0.474; 89 v. 113 W = 15.0, p = 0.094; 90 v. 103 W 
= 6.0, p = 0.174; 90 v. 113 W = 15.0, p = 0.094; 103 v. 113 W = 8.5, p = 0.202). BP (89 
days = 5.00 (4.00 - 7.70); 90 days = 7.00 (6.10 - 8.00); 103 days = 5.00 (2.20 - 7.70);113 
days = 4.00 (4.00 - 5.90) and RU data (89 days = 10.00 (8.20 - 10.00); 90 days = 10.00 
(8.00 - 10.00);103 days = 10.00 (8.20 - 10.00);113 days = 8.00 (8.00 - 10.00)) do not 
reach the statistical significance (χ2(3) = 6.5745, p = 0.087 and χ2(3) = 2.5385, p = 0.468 
respectively. 
 
